Higgs v. U.S. Park Police
| Decision Date | 25 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2:16-cv-96-JMS-MJD |
| Parties | DUSTIN JOHN HIGGS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Dustin Higgs filed this suit against Defendant U.S. Park Police (the "Park Police") pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), asking this Court to review whether the Park Police complied with FOIA in response to Mr. Higgs' request for all documents in the agency's possession related to a triple homicide that occurred in 1996. [Filing No. 1.] Presently pending before the Court is Mr. Higgs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. [Filing No. 64.] In addition, given the unique procedural background of this case,1 the Court will treat the ParkPolice's filing entitled "Reply In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" as a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Filing No. 71.]
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2016). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome-determinative. Montgomery v. American Airlines Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union 150, AFL-CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
II.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case involves Mr. Higgs' conviction for three counts of first degree murder that were committed at the Patuxent National Wildlife Refuge in Prince George's County, Maryland in 1996. Both parties acknowledge that the identity of a FOIA requestor is not relevant to an analysis of the propriety of an agency's response to a FOIA request. [Filing No. 38 at 8.] As such, the Court will refrain from setting forth a more detailed recitation of Mr. Higgs' various attempts to appeal his conviction, except to note that Mr. Higgs was sentenced to death and is currently incarcerated on federal death row at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
The facts of this case are not in dispute, and they begin on or about January 5, 2012, when Jessica Johnson, an investigator from the Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, submitted a FOIA request (the "2012 Request") to William Line at the National Park Service. [Filing No. 1-1.] The 2012 FOIA Request referenced case #96-002243, described as "[t]riple homicides on route 197 in Patuxent Research Refuge on January 27, 1996," and requested that the Park Police furnish:
a complete copy of everything pertaining to the above referenced matter including by way of illustration only and not limitation: files, transcripts, documents, notes, bench notes, worksheets, chain of custody forms, memorandums, reports, interviews, pictures/photographs, drawings, tests, test results, diagrams, tape recording(s), and any and all other information related to this case.
Upon receipt of the 2012 Request, the Park Police emailed it to the Park Police's Criminal Investigation Branch ("CIB"), which began its search. [Filing No. 36-1 at 2.] By January 17, 2012, CIB had identified nine boxes of documents that it deemed responsive to the 2012 Request, including interviews, mug shots, investigative reports, photographs, and newspaper clippings. [Filing No. 1-1 at 2-3.] On February 7, 2012, the Park Police sent Ms. Johnson a letter estimating that it would "cost a total of $11,026.00 to process" the 2012 Request, giving remittance information for the payment, and indicating that the Park Police would not proceed further without receipt of the advance payment. [Filing No. 1-2 at 1-2.]
On May 12, 2012, Aren Adjoian, acting on behalf of Mr. Higgs, appealed the Park Police's calculation of the fee required to fulfill the 2012 Request. [Filing No. 1-6.] The following month, the appeal was granted, [Filing No. 1-7], and the Community Defender Office remitted $910.00 to the Park Police, [Filing No. 1-8.] On August 23, 2012, the Park Police again began to process records that it deemed responsive to the 2012 Request, [Filing No. 36-1 at 3].
Over a year later, on November 7, 2013, the Park Police sent Mr. Higgs a response which stated that documents responsive to the 2012 Request could not be released pursuant to 3 FOIA exemptions: 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); and 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C). [Filing No. 1-10 at 2.] On December 6, 2013, Mr. Higgs appealed the Park Police's November 7, 2013 Final Response. [Filing No. 1-11.] On September 17, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior remanded the matter to the Park Police due to "procedural deficiencies," finding that the Park Police did not actually review documents that were responsive to the 2012 Request. [Filing No. 1-13 at 1-6.]
On February 15, 2015, the Park Police informed Mr. Higgs that it had determined that an enforcement proceeding remained pending due to Mr. Higgs' appeal of his criminal conviction.[Filing No. 1-15.] On March 11, 2015, Mr. Higgs sent a letter to the Park Police alleging that the Park Police's handling of the matter "has been characterized by extensive delay and numerous errors," and contending that the Park Police's conclusion regarding enforcement proceedings was in error because Mr. Higgs' "conviction became final in 2004, when his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied on direct appeal." [Filing No. 1-18.]
On March 16, 2016, Mr. Higgs filed suit in this matter, alleging that the Park Police had wrongfully withheld documents to which Mr. Higgs has a legal right and that the Park Police had no legal basis under FOIA for doing so. [Filing No. 1.] Mr. Higgs alleged that the Park Police never responded to his March 11, 2015 letter. [Filing No. 1 at 8.]
On May 12, 2016, the Park Police responded to Mr. Higgs' March 11, 2015 letter, informing him that the Park Police had located 9 boxes of materials responsive to the 2012 Request, and had referred 46 groups of documents to other federal agencies. [Filing No. 16-1.] In addition, the Park Police released approximately 330 pages of responsive documents to Mr. Higgs and informed him that it would "process the remaining responsive records in a series of 'rolling responses.'" [Filing No. 16-1 at 5.] Accordingly, this Court stayed the case pending the production of additional documents. [Filing No. 17.]
By August 18, 2016, Mr. Higgs informed the Court that the "agency with the largest volume of records - the FBI - has asserted a blanket exemption to the production of any records." [Filing No. 20 at 1.]
Throughout the remainder of 2016 and into 2017, the Park Police continued to work with other federal agencies in reviewing documents in those agencies' possession that are responsive to the 2012 Request. [Filing No. 21; Filing No. 25; Filing No. 27.]
On April 6, 2017, Mr. Higgs filed a Memorandum of Law, indicating that the "only issue that remains in this litigation is whether the referrals made by [the Park Police] regarding documents generated by...
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