Hilfiger v. Alger
| Decision Date | 06 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-CV-6040L.,05-CV-6040L. |
| Citation | 582 F.Supp.2d 418 |
| Parties | Loretta HILFIGER, Plaintiff, v. Mark ALGER, Steuben County Executive of Steuben County Department of Social Services, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Loretta Hilfiger, Corning, NY, pro se.
Bryan J. Maggs, Donald S. Thomson, Davidson & O'Mara, P.C., Elmira, NY, Matthew J. Duggan, Lippman O'Connor, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
This case, involving an exceptionally convoluted administrative history, relates only to denial of child-care benefits by a New York State Social Service Agency for a single month, July 2004. The complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiff, Loretta Hilfiger, appearing pro se, commenced this action on January 31, 2005. In her amended complaint, which plaintiff filed as of right on March 16, 2005, plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of the discontinuance of her child day-care benefits in 2004. Plaintiff has sued six defendants: the Steuben County (New York) Department of Social Services ("DSS"); Steuben County Executive Mark Alger, who is sued in his official capacity only; Kathryn Biehl, the Commissioner of DSS; Robert Plenge, the Deputy Commissioner of Administration and Finance of DSS; Carla Hibbard, the Director of the Steuben Child Care Project ("SCCP"); and Joan Simpson, a caseworker for SCCP.
DSS, Alger, Biehl, and Plenge (collectively "County defendants") have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 12(d) and 56. Hibbard and Simpson have separately moved for the same relief, based on the same grounds and arguments advanced by the County defendants. Because both plaintiff and defendants have submitted materials outside the pleadings, I will treat defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(d).1
Plaintiff has filed what she styles as a "motion for determination of issues" (Dkt.# 15), seeking "an order applying the civil doctrine of collateral estoppel precluding the defendant [DSS] from re-litigating factual findings established in an unreviewed State administrative hearing."
For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions are granted, plaintiff's motion is denied as moot, and the complaint is dismissed.
On June 16, 2004, plaintiff gave birth to her second child, a daughter, Trinity. At that time, plaintiff was receiving New York State child care assistance benefits from DSS for day care for her son Alexander, who was born in 2001. DSS contracted with SCCP to provide certain services in connection with the provision of child care assistance benefits, such as case management services and the issuance of payments to child care providers.
When she applied for benefits, plaintiff had signed and submitted a form providing that she would "notify SCCP of any change that w[ould] affect [her child care] subsidy case immediately and mail supporting documentation to [her] case worker within 15 days of the change." Dkt. #24-5 at 27. It was not until mid-July 2004, however, about a month after her daughter was born, that plaintiff informed SCCP by telephone of that fact. See Dkt. # 2 ¶ 51; Dkt. # 21-4 at 4, ¶ 7.
In that same phone call, plaintiff also informed SCCP that she had been on disability leave from work since mid-May 2004 due to complications from her pregnancy, and she told SCCP that, for medical reasons, she was in need of continuous child care. Dkt. # 21-4 at 4, ¶ 7. The case worker with whom plaintiff spoke asked plaintiff to provide documentation of her medical condition to support her claim of need for child care services for Alexander during the time when plaintiff was on leave from work. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 13, 2004, by which time she had returned to work, she received a telephone call at work from defendant Simpson, who told plaintiff that SCCP had been directed by DSS to deny plaintiff's child care payment for Alexander for the single month of July 2004. Amended Complaint ¶ 52. The reason given for this decision was the untimely notice by plaintiff to SCCP of her disability leave, and of her daughter's birth, both of which affected plaintiff's child care status. See Amended Complaint Ex. 2. Apparently the rationale was that since plaintiff had been at home and not working since May, it was not obvious that she needed assistance caring for Alexander.
On or about that same date, plaintiff submitted to SCCP a nurse practitioner's note in response to SCCP's earlier request for medical documentation of her need for child care services. The note indicated that plaintiff had been on bed rest since May 19, 2004 due to pre-term labor, and that she had been "off 6 weeks post-partum (7/28/04)." Dkt. # 21-4 at 4, ¶ 9.
In a letter to Simpson dated August 23, 2004, Barbara Mendez Toms, a legal advocate with the Disabled Workers' Coalition of the State of New York, referencing Simpson's prior telephone call to plaintiff informing plaintiff that her benefits had been denied for July 2004, stated that Simpson had "told [plaintiff] that once [her daughter] was born she was procedurally required to pull out her [son] from Daycare," and that "[n]o prior notice of this rule was ever given" to plaintiff. Dkt. # 24-5 at 21. The letter stated that as a result of these events, plaintiff was "in default with the Childcare center," which had "demanded payment in the amount [sic] $500.00," and that the "center . . . has indicate [sic] they would not extend a `commitment' to place the newborn child until the debt is fully paid." Id. Mendez Toms "ask[ed] that [Simpson] provide Loretta Hilfiger with a copy of the regulation and/or policy statement referenced in [Simpson's] telephone determination and a copy of her rights, if any, under [SCCP's] program . . . ." Id. at 22.
In a letter to plaintiff dated August 26, 2004, defendant Hibbard responded to Mendez Toms's August 23 letter, stating that DSS "had no other choice but deny payment [sic] for Alex's care for July," due to a number of circumstances. Dkt. # 24-5 at 24. First, Hibbard referenced plaintiff's late notice of her daughter's birth and her disability leave. In addition, she noted that although Simpson had requested in mid-July that plaintiff submit "a medical statement from [her] doctor on letterhead regarding [plaintiff's] physical condition," it took about a month for plaintiff to submit any documentation, which, Hibbard said, was "not correct as it [wa]s not signed by the doctor who attended [plaintiff]." Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 2, 2004, she faxed to SCCP a note from her doctor stating that plaintiff "had preterm labor from 5/19/04 to 6/16/04" and that she "was postpartum 6/16/04 to 7/28/04." The following day, however, SCCP issued a Notice of Intent to Discontinue Child Care Benefits, informing plaintiff that "[t]his agency intends to stop your payment of Child Care benefits effective 6/30/04," and that plaintiff's "case w[ould] be closed effective 7/1/04." Dkt. # 21-2 at 33. The notice stated that the reason for this action was It also stated, Id.
On or about September 8, 2004, plaintiff's attorney contacted the Office of Administrative Hearings of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, arguing that the September 3 notice did not afford plaintiff timely notice of the proposed action. Plaintiff was awarded continued aid benefits pending further action on her benefits. Dkt. #21-4 at 5, ¶ 14. On September 22, 2004, however, SCCP issued another notice informing plaintiff that her child care benefits would be discontinued effective September 29, and her case closed as of September 30, for plaintiff's "[f]ail[ure] to comply with requested documentation." Dkt. # 21-2 at 35.
On August 26, 2004, plaintiff requested a fair hearing to review the denial of her benefits for July 2004. Dkt. # 21-4 at 5, ¶ 11. A hearing was held on September 27, 2004, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John G. Herriman. At the hearing, the ALJ took evidence concerning both the suspension of plaintiff's day care benefits for July 2004, and the decision to terminate her benefits completely as of September 29, 2004. Dkt. #21-4 at 12.
On February 7, 2005, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services ("OCFS") issued a decision in which it reversed the decisions by DSS both to suspend plaintiff's child day care benefits beginning July 1, 2004, and to terminate her benefits effective September 29, 2004. Dkt. # 21-4 at 14-15. With respect to the suspension of benefits, OCFS found that the September 3 notice informing plaintiff of that suspension "was not timely inasmuch as it did not afford [plaintiff] ten day's [sic] notice of the negative action." Id. at 13.
OCFS added, however, that the "more pressing concern [with respect to that notice] involves closer analysis of the `issuing authority' in this case." Id. In that regard, OCFS quoted state regulations providing that "[n]otice of action means a notice from a social services agency advising an applicant [or] recipient . . . of any action the agency intends to take or has taken on any assistance or benefits . . . ." Id. (citing 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.15). OCFS stated that although the regulations did not prohibit a social services district from contracting with a private entity to administer its programs, "[t]his right however does not extend without limit, to the point where the contractor is delegated authority for making vital decisions such as those pertaining to the acceptance or denial of an application or the discontinue [sic] of benefits." Id. Thus, OCFS stated, "while there is...
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Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ.
...remedy," but it seems clear that the availability of an administrative hearing generally suffices. See Hilfiger v. Alger, 582 F.Supp.2d 418, 429 (W.D.N.Y.2008)aff'd, 387 Fed.Appx. 111 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that the availability of an administrative hearing, even where the plaintiff fails t......