Highgate Associates, Ltd. v. Merryfield
Decision Date | 23 August 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-032,90-032 |
Citation | 157 Vt. 313,597 A.2d 1280 |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Parties | HIGHGATE ASSOCIATES, LTD. v. Lorna MERRYFIELD. |
George K. Belcher and Eric G. Parker, Barre, for plaintiff-appellant.
John J. McCullough, III, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
Plaintiff, Highgate Associates, Ltd., the owner of a federally subsidized housing project in Barre, appeals the trial court's ruling that the late charge provision contained in its lease agreements is void as an unenforceable penalty. We affirm.
Defendant, Lorna Merryfield, occupied an apartment in the project beginning in January of 1986. The lease contained the following provision:
If the Tenant does not pay the full amount of the rent by the end of the 5th day of the month, the Owner may collect a fee of $5.00 on the 6th day of the month, the Owner may collect a fee of $1.00 for each additional day the rent remains unpaid during the month it is due. The owner may not terminate this Agreement for failure to pay rent charges, but may terminate this Agreement for non-payment of rent.... The charges herein discussed are liquidated damages, are not to be considered charges for the use or forbearance of money, are in addition to the regular monthly rent payable and are being incurred to cover administration costs caused by late rent payments.
Defendant was not a model tenant; her rent payments were late on numerous occasions, and by the time she had vacated her apartment in July of 1988, she had accrued late charges of $397. Plaintiff brought this action to recover unpaid rent, damages to the apartment, and the late charges. After an expedited hearing, the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff on the unpaid rent and on part of the claimed damages. The court denied recovery on the late charges. On appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the late payment provision was void as an illegal penalty.
We begin by emphasizing our limited standard of review in this matter. The trial court's findings of fact must stand unless they are clearly erroneous, viewing the supporting evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and excluding the effect of modifying evidence. Lawrence v. Pelletier, 154 Vt. 29, 33, 572 A.2d 936, 939 (1990). A finding will not be disturbed merely because it is contradicted by substantial evidence; rather, an appellant must show there is no credible evidence to support the finding. See Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 564, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (1990). Where the trial court has applied the proper legal standard, we will uphold its conclusions of law if reasonably supported by its findings. Goodrich v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 152 Vt. 590, 596, 568 A.2d 385, 389 (1989).
The ultimate test for the validity of a liquidated damages clause is whether the clause is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis.2d 518, 525, 331 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1983). We recently articulated three factors that should be considered in determining whether a contract provision is a reasonable liquidated damages clause rather than an unlawful penalty:
[A] liquidated damages clause must meet three criteria to be upheld: (1) because of the nature or subject matter of the agreement, damages arising from a breach would be difficult to calculate accurately; (2) the sum fixed as liquidated damages must reflect a reasonable estimate of likely damages; and (3) the provision must be intended solely to compensate the nonbreaching party and not as a penalty for breach or as an incentive to perform.
New England Educational Training Service, Inc. v. Silver Street Partnership, 156 Vt. 604, ----, 595 A.2d 1341, 1346 (1991). These factors are not exclusive or necessarily conclusive. They do, however, provide a framework for the trial court's determination of whether a particular clause is reasonable. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis.2d 349, 361, 377 N.W.2d 593, 600 (1985).
While final determination of whether a liquidated damages provision is reasonable is a legal question for the trial court, evaluation of the three factors underlying that determination requires resolution of factual issues. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 2 Conn.App. 279, 281, 477 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1984) () ; Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas B. Hartley Constr. Co., 258 Ga. 808, 809, 375 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1989) ( ); Illingworth v. Bushong, 297 Or. 675, 694, 688 P.2d 379, 390 (1984) ( ). Accordingly, we give some deference to the trial court's final determination. Wassenaar, 111 Wis.2d at 525, 331 N.W.2d at 361 ().
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial court's findings on the three criteria were not clearly erroneous, and that its conclusion that the lease provision was an unenforceable penalty was supported by these findings.
The first factor concerns the difficulty of calculating or proving the damages that might follow from a breach. See Borley v. McDonald, 69 Vt. 309, 313, 38 A. 60, 61 (1897) ( ). The record contains extensive evidence bearing on this factor. It shows that plaintiff's employees had considerable experience in handling late rent payments. Plaintiff's office manager and managing agent testified that they followed an established routine when a rent payment was more than five days late. Based on this evidence, the court found that the total cost to plaintiff in responding to a late-paying tenant, including both labor and administrative costs, is approximately ten dollars per month and does not depend on the amount of rent outstanding. Although plaintiff's managing agent testified that "costs are greatly increased if the rents are not in on a timely fashion," there was no evidence that plaintiff's expenses had ever exceeded ten dollars per month.
On the basis of the above evidence and findings, the court found that plaintiff's damages in case of breach were readily ascertainable. Although plaintiff argues that this finding is erroneous, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support it. See Heikkila v. Carver, 378 N.W.2d 214, 217 (S.D.1985) ().
Plaintiff argues that the finding is incomplete because it failed to consider lost interest income on the belated funds (or the cost of money to plaintiff). We are unpersuaded. Interest income can be readily calculated based on current interest rates. 1 See 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1065 (1964); see also Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Supply Corp., 76 Cal.App.3d 896, 900, 143 Cal.Rptr. 306, 308 (1978) ( ).
Plaintiff also maintains that the amount of damages stipulated in the lease was reasonable because it could have included attorney's fees the landlord might pay as a result of tenant's failure to make timely rent payments. But attorney's fees are ordinarily unrecoverable in the absence of special legal authority or the parties' specific agreement to include this expense. See Myers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 146 Vt. 552, 558, 508 A.2d 689, 692 (1986). There is no such specific provision in this lease, in which the lateness fee was said to cover "administrative costs." We are unwilling to include in a reasonableness analysis attorney's fees which are neither recoverable as damages in the absence of a stipulation nor specifically provided for in the lease.
The evidence bearing on whether the damages are ascertainable is also relevant to the second factor, whether the stipulated charge was a reasonable forecast of likely damages. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis.2d at 363, 377 N.W.2d at 600 ( ). The uncontroverted evidence was that plaintiff's foreseeable damages do not exceed ten dollars per month. Even if we added interest to this calculation, as plaintiff argues, the...
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