Highland Ave. & B.R. Co. v. Swope

Decision Date25 May 1897
Citation115 Ala. 287,22 So. 174
CourtAlabama Supreme Court
PartiesHIGHLAND AVE. & BELT R. CO. v. SWOPE.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; Leroy F. Box, Judge.

Action by Matilda J. Swope against the Highland Avenue & Belt Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while a passenger on one of the trains being operated by the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company, with which train one of the trains of the defendant company collided, from the result of which collision the personal injuries were inflicted. The substance of the counts of the complaint as to which the court did not give the general affirmative charge for the defendants are sufficiently stated in the opinion. To these counts the defendant demurred upon the following ground: "(1) It is not alleged in said count that the train on the defendant's road was being operated by the defendant, or by the defendant's agent or servants. (2) It is not alleged in said count that the train on defendant's road was being operated by defendant, or under its authority. (3) That it is not averred that the track of defendant crossed the track of any other railroad at the point where the collision occurred. (4) It is not averred whom the track belonged to which was being used by the train of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company. (5) The said count shows no obligation or duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff, in the management of its train, which it violated. (6) Said count shows no duty or obligation on the part of the defendant to plaintiff, in the management of its train, which it violated. (7) Said count does not allege any negligence for which this defendant is chargeable. (8) By said count it is attempted to allege the negligence in the alternative. (9) That by said count defendant is not informed whether the alleged negligence was in the management or running of the train. (10) There are no facts alleged which show any negligence for which defendant is chargeable. (11) It is not averred that the whistle was not blown or the bell was not rung at short intervals while running. (12) It is not shown how or in what manner the failure to blow the whistle or ring the bell was the direct or proximate cause of the injury complained of, or contributed thereto. (13) It is not averred that the defendant had any right or authority to authorize or permit the train of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company to use or occupy the track upon which the train on which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the alleged injuries then was." To the eighth and eleventh counts the defendant separately demurred upon the following grounds: "It is not alleged or shown in said counts that the person or persons in charge of the train on defendant's track after discovering the peril of the train in which plaintiff was riding, could, by the use of any efforts, have stopped the train on defendant's track in time to prevent the collision, or injury to plaintiff." To the sixth and tenth counts the defendant separately demurred upon the following grounds: "(1) That in and by said several counts it is alleged in the alternative that the negligence of the defendant's employés in failing to give signals prevented the train from avoiding the collision, or prevented the plaintiff from escaping the danger, and it is not averred which result would have followed the giving of such signals." Each of these separate demurrers was overruled. The defendant then interposed several pleas. The first was the plea of the general issue. In the second and third pleas the defendant alleged that the train which caused the injury complained of was operated without its knowledge or consent, and was not operated by any of the servants or agents of the defendant, or by its authority. The other pleas were as follows: "(5) For further answer to the complaint, defendant says that it was at the time of the alleged injuries the owner of the track on which the car of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company on which plaintiff was riding was moving, and defendant avers that the persons in charge of the train which it is alleged caused said injuries, but who were operating the same without the knowledge or consent of this defendant, before they saw or could have seen the said car, and before they knew or could have known that a collision was probable, had used all the means in their power to stop said train, and continued to use the same after they discovered said car on the track, but notwithstanding such efforts on their part the said train could not be stopped in time to prevent the collision, and after discovering said car on the track there was not sufficient time in which to give any signals which would have prevented the collision and injury. (6) For further answer to the complaint, defendant says that it was at the time of the alleged injury the owner of the track on which the car of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company on which plaintiff was riding was moving; and defendant avers that the persons in charge of said train which it is alleged caused said injuries, before they saw or could have seen the said car, and before they knew or could have known that a collision was probable, had used all the means in their power to stop said train, and continued the use of the same after they discovered said car on the tract, but notwithstanding such efforts on their part the said train could not be stopped in time to prevent the collision and after discovering said car on the track there was not sufficient time in which to give signals which would have prevented the collision and injury. (7) For further answer to the complaint, defendant says that the train of cars on defendant's railroad was equipped with brakes of approved pattern, and other appliances for stopping and checking the speed thereof; and the defendant avers that the said brakes and appliances were on said day tested, and were found sufficient to check the speed and stop said train, and a few minutes before the happening of the alleged collision said brakes had been successfully applied for stopping the said train at the corner of Twenty-Second street and Avenue E, a point about five hundred yards from the point of collision; that as the train was crossing the bridge on Twenty-Second street, and before the engineer in charge of the engine, or the fireman, saw or could have seen the train on which plaintiff was riding, the engineer applied the brakes for the purpose of checking the speed of the train as it approached First avenue, and then discovered that there was some defect therein, and they would not work, and the engineer then reversed the engine and applied steam, and used all efforts to check the speed of the train, and continued to use such efforts after he discovered the car on the track; but notwithstanding such efforts the engineer was unable to stop said train, and it moved or slided on the rails down to the point where the train on which plaintiff was riding was, and which was on the track of defendant, and collided therewith, without fault on the part of this defendant, its agents or servants; and, after discovering the car on the track, there was not sufficient time in which to have given signals which would have prevented the collision and injury. (8) For further answer to the complaint, defendant says that it was at the time of the alleged injuries the owner of the track on which the car of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company on which plaintiff was riding was moving, and that the track on which the train was moving, which it is alleged caused the injuries and collision, crosses its other track on which the train was moving on which plaintiff was riding on First avenue at Twenty-Second street; and defendant avers that it had the right of priority in the use of both of said tracks over the train of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company, and that the agents and servants of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company were required to keep out of the way of defendant's trains; and defendant avers that the said point where the said collision occurred was not a crossing of the tracks of the two railroads, but was a crossing of one track of defendant's over another, and the use of the track of defendant by the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company was subordinate and subject to the use of the same by the defendant; and defendant avers that the persons who were operating the train on its track, before they saw or could have seen the car on which plaintiff was riding, and before they knew or could have known that a collision was probable had used all the means in their power to stop the train on defendant's tracks, and continued to use the same after they discovered the car on the track, but notwithstanding such efforts on their part the said train could not be stopped in time to prevent the collision and injury. (9) For further answer to the complaint defendant says that the train of cars on defendant's railroad which collided with the train on which plaintiff was riding was approaching First avenue across the bridge on Twenty-Second street in such a manner and at such a rate of speed that it could, under ordinary circumstances, and with the appliances with which it was equipped, be stopped before reaching the track upon which the train on which the plaintiff was riding then was; and defendant avers that the said appliances had been, a short time before said collision tested, and found to be in perfect condition, but that when said train was about to leave said Twenty-Second street bridge the engineer on said train put in operation said appliances in ample time, under ordinary circumstances, to stop said train before reaching...

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7 cases
  • Winn v. Kansas City Belt Railway Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1912
    ...contributed to cause him to fall from the train. Hutchison on Carriers, Sec. 593; 1 Thompson Com. Law Neg., Secs. 206, 7, 8; Railroad v. Swope, 115 Ala. 287; Moore's Case, 38 S.C. 1; Railroad v. Gants, Kan. 608; Hall v. Railroad, 15 F. 7. (d) The charge of negligence in the petition was a j......
  • Randell v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co.
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • June 8, 1903
    ... ... Thompson Com. Law of Negligence, secs. 207-8; Railroad v ... Swope, 115 Ala. 287; Railway v. Gants, 38 Kan ... 608; 3 Elliott on ... ...
  • Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Drennen
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 3, 1911
    ... ... 160, 15 So ... 511, 49 Am. St. Rep. 21; Swope's Case, 115 Ala. 287, 22 ... So. 174; Burgess' Case, 116 Ala. 509, 22 So ... R. Co. v. Webb, ... 97 Ala. 308, 12 So. 374; Highland Avenue & Belt R. Co. v ... Sampson, 91 Ala. 560, 8 So. 778 ... ...
  • Shepard v. Louisville & N.R. Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 15, 1917
    ... ... Case, 103 Ala. 160, 15 So. 511, 49 Am.St.Rep. 21; Swope's ... Case, 115 Ala. 287, 22 So. 174; Burgess' Case, 116 Ala ... 509, ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • Exploring Wantonness
    • United States
    • Alabama State Bar Alabama Lawyer No. 74-1, January 2013
    • Invalid date
    ...in skill, or erred in judgment, or what mere inadvertence or negligence may have caused him to do." Highland Ave. & B.R. Co. v. Swope, 115 Ala. 287, 22 So. 174, 180 (1897). Hence, in a case where a traffic light changed from green to red as a driver approached an intersection, and the drive......

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