Highland Renovation Corp. v. Hanover Insurance Group

• Decision Date: 01 June 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-1902 (RWR).
• Citation: 620 F.Supp.2d 79
• Parties: HIGHLAND RENOVATION CORP., Plaintiff, v. HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Page 79

620 F.Supp.2d 79

HIGHLAND RENOVATION CORP., Plaintiff, v. HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07-1902 (RWR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 1, 2009.

Dawn C. Stewart, Stewart & Henry, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD W. ROBERTS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gordon P. Peyton, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Highland Renovation Corp. ("Highland") brings this action against surety bond issuer Hanover Insurance Group ("Hanover") under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3133, for $329,183.03 that is allegedly owed to Highland by the Military Personnel Services Corporation ("MPSC") for work Highland engaged in to renovate the Old Post Office Pavilion in Washington D.C. Hanover moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a report recommending granting Hanover's motion, concluding that this court lacked jurisdiction because Highland did not file suit within the one-year limitation period set forth in 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(4). Highland objects to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Because Hanover's motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment, and there is no genuine dispute about material facts that show that Highland filed this action outside of the limitation period, judgment will be entered for Hanover.

BACKGROUND

In 2004, the General Services Administration ("GSA") entered into three contracts with the MPSC to renovate the Old Post Office Pavilion in Washington D.C. — Contract 166 for $401,452; Contract 212 for $902,650; and Contract 221 for $326,926 (collectively "the contracts"). (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7.) In June 2006, the MPSC entered into a contract with Highland that called for Highland to perform the renovation work at the Old Post Office Pavilion that MPSC was obligated to complete under its contracts with the GSA. (Id. ¶ 6.) Hanover issued payment bonds for each contract. (Id. ¶ 7.) Highland alleges that the MPSC failed to pay Highland $329,183.03 for work it completed on the Old Post Office Pavilion project, and brings this action against Hanover, MPSC's surety. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.)

Hanover moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss, arguing that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Hanover asserted that the last labor performed and the last material supplied on the contracts was in July 2006, more than the Miller Act's one-year limitation period before this lawsuit was filed on October 22, 2007. Hanover has provided an affidavit from the Vice President of MPSC who administered the contracts stating that the last work performed that was central to Contract 212 was performed in June 2006, and that the last work performed on Contracts 221 and 166 was performed in July 2006. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), Ex. 4, Aff. of Rob Johnston ("Johnston Aff.") at 1-2.) Accompanying the affidavit were copies of invoices on Contracts 212 and 221 reflecting work performed on those contracts no later than July 2006, as well as a certified copy of Highland's payroll for the period between May 5, 2006 and August 25, 2006, showing that the latest work on Contract 166 was done on July 28, 2006. Highland opposed by providing copies of punch lists showing work that Highland says it performed under the contracts between July 2006 and January 7, 2007. (See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n").)

Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a report recommending that Hanover's motion to dismiss be granted because Highland filed its complaint more than one year after the day on which it performed its last labor or supplied its final material. Hanover objects to Magistrate Judge Facciola's recommendation, citing as error the conclusion that the work performed after the end-dates mentioned in Johnston's affidavit was remedial work and not original contract work.

DISCUSSION

A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is reviewed de novo. LCvR 72.3(c); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Ames v. Yellow Cab of D.C., Inc., Civil Action No. 00-3116(RWR), 2006 WL 2711546, at *4 (D.D.C. September 21, 2006). "Before a court may address the merits of a complaint, it must assure that it has jurisdiction to entertain the claims." Osseiran v. Int'l Fin. Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 139, 143 (D.D.C.2007) (quoting Rodriguez v. Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Civil Action No. 03-120(RWR), 2005 WL 736526, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2005)). When assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may consider any undisputed facts in the record, or "the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Coalition for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992)).

Cases in this and other jurisdictions have held that the one-year limitations period in the Miller Act forms an integral part of the statute and is jurisdictional in character. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Corbett Tech. Solutions v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 238 F.Supp.2d 168, 171 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing United States ex rel. Lank Woodwork Co. v. CSH Contractors, Inc., 452 F.Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C.1978)); United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard, 504 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1974) ("As an integral part of the statute creating the remedy, the one year limitation in [the Miller Act] is jurisdictional."); Diversified Carting, Inc. v. City of New York, Civ. Action No. 04-9507, 2006 WL 147584, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. January 20, 2006) ("[T]he Miller Act limitations period is jurisdictional[.]"); United States v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 339 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (W.D.Tex. 2004) ("[T]he one-year filing requirement [is] a jurisdictional limitation[.]").

However, the D.C. Circuit, describing limitation periods as being substantive restrictions on claims rather than impediments to jurisdiction, has stated that "[s]tatutes of limitations create affirmative defenses" which are properly raised in "a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) [to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted], not a motion under Rule 12(b)(1)" to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gordon v. Nat'l Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360 (D.C.Cir.1982). Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a rebuttable presumption that statutes of limitations in suits against private parties can be equitably tolled.¹ Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). More recently, the Court has even said that "in recent decisions, we have clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, are not properly typed `jurisdictional.' . . . We have described . . . unrefined dispositions [on jurisdictional grounds] as `drive-by jurisdictional rulings' that should be `accorded no precedential effect' on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Indeed, other courts have ruled that the Miller Act's one-year limitations period is not accurately described as jurisdictional, but instead is a condition precedent to bringing an action under the Miller Act that a plaintiff must satisfy. See, e.g., United States ex rel. PRN Associates, Inc. v. K & S Enter. Inc., Civ. Action No. 04-470 2007 WL 925267, at *4 (S.D.Ind. March 27, 2007) ("Defendants did not waive the timeliness issue by failing to plead in their answer an affirmative defense under the statute of limitations. . . . [T]he one-year time limit under the Miller Act [is] a condition precedent to suit, so that the burden is on the plaintiff to plead and prove compliance with the time limit[.]"); United States ex rel. Automatic Elevator Co. v. Lori Construction, 912 F.Supp. 398, 399 (N.D.Ill.1996) ("[T]he bulk of the cases — particularly the more recent authority — view the one-year restriction on suit as a limitations period instead [of a jurisdictional limitation], with the possibility that failure to meet that timetable may be excused under the principles of equitable tolling and the like[.]"); United States ex rel. American Bank v. C.I.T. Constr., Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 256-257 (5th Cir.1991) ("[O]ur use of the word `jurisdictional' [in previous cases] referred `to the conditional nature of the right to sue' under the Miller Act, not to the `jurisdiction of the court itself.' . . . The one-year period in the Miller Act is limitational, not jurisdictional."); United States v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 813 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir.1987) ("It is not surprising, therefore, that a majority of the Circuit Courts, in construing the Miller Act's provisions, have followed the lead of the Heard Act courts and treated the one-year requirement as a substantive limitation of the rights conferred by the Act. . . . However, to the extent that the word `jurisdictional' is used in those cases, it refers to the conditional nature of the right to sue, not to the jurisdiction of the court itself.").

The more sound position appears to be, then, that the one-year period of limitations found in the Miller Act is substantive, not jurisdictional, and thus is an affirmative defense that must be analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6) instead of Rule 12(b)(1), and be subject to the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.² Felter, 412 F.Supp.2d at 122. Thus, the motion to dismiss will be viewed at this stage as one brought under Rule 12(b)(6).

When "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court" on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment[.]" Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(d). In particular, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) asserting a statute of limitations bar, where both parties submit material outside the pleadings and "the parties are not taken by surprise or deprived of a...