Hightower v. Family Health Care Clinic, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:19-CV-934-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | DR. PHYLLIS HIGHTOWER PLAINTIFF v. FAMILY HEALTH CARE CLINIC, INC. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Dr Phyllis Hightower sued her former employer, Defendant Family Health Care Clinic, Inc. (“FHCC”), alleging discrimination based on her race, sex, and disability. Specifically, she asserts claims for disparate compensation failure to promote, hostile work environment, and wrongful termination. While there appears to have been much conflict at FHCC, Hightower has not shown that her race, sex, or disability motivated any employment actions. Notably, federal law “is not a general civility code for the American workplace.” Indest v. Freeman Decorating Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999). Having reviewed each claim, the Court finds that FHCC is entitled to summary judgment because Hightower's claims are unexhausted time-barred, or meritless.
FHCC is a health center serving underprivileged patients in three states. Def.'s Redacted Supp. Mem. [127] at 2; Compl. [1] ¶ 9. In October 2007, FHCC's CEO, Dr. Margaret Gray (Black female), hired Hightower, a Black female pediatrician, to work at FHCC's clinic in Rankin County, Mississippi. Hightower Contract [126-3] at 1-2, 8. The clinic has a diverse staff because, over the years, Gray had hired doctors identified as Black, White, and Asian.
Though Gray and Hightower are the same race and sex, Hightower says Gray repeatedly discriminated against her based on Hightower's race and sex. For starters, Hightower claims that Gray paid her a lower wage than male and non-Black pediatricians. She also asserts that Gray failed to promote her to chief medical officer (“CMO”) because of Hightower's race and sex, though Gray successively filled that position with two Black doctors (one male, one female).
On August 26, 2016, Hightower was hospitalized for symptoms related to her polymyositis. Hightower Dep. [133-16] at 76-77. She subsequently took FMLA leave. Hightower Aff. [157] ¶ 91. While on leave, Hightower received several calls from FHCC personnel asking when she would return. Id. ¶ 92. She also visited the clinic one day, and Gray made an inappropriate comment regarding her weight. Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs. [126-36] at 26. Hightower claims that Gray's weight-related statement and the calls asking when she would return constitute disability harassment.
Hightower also believes Gray harassed her and eventually terminated her employment due to Hightower's race, sex, and disability. There is no material dispute that Hightower clashed with doctors and nurses before her medical leave, prompting warnings from Gray. That pattern continued after Hightower's October 15, 2016 return from medical leave, starting when two nurses complained to management that Hightower had been rude or was undermining their work; another doctor reported that the nurses had been crying. See Gray Aff. [133] ¶¶ 27-28. Hightower also had two conflicts during this time with Dr. EE, [1] prompting FHCC investigations. See Id. ¶¶ 29, 30. The second investigation concluded when Gray “terminated [Hightower's] employment due to the ongoing conflicts chronically created by Dr. Hightower in the clinic.” Id. ¶ 32; see also Termination Letter [159-10].
On May 25, 2017, Hightower filed an EEOC charge; she received a right-to-sue letter on September 24, 2019. See EEOC Charge [157-46]; Right to Sue Letter [1-1]. On December 20, 2019, Hightower filed this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112. She asserted the following claims: Count I, race-based discrimination in compensation and promotion under Title VII; Count II, sex-based discrimination in compensation and promotion under Title VII; Count III, hostile work environment under Title VII (); Count IV, race discrimination in compensation and terms of employment under § 1981; and Count V, disability discrimination resulting in harassment and termination from employment. The issues have been fully briefed, and the Court has both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case[] and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion[] and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). It must “interpret all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016); accord Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014). But conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)); accord Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Moreover, under Rule 56(c)(1)(A), a party asserting that a fact “is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” “The court has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, “the party opposing the summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely how this evidence supports his claim.” RSR Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Here, the Court has endeavored to consider the whole record, but it is immense, and the parties frequently offer no cites or cite entire documents, including lengthy depositions.
Hightower says FHCC violated Title VII, § 1981, and the ADA. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” as to an employee's “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits many forms of race-based employment discrimination. See Bobo v. ITT, Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342-45 (5th Cir. 1981). And the ADA, as its name suggests, prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
Before addressing the merits, the parties dispute whether Hightower properly exhausted the Title VII and ADA claims and further dispute whether the failure-to-promote, hostile-work-environment, and compensation claims are time barred. This Order follows that same outline.
Title VII and ADA claims must be exhausted through charges filed with the EEOC, as those statutory schemes demand that the agency's “investigatory and conciliatory procedures” are given a chance to yield “non-judicial resolution[s].” Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Patton v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017)). A charge must be brought within 180 days of “the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)) ( that § 2000e-5 applies to the ADA).
Such a charge will exhaust “any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation [sic] during the pendency of the case before the Commission.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (citation omitted); accord McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008). “[T]he ‘scope' of the judicial complaint is limited to the ‘scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466. Whether a claim falls within that scope requires a “fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the administrative charge, [] look[ing] slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label.” Jennings, 11 F.4th at 342 (quoting Patton, 874 F.3d at 443). See generally Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 891 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 2018).
There is no dispute Hightower filed an EEOC charge expressly complaining that males were paid more than her. EEOC Charge [126-35] at 1. But she also stated that FHCC “subjected [her] to different terms and conditions...
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