Hill's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 12 November 1968
• Citation: 432 Pa. 269,247 A.2d 606
• Parties: , 37 A.L.R.3d 1 In re ESTATE of Edward T. HILL, Deceased. Appeal of Jean H. KNOWLSON, Robert T. Winchester and Jeannette W. Garrison,the only Heirs at Law of Edward T. Hill.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 606

247 A.2d 606

432 Pa. 269, 37 A.L.R.3d 1

In re ESTATE of Edward T. HILL, Deceased Appeal of Jean H. KNOWLSON, Robert T. Winchester and Jeannette W. Garrison,the only Heirs at Law of Edward T. Hill.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 12, 1968.

John V. Snee, Bethel Park, for appellants.

James S. Crawford, III, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, for Mellon Nat. Bank & Trust.

Fred Shoemaker, Pittsburgh, William C. Sennett, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Woods, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., John M. Haverty, Jr., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Justice.

On this appeal we are called upon to interpret the language contained in the last will of Edward Hill (testator) who died November 12, 1966 survived by an aunt and two first cousins, children of a deceased aunt (appellants).

On November 24, 1942, testator, then 37 years of age, married Kathryn C. McCabe, then 36 years of age; of that marriage no children were born. Approximately one and one-half years after the marriage, testator--without the help of a lawyer--drew the will now before us. On April 28, 1966, Kathryn C. Hill died; the testator died approximately seven and one-half months later.

Testator's will provided:

'(1) If at my demise I have no heirs other than my dear wife Kathryn C. Hill I wish to set up a trust the income from which to go to her as long as she has no other means of support or remains unmarried. (At this point in the will, a bank was named trustee). When her death or remarriage occurs I direct that the same go to my Alma Mater, Bucknell University at Lewisburg, Pa. (Both estate and income from same). To be used as the University Board of Directors so desires. (2) If at my demise I have more heirs than my dear wife Kathryn C. Hill I direct that my entire estate go to her solely.' Testator then named a bank as executor.

At the audit of testator's estate before the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, both Bucknell University and appellants claimed distribution of the balance of the estate. ¹ The record simply reveals a stipulation by the parties as to the dates of birth, the date of marriage and the dates of death of testator and his wife. There is nothing of record to show whether testator's wife was ever pregnant, whether she could have borne children or could have anticipated a child of her marriage to testator.

After legal arguments, the court (Judge Rahauser) entered a decre nisi awarding the balance of the estate to Bucknell University, (Bucknell). Exceptions to this decree were dismissed by the court en banc (Judge Kramer filing a dissenting opinion) and a final decree was entered from which the instant appeal was taken.

The initial question presented is whether the testator used the word 'heirs' in its legal sense or in its popular sense, i.e., 'children'.

In resolving this question, we bear in mind certain well settled principles in this area of the law: (a) the duty of the court is to ascertain, if possible, the intent of the testator (Burleigh Estate, 405 Pa. 373, 376, 175 A.2d 838 (1961); Moltrup Estate, 424 Pa. 161, 170, 225 A.2d 676 (1967)); (b) the court must garner, if possible, the intent of the testator from a consideration of All the language contained in the four corners of the will, together with all the surrounding and attendant circumstances and from the scheme of distribution and not merely from isolated clauses or provisions of the will (Vandergrift Estate, 406 Pa. 14, 26, 177 A.2d 432 (1962); Grier Estate, 403 Pa. 517, 525, 526, 170 A.2d 545 (1961)); (c) '(w)hen a decedent drafts a last will and testament, he is presumed, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, to have intended to dispose of his entire estate and not to die intestate as to any part of it' and a construction should be adopted that would avoid an intestacy unless such construction would do violence to the language of the will: Farrington Will, 422 Pa. 164, 168, 220 A.2d 790, 793 (1966) and authorities cited therein; (d) '(w)here a testator uses words which have a legal or technical meaning, 'they are to be so interpreted according to the law in effect at the testator's death unless the will contains a clearly expressed intention to the contrary": ² Houston Estate, 414 Pa. 579, 595, 201 A.2d 592, 600 (1964) such rule being one of construction (Grier Estate, supra, 403 Pa. p. 525, 170 A.2d 545; (e) rules of testamentary construction are to be resorted to only if the language of the will is ambiguous or conflicting or the intent of the testator is for any reason uncertain (Hoover Estate, 417 Pa. 263, 266, 267, 207 A.2d 840 (1965) and authorities therein cited).

If appellants are correct in their interpretation of the word 'heirs' in the sense such term is used in the intestate law, the testator died intestate and the balance of his estate could go to appellants under the statutory law governing intestacy. If Bucknell is correct in its interpretation of the word 'heirs' as 'children', then, upon the death of Kathryn C. Hill, the gift to Bucknell was accelerated. There is also a question whether the testator neglected to provide for Any disposition of his estate on the occurrence of the event which did occur, i.e., the death of the wife prior to testator's death.

The rationale of the majority opinion in the court below was: (1) the will indicates that, if no children were born, testator's wife and Bucknell were to be the sole objects of testator's bounty and that when testator spoke of 'heirs' he meant 'children'; (2) that the scheme of testator's contemplated disposition of his estate clearly requires such interpretation; (3) that such result avoids an intestacy; (4) that, in view of testator's evident intent, resort need not be made to the rule of construction which would require that the word 'heirs' to be given a technical meaning; (5) that, even though testator failed specifically to provide for the event wherein his wife predeceased him, he did so by implication. The rationale of the minority opinion was: (1) that testator's first testamentary disposition--'If at my demise I have no heirs other than my dear wife' and second testamentary disposition--'If at my demise I have more heirs than my dear wife'--never became effective; (2) that the language of the will is not ambiguous; (3) that while an intestacy should be avoided, if possible, there is an 'equally potent presumption that an heir is not to be disinherited except by plain words of necessary implication'; (4) that testator failed to provide for Any disposition of his estate should he die before his wife, leaving persons who could qualify as 'heirs' under the laws of intestacy.

As we have previously noted, the word 'heirs' is a technical word. While we recognize the existence of a rule of construction which requires that technical words be given their technical meanings, such recognition does not mandate that we accord to the word 'heirs' In this will its legal or technical meaning. In the first place, even though the testator was a college graduate, he was a layman unversed in the law or legal language and, so far as the record reveals, was not aware of the technical as opposed to the popular meaning of the word 'heirs'. While this is in no sense controlling, it is a circumstance to be given consideration in our interpretation of the language used by the testator. In the second place, in view of what we consider from our examination of this will to be testator's Evident scheme of disposition of his estate, we are not required to apply this rule of construction. In the third place, on occasions, our appellate courts have construed the word 'heirs' to mean 'children'. See: Haverstick's Appeal, 103 Pa. 394 (1883); Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585, 19 A. 1058 (1890); Miller's Estate, 145 Pa. 561, 22 A. 1044 (1891); Tucker's Estate, 209 Pa. 521, 58 A. 889 (1904); Mayer v. Walker, 214 Pa. 440, 63 A. 1011 (1906); Church v. Baer, 236 Pa. 605, 84 A. 1099 (1912); Bechtel v. Fetter, 267 Pa. 173, 111 A. 50 (1920); Schleich's Estate, 286 Pa. 578, 134 A. 442 (1926); Linn v. Bowman, 77 Pa.Super. 261 (1921); Howard's Estate, 24 Pa.Dist.Rep. 155 (1915). In the fourth place, if we construe the word 'heirs' in this will in its technical sense, we reach and absurd result. Cf: Worst v. De Haven, 262 Pa. 39, 41, 104 A. 802 (1918). If we accept appellants' construction of the word 'heirs', an examination of the will discloses this absurdity: if the word 'heirs' be construed technically, then, under testator's second testamentary disposition, if, in addition to his wife, testator was survived by 'heirs' such as appellants, the testator's wife would take the estate outright, whereas, under testator's first testamentary disposition, if testator was not survived by 'heirs' such as appellants, testator's wife would not take his estate outright but only in trust. Such disposition of his estate defies common sense. From an examination of the language of this will In its entirety, we believe that testator clearly intended that if he were survived by a wife and no 'children', then his estate would go to his wife in trust, for life or remarriage, and then to the university from which he was graduated, and that, if he were survived by his wife and a child or children, then his estate would go to his wife outright. ³ In this connection, Judge Rahauser aptly said:

'Testator's outright gift to his wife, if he had 'children', makes sense; she could reasonably be expected to give them what was left at her death. Like-wise, his limitation of the gift to his wife for life or until remarriage, with remainder to Bucknell University, if he had no 'children', makes sense since this would provide for his wife as long as she needed his care, with the remainder to his university.

'However, it is difficult to believe that the testator intended his wife to take his entire estate absolutely if...