Highland Ave. & Belt R. Co. v. Burt

• Decision Date: 08 June 1891
• Citation: 92 Ala. 291,9 So. 410
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: HIGHLAND AVE. & BELT R. CO. v. BURT.

9 So. 410

92 Ala. 291

HIGHLAND AVE. & BELT R. CO. v. BURT.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 8, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

This action was brought by the appellee, Margaret A. Burt, against the appellant corporation, and sought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained on account of the negligence of the defendant's employees. The testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that she boarded one of the defendant's dummy trains in Birmingham; that upon paying her fare she told the conductor that she wanted to get off at St. John's Church, and to put her off at that place, to which he nodded his consent; that when the cars arrived at St. John's Church they stopped, and several passengers got off; that plaintiff arose from her seat in the car as soon as it had stopped; that while she was alighting therefrom the cars, in response to a signal from the conductor, started off with a jerk, throwing her to the ground, causing the injuries complained of in this action. The plaintiff testified that she arose from her seat in the car, and proceeded to alight as quickly as possible, and without delay. The testimony for the defendant tended to show that its said train stopped at St. John's Church a reasonable length of time to enable the passengers to alight therefrom; that several did alight from said train at that point, and were assisted by the conductor of the train; that before the conductor signaled to the engineer of said train he looked to see if there was any one else who wished to get off, and, seeing no one, he signaled the engineer to start. The evidence was that the plaintiff got off the car on the opposite side from which the other passengers alighted. Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the court charged the jury as follows: "That it was the duty of defendant, on reaching the stopping place at St. John's Church, to stop the dummy a reasonable length of time for plaintiff to alight, and the plaintiff's duty, when it stopped, to alight with reasonable diligence; that when it stopped, if the conductor went to the car in which plaintiff was, to help the passengers off, and if during such reasonable time given for passengers to alight plaintiff was up and in the act of alighting, it was the duty of the conductor to know it, and not start the train while she was in the act of alighting that if the train stopped a reasonable length of time for the plaintiff to alight, and at the expiration of such time she was still in her seat, and not in the act of getting off then the conductor had the right to turn his attention away from the car to the engineer, and to signal the engineer to go ahead, and if thereafter plaintiff arose, and attempted to alight, and fell, the defendant is not liable, unless the conductor or engineer actually knew she was trying to get off, and, so knowing it, could, by the exercise of reasonable care, have prevented her fall." The defendant requested the court to give the following written charges, and separately excepted to the refusal to give each of them as asked: (1) "That, if the train stopped a sufficient time to allow the plaintiff to get off, then the defendant was not guilty of negligence in its management." (2) "That if the jury believe that the car stopped at St. John's Church a sufficient time for plaintiff to alight, and the conductor, without knowing of the intention of plaintiff to alight there, and without knowing or seeing that she was in the act of alighting, started the train, then the defendant would not be guilty of negligence, and plaintiff would not be entitled to recover." (3) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the train came to a full stop at the place where the plaintiff wished to alight, and remained there long enough for two ladies in another seat of the car to alight therefrom safely, then, on the undisputed evidence, as to the character and construction of the car in which plaintiff was riding, this was a reasonable time for the car to stop for the plaintiff to alight." (4) "That if the jury believe from the evidence that the train of the defendant was stopped at St. John's Church for a reasonable time for plaintiff to have alighted from the car, then after this time the conductor was not required to be on the lookout for the plaintiff to alight." (5) "That, under the evidence in this case, the train stopped at St. John's Church a reasonable time for plaintiff to alight." There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings this appeal, and assigns as error the refusal of the court to give...