Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A.1:96CV3147-ODE.,Civ.A.1:96CV3147-ODE.
• Citation: 17 F.Supp.2d 1377
• Parties: Linda F. HILBURN, Plaintiff, v. MURATA ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA, INC. f/d/b/a Murata Erie North America, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

17 F.Supp.2d 1377

Linda F. HILBURN, Plaintiff, v. MURATA ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA, INC. f/d/b/a Murata Erie North America, Inc., Defendant.

No. Civ.A.1:96CV3147-ODE.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 16, 1998.

William Q. Bird, Karin L. Allen, William Q. Bird & Associates, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Stephen William Riddell, John Shiver Snelling, Troutman Sanders, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

ORINDA D. EVANS, District Judge.

This civil action, in which Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, is before the court on Defendant's opposed motion for summary judgment.¹

Defendant manufactures, distributes and sells electronic components used in consumer electronic products. Defendant maintains corporate headquarters in Smyrna, Georgia with its parent company and principal supplier in Japan. Most of Defendant's products are manufactured or processed at a large facility in State College, Pennsylvania; however, Defendant maintains a small processing facility in Rockmart, Georgia where it operates a production line which processes tiny ceramic chips by attaching a conductor wire that allows the chips to be installed in electronic board circuits. Plaintiff was hired to work as a machine operator for Murata Electronics North America, Inc. ("Defendant") in its Rockmart plant on February 28, 1976. At the time the following events occurred, Plaintiff was working as a Material Control Coordinator. Her responsibilities included receiving customer orders and monitoring inventory.

The facts are undisputed except as otherwise noted. On June 2, 1988 Plaintiff's son was diagnosed with brain stem Astrocytoma, a brain stem tumor. He received chemotherapy and radiation therapy. Several months later, Plaintiff's husband was diagnosed with Acute Pancreatitis and was forced to have a portion of his pancreas removed. As a result of medical treatments, Plaintiff's husband suffers from diabetes. Between June 2, 1988 and February 1989, Plaintiff was not at work for all or part of 100 days. In October 1989, Plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction. Plaintiff missed all or part of 38 days between October and December of 1989.

Defendant has an attendance policy and a general corporate policy which provided a limited number of paid sick days and the option for discretionary leaves of absence. The policy further provided that Defendant could discipline an employee with more than five absences during any six month period and to consider an employee's attendance record for the purposes of transfer, promotion and pay increases.² Plaintiff missed 14 days in 1990, 13 days in 1991, and 15 days in 1992, with a total of 180 days missed between 1988 and 1992. Plaintiff was not disciplined as a result of her absences.

Plaintiff returned to work and was able to perform her duties. No special accommodation was sought or was granted. Plaintiff states that her Doctor told her not to lift over ten pounds and "[t]hat's the only thing I've been told I can't do." [Hilburn Depo. at 56]. According to Plaintiff, her son now wears bilateral hearing aids as a result of some hearing loss, and he has some memory and learning problems.³ Plaintiff states that her son is not able to play contact sports or ride certain amusement park rides. Plaintiff states that her husband, a Captain in a police department, has a fifteen pound lifting restriction and cannot fight or be kicked. [Id. at 49].

On January 4, 1993, Plaintiff applied for a transfer to the position of Material Control Expediter at the Smyrna location. Plaintiff's Supervisor, Fred Smith, ("Smith") recommended Plaintiff for the job; however, Smith noted his concern over Plaintiff's attendance stating: "Illness and sickness to herself and family members have caused her to be out from her job." [Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment Exhibit E]. Taku Katayama [Katayama], the Smyrna supervisor in charge of hiring for the open position, never received Smith's recommendation. Katayama was approached by Bob Entrekin, Vice President for Human Resources, and was informed that Plaintiff "had attendance problems." [Katayama Depo at 21]. Katayama chose another woman for the position with a college degree. Defendant has stated that it did not promote Plaintiff because she did not have a college degree,⁴ that the individual selected had direct experience performing the jobs in question, and Plaintiff had a history of attendance problems.

On March 11, 1993, Plaintiff applied for a transfer to an open position in customer service at the Smyrna office. Smith again recommended Plaintiff for the position and he expressed his concerns over her attendance as well. Defendant hired another individual with a college degree.

Between 1992 and March 1993, Defendant instituted a corporate downsizing effort at the Rockmart facility as a result of a decrease in customer orders. On March 26, 1993, Plaintiff received official notice from Defendant that she was being placed on "layoff," in addition to three other non-production employees. Plaintiff's responsibilities were divided among three existing employees. As a result of this effort to reduce its force, Defendant laid off twenty-six (26) of the fifty-two (52) non-production employees.

After approximately two months, a temporary position in Defendant's Product Support Group became available. Plaintiff was issued a recall for this position on May 14, 1993.⁵ Plaintiff accepted and worked in the capacity of Literary Fulfillment Clerk in the production department from May 14 until June 24, 1993. In June 1993, while working in the temporary position, Plaintiff applied for a transfer to another open position as a Material Control Expediter at Defendant's Smyrna office. Plaintiff's supervisor at that time, Mary Akin, ("Akin") recommended Plaintiff for the position. Defendant hired another individual with a college degree for this position.

Plaintiff secured employment as a medical secretary for a trial period with the Floyd County Medical Center. On August 30, 1993, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on her sex and disability or her association with immediate family members with disabilities.

Plaintiff was later called about an open position in the Rockmart facility warehouse as a result of Defendant's layoff and recall policy. Plaintiff declined the position and the opportunity to interview.⁶ On January 10, 1994, Akin contacted Plaintiff about an open position in Defendant's Production Control Department as a Product coordinator. Plaintiff declined to interview for this position as well, because she had already secured full-time work at the Floyd County Medical Center. As a result of Plaintiff declining the interview, she waived her recall rights. Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter terminating her employment the following day.

Plaintiff received her Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on August 30, 1996, and commenced the instant action on November 27, 1996. Plaintiff contends that she was not promoted, laid off, and not rehired as a result of her disability and because of her association with individuals with disabilities, her son and husband, in violation of the ADA.

The court will grant summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is mandated against a party who, after adequate discovery, "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). While the evidence and factual inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1987), the non-moving party is required to do "more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

With respect to count one of Plaintiff's complaint, in enacting the ADA, Congress made it unlawful for a covered entity to discriminate "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), the term "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee...."

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she is disabled; 2) she is otherwise qualified for the position; and 3) she was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability. Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447-49 (11th Cir. 1996). In addition, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of the disability or considered the employee to be disabled. Id. at 448. A "qualified individual with a disability" is an "individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

In the ADA, Congress has defined "disability" as a(1) physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such...