Hill v. Bain
| Decision Date | 26 June 1885 |
| Parties | HILL v. BAIN, TOWN TREASURER. [1] |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Nicholas Van Slyck and Ziba O. Slocum, for defendant.
The case made by the pleadings is this: September 28, 1882, the plaintiff, while driving on the Pontiac road, so called, in the town of Cranston, in the night-time, in the exercise of reasonable care, came into collision with certain teams or carts placed in the road and left there by James A. Budlong and Frank L. Budlong, copartners, and was badly injured in his person. He sued the Budlongs at the March term of this court, 1883, in a plea of trespass on the case, laying his damages at $20,000, for injuries received from said obstruction; but, after trial, the jury found a verdict for the Budlongs as not guilty of causing the injuries, on which verdict the court gave a final judgment for the Budlongs which judgment still remains in force. At the December term of the court of common pleas, 1883, the plaintiff brought this action against the town of Cranston, which is an action on the case to recover damages for the injuries aforesaid, on the ground that the town neglected to keep said road, the same being a public highway, safe and convenient for travel. The defendant pleads the judgment for the Budlongs in bar by way of estoppel, alleging that the Budlongs were the authors of the obstruction or defect complained of. The plaintiff demurs to the plea. The case is here on appeal. The question is whether the plea is a good plea by way of estoppel. The defendant contends that it is, because, in the first place the plaintiff, in order to recover in this action, would have to prove all which it was necessary for him to prove in order to recover in the former action, except the fact that the said teams and carts were placed in said road and left there by the Budlongs, which fact is admitted by the demurrer, and something else besides, namely, that the town, after notice of the alleged nuisance, actual or constructive, neglected to remove or guard against it; and because, in the second place the town has only to notify the Budlongs of this action, thus giving them an opportunity to defend it, in order, in case of a judgment against the town, to make the Budlongs liable over for the damages recovered; so that, if the plea is not sustained, the Budlongs, after judgment in their favor proving that the plaintiff has no case, may be compelled, in this roundabout way, to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the plea is bad, because the defendants in the two actions are different, and there is no privity between them.
Undoubtedly the rule, as generally laid down, is that judgments avail as estoppels only for or against parties and privies; but nevertheless, the courts allow themselves a good deal of latitude in applying the rule, observing the spirit of it rather than the letter. Thus it has been held that a judgment in favor of a deputy-sheriff, in an action against him for official misfeasance or default, is available by way of estoppel in an action against the sheriff for the same misfeasance or default. King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9. So it has been held that a judgment in favor of a master in an action against him for the act of his...
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