Highsmith v. Sec'y
Decision Date | 23 September 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-619-J-34JRK |
Parties | NICHOLAS M. HIGHSMITH, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Nicholas M. Highsmith, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on May 28, 2013, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the Petition, Highsmith challenges a 2011 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for aggravated battery. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 10) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On November 12, 2013, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 7), admonishing Highsmith regarding his obligations and giving Highsmith a time frame in which to submit a reply. Highsmith submitted a brief in reply. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Answer to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reply; Doc. 12). This case is ripe for review.
On April 5, 2011, the State of Florida, in Case No. 2010-CF-7868, charged Highsmith with attempted first degree felony murder (count one), sexual battery (count two), robbery (count three) and aggravated battery (count four). Resp. Ex. C at 26, Amended Information. In April 2011, Highsmith proceeded to trial, see Resp. Ex. D, Transcript of the Jury Trial (Tr.), at the conclusion of which, on April 14, 2011, a jury found him not guilty on counts one and two, and guilty of theft, a lesser-included offense of robbery (count three), and aggravated battery (count four), as charged. Id. at 476; Resp. Ex. 30-33, Verdicts. On May 11, 2011, the court sentenced Highsmith to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years on count four, and a term of imprisonment of sixty days on count three. Id. at 282-87, Judgment.
On direct appeal, Highsmith, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to establish that Highsmith was the person who committed the aggravated battery; the victim did not testify at trial; and the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence establishedcontact between Highsmith and the victim, but did not prove that Highsmith beat the victim. Resp. Ex. F. The State filed an answer brief, see Resp. Ex. G, and Highsmith filed a reply brief, see Resp. Ex. H. On July 11, 2012, the appellate court affirmed Highsmith's conviction per curiam, see Highsmith v. State, 91 So.3d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. I, and the mandate issued on July 27, 2012, see Resp. Ex. J.
The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 13-15053, 2016 WL 4474677, at *14 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of thiscase are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Highsmith's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Court will analyze Highsmith's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Section 2254(d) states:
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As the United States Supreme Court stated, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burtv. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). This standard of review is described as follows:
Taylor v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 760 F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2323 (2015); see also Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1230 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2126 (2015).
For a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's determination will be entitled to deference for purposes of federal habeas corpusreview under AEDPA, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that explains the state court's rationale for such a ruling. Hittson, 759 F.3d at 1232 (); see Richter, 562 U.S. at 100 ( ). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit instructed:
Under section 2254(d), a federal court reviewing the judgment of a state court must first identify the last adjudication on the merits. It does not matter whether that adjudication provided a reasoned opinion because section 2254(d) "refers only to 'a decision'" and does not "requir[e] a statement of reasons." Id. at 98, 131 S.Ct. 770.[1] The federal court then must review that...
To continue reading
Request your trial