Hilger v. Moore
| Decision Date | 18 June 1919 |
| Docket Number | 4407. |
| Citation | 182 P. 477,56 Mont. 146 |
| Parties | HILGER v. MOORE, County Treasurer. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Suit for injunction by David Hilger against W. A. Moore, Treasurer of Lewis and Clark County. Writ issued.
Chas R. Leonard, of Butte, Pray & Callaway, of Great Falls, and R Von Tobel, of Lewistown, for relator.
S. C. Ford, of Helena, and Frank Woody, of Missoula, for respondent.
At 12 o'clock noon on the first Monday of March of this year, plaintiff owned personal property subject to taxation in Lewis and Clark county, but owned no real estate in that county. His property was duly assessed at $1,000, its full cash value, and upon this valuation the taxes were computed, amounting to $35.05, and the county treasurer thereupon demanded payment. Plaintiff tendered $7.01, and upon refusal of his tender commenced this action to restrain the treasurer from seizing and selling the property.
The controversy involves the validity of House Bill No. 30 (Laws 1919, c. 51) entitled:
"An act providing for the classification of taxable property in the state for the purpose of taxation, and providing the percentage of the true and full value of each class which shall be taken and used as the basis for the imposition of the tax thereon."
Section 1 distributes all taxable property into seven distinct classes; the kind of property constituting each of the first six classes being specifically enumerated. The seventh class includes all property not assigned to some one of the preceding classes.
Section 2 provides:
"As a basis for the imposition of taxes upon the different classes of property above specified, a percentage of the true and full value of the property of each class shall be taken as follows:
(a) Class one: 100 per cent. of its true and full value.
(b) Class two: 20 per cent. of its true and full value.
(c) Class three: 33 1/3 per cent. of its true and full value.
(d) Class four: 30 per cent. of its true and full value.
(e) Class five: 7 per cent. of its true and full value.
(f) Class six: 40 per cent. of its true and full value.
(g) Class seven: 40 per cent. of its true and full value."
The property involved in this litigation belongs to class two, and it is conceded that if House Bill 30 is a valid legislative enactment the plaintiff tendered the amount of tax due; if it is not, the amount demanded by the treasurer is the amount to be paid.
1. It is insisted by the treasurer that House Bill No. 30 is unconstitutional, in that the Legislative Assembly was without authority to classify property for the purpose of taxation.
The legislative department of this state possesses all the powers of lawmaking which inhere in any independent sovereignty, except only in so far as those powers are curtailed by the Constitution of the state, or the supreme law of the land. In re Pomeroy, 51 Mont. 119, 151 P. 333. To determine, therefore, whether a statute is valid, it is not necessary to seek the source of the power to enact it. The authority is inherent if the subject-matter is one with reference to which any legislation may be enacted, and the burden of showing that the authority has been withdrawn from the lawmakers is upon the party who questions the validity of the act. As said by this court:
State ex rel. Evans v. Stewart, 53 Mont. 18, 161 P. 309.
Taxation for the purpose of raising public revenue is a subject peculiarly and inherently of legislative cognizance (1 Cooley on Taxation [3d Ed.] p. 7), and our Legislature was therefore within its authority in enacting House Bill No. 30, unless the authority to do so is denied to it by the state Constitution or by the Constitution of the United States. The basic contention of the Attorney General, for the treasurer, is that the classification of property by the statute in question violates the principle of uniformity of taxation declared by our state Constitution. Throughout all revenue legislation by the several states there has been recognized some rule of uniformity. Fifty years ago, and prior thereto, the rule was generally understood to require nothing less than this: If A. and B. each owned taxable property of the same value within the same taxing district, each should pay thereon precisely the same amount of tax, without reference to the character of the property. The rule as thus understood is designated the "uniformity rule of general property taxation," or "uniform ad valorem system." By express declaration or by necessary intendment that rule was written into the Constitution of nearly every state. The Constitution of Nebraska declares:
"The Legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property and franchises." Nebraska Const. art. 9, § 1.
This is a reasonably clear statement in ex press terms of the rule of uniformity of taxation as it was understood quite generally in 1875. A similiar provision is found in the Constitution of Idaho (article 7, § 2); Illinois (article 9, § 1); South Dakota (article 11, § 2); Utah (article 13, § 3); and Washington (article 7, § 2). It cannot be open to argument that a provision of this character does not admit of classification of property for the purpose of taxation. The meaning is too plain to admit of doubt.
The Constitution of Wisconsin declares, "The rule of taxation shall be uniform" (Wisconsin Const. art. 8, § 1), and the same principle, though expressed differently, is to be found in the Constitution of each of some 30 other states. Whenever the question has arisen in any of these jurisdictions, it has been held that the language of the Constitution under review, by necessary implication, evidenced an intention to maintain the rule of uniformity as expressed above. We find no fault with the conclusions reached in the cases so holding.
The rule never prevailed in Colorado or Pennsylvania, and does not prevail in several states by reason of recent constitutional amendments. Does it prevail in Montana? It is the contention of the Attorney General that it does, and that it is declared in article 12, § 1, of our Constitution, in the following language:
Great stress is laid upon the fact that the Legislature is commanded to levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation. Counsel, however, distorts the meaning of the term "assessment." It is said to comprehend the entire process by which taxes are secured-from the inception to the conclusion. If the term has such broad significance, then it includes the entire process of taxation, and the word "taxation," used in conjunction with it, is meaningless. But this court is not authorized to disregard the term "taxation," or to assume that it was used without purpose.
When our Constitution was prepared and ratified, the term "assessment" and the term "taxation" each had a definite, well-understood meaning. Assessment was the process by which persons subject to taxation were listed, their property described, and its value ascertained and stated. Taxation consisted in determining the rate of the levy and imposing it. Speaking generally, the assessment was made by the assessor, subject to review by the board of equalization. The rate of taxation was fixed and imposed by the Legislature for state purposes, by the county commissioners for county purposes, by the city council for city purposes, etc. This has been the history of our revenue legislation from the time Montana was organized as a territory, and the framers of our
Constitution understood these words and used them accordingly. It may be conceded that they apparently chose to employ inept language, rather than multiply words, for the use of "levy" and "rate," as applied to assessment, is hardly appropriate; but when we consider the entire first sentence of section 1 with other provisions in pari materia the meaning is reasonably clear. The mode of assessment-the rule for ascertaining values-must be uniform, to the end that a just valuation of all taxable property may be secured. This is the rule-the exceptions will be noticed later.
The act in question has nothing whatever to do with either the assessment of property or the determination of the rate of the tax levy. It is not directed to the assessor. His duties are defined by the statutes in force when this measure was enacted.
The mandate of the Constitution that the Legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valaution for taxation of all taxable property was complied with by the first state Legislature which passed any laws after the Constitution was adopted. An elaborate revenue measure was enacted, comprising 206 sections, which provided, among other things, for the assessment of all taxable property at its full cash value, for the proper methods of ascertaining such value, and for the review of the assessments and the equalization thereof. Laws of 1891, p. 73. Those provisions with...
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