Hile v. Jimmy Johns Highway 55, Golden Valley

• Decision Date: 09 October 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 12–1672 (SRN/TNL).
• Parties: Brian HILE, Plaintiff, v. JIMMY JOHNS HIGHWAY 55, GOLDEN VALLEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

899 F.Supp.2d 843

Brian HILE, Plaintiff,

v.JIMMY JOHNS HIGHWAY 55, GOLDEN VALLEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 12–1672 (SRN/TNL).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Oct. 9, 2012.

R. Daniel Rasmus, Rasmus Law Office, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Mark A. Greenman, Law Office of Mark A. Greenman, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.

Lindsey E. Middlecamp, Nell E. Mathews, Nancy L. Bostrom Vollertsen, Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD H. KYLE, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Brian Hile, who is deaf, alleges in this action that he was denied a job as a delivery driver at five Jimmy John's ¹ franchises (the Franchises) in the Twin Cities area on account of his disability. He has sued each of the Franchises, as well as franchisor Jimmy John's LLC (Jimmy John's), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. The Franchises now move to dismiss Hile's claims as untimely. For the reasons that follow, their Motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Hile has been a delivery driver for Domino's Pizza and Pizza Hut since 1992. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) In the later summer and fall of 2009, he sought to supplement his income by adding an extra job as a Jimmy John's delivery driver. ( Id. ¶ 4.) He applied for such a position at each of the Franchises, informing them that he was deaf and that he could perform the duties of the position with reasonable accommodation. Each Franchise turned him down, allegedly advising him that they could not hire him because he could not verbally communicate with customers. ( Id. ¶¶ 8–10, 13–15, 18–20, 23–25, 28–30.) Hile asserts, upon information and belief, that he was denied the positions because Jimmy John's has a policy of requiring that all of its delivery drivers have the ability to verbally communicate with customers. ( Id. ¶ 32.)

Hile commenced the instant action on July 11, 2012, asserting that the Franchises had violated the ADA and MHRA by denying him employment based on his disability. He also asserted that Jimmy John's had implemented an unlawful policy requiring delivery drivers to be able to verbally communicate with customers. The Complaint did not mention whether he had filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR).² Before any Defendant had appeared, Hile filed an Amended Complaint asserting the same claims as his initial Complaint but adding allegations regarding discrimination charges he claims to have filed. In particular, he alleged that on December 13, 2011, he filed charges of discrimination with the [MDHR] and the [EEOC], which purportedly alleged that several [Jimmy John's] stores in the Twin Cities metropolitan area, including [the Franchises], refused to hire him as a delivery driver because of his disability. ( Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.)

Yet, no charge dated December 13, 2011, is attached to the Amended Complaint. Rather, five charges (one for each Franchise) dated January 9, 2012, are attached. ( Id. Ex. 1.) ³ Those five charges, according to the Amended Complaint, came in response to an EEOC request that he amend his initial charge of discrimination to include all Defendants named herein. ( Id. ¶ 37.) Without context, this allegation is somewhat confusing. The record, however, offers some clarification.

It appears that in late 2009, Hile filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC naming as the respondent only Jimmy John's, but listing each of the Franchises as the locations where discrimination had occurred. ( See Hile Aff. Ex. A.) The EEOC ostensibly asked Hile to amend this charge to name each Franchise as an individual respondent, and Hile then filed five separate discrimination charges in January 2012, which are the charges attached to his Amended Complaint. It is unclear, therefore, why he references a (nonexistent) December 13, 2011 EEOC charge in his Amended Complaint. Regardless, the EEOC dismissed all of his charges—including the 2009 charge against Jimmy John's—and issued him right-to-sue letters on April 30, 2012. (Compl. Ex. 2.)

The Franchises (but not Jimmy John's) now move to dismiss Hile's claims in this action as untimely. The Motion has been fully briefed, and the Court heard oral argument on September 28, 2012. The Motion is now ripe for disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955;accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rather, the party seeking relief must set forth sufficient facts to nudge[ ] the[ ] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. ‘The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a [party] has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept a plaintiff's specific factual allegations as true but [need] not ... accept ... legal conclusions. Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The complaint must be construed liberally, and any allegations or reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

ANALYSIS

The thrust of the instant Motion is that Hile's claims are untimely because his discrimination charges were filed beyond the ADA's and MHRA's time limitations. A claimant must exhaust administrative remedies by filing an ADA discrimination charge with the EEOC within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); ⁴accord, e.g., Tusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 507, 520 (8th Cir.2011) (Under the ... ADA, Tusing was required to bring a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.). The MHRA contains a similar provision, but with a one-year (rather than 300–day) time limit. SeeMinn.Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3; Longaker v. Boston Scientific Corp., 872 F.Supp.2d 816, 820–21, 2012 WL 1886495, at *4 (D.Minn. May 23, 2012) (Montgomery, J.). The Franchises argue that Hile's charges were filed too late, as the Amended Complaint alleges he was denied employment sometime in late summer or early fall 2009 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 12, 17, 22, 27) but he did not file his charges until December 2011, more than two years later.

At first blush, there appears to be merit to this argument. Indeed, Hile seems to recognize as much, because in his opposition he retreats from the (nonexistent) 2011 charge mentioned in the Amended Complaint, instead pointing to the charge he filed in 2009. (Mem. in Opp'n at 1–2.) As noted above, that charge named only Jimmy John's as the respondent and alleged that Hile had applied for jobs at each of the Franchises but was denied employment because of his disability. He explains that he amended this charge in January 2012 at the request of the EEOC, so that each [Franchise] would have a separate Charge of Discrimination. (Hile Aff. ¶ 4 (emphasis added); accord Am. Compl. ¶ 37 (In January 2012, the EEOC invited Mr. Hile to amend his charge of discrimination to include all Defendants named herein.).) And he argues that these later-filed charges, which were addressed to each Franchise individually rather than the franchisor, were timely because they were simply amendments to the 2009 charge against Jimmy John's. (Mem. in Opp'n at 4–6.) In support, he relies upon 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), which provides that a charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, and such amendments relate back to the date the charge was first received.

The Franchises offer two arguments in response: (1) the Court cannot consider the 2009 charge on a motion to dismiss and (2) even if it could, the 2009 charge does not alter the outcome. Neither argument is persuasive.

I. The Court may consider the 2009 charge

The Franchises first argue that Hile's 2009 charge is not mentioned in the Amended Complaint and is therefore beyond the pleadings. (Reply at 1.) As the Court's analysis must be confined to the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss, they contend that the Court must ignore this charge. ( Id. at 1, 7.) ⁵

But while the Franchises are correct that matters beyond the pleadings generally may not be considered when ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), public records are not beyond the pleadings. See, e.g., Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir.2011); Stahl v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir.2003). And the Eighth Circuit has expressly recognized that an EEOC charge is a part of the public record. Blakley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 931 (8th Cir.2011) (considering EEOC charge despite fact it was not attached to complaint); accord, e.g., Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 802–03 (8th Cir.2002). Hence, the Court may properly consider the 2009 charge here.

In any event, the Court could consider that charge even if it were not part of the public record, by converting the pending Motion into one...