Hill v. Blackwelder

• Decision Date: 30 March 1885
• Citation: 113 Ill. 283
• Parties: SAMUEL C. HILL et al.v.GEORGE H. BLACKWELDER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

113 Ill. 283

SAMUEL C. HILL et al.

v.GEORGE H. BLACKWELDER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Mar. 30, 1885.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. JESSE J. PHILLIPS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. MILLER & MCDAVID, and Mr. J. M. TRUITT, for the appellants:

As a general rule a party will be concluded from denying his own acts or admissions which were expressly designed to influence the conduct of another, and did influence it, when such denial will operate to the injury of the latter. Kinnear v. Mackey, 85 Ill. 96; Heiner v. Vandolah, 57 Id. 520.

It is not essential there should be intentional fraud. It is sufficient if it will result from the evidence he attempts to set up. Kinnear v. Mackey, 85 Ill. 96; Flower v. Elwood, 66 Id. 447; Chandler v. White, 84 Id. 435.

It has been held by this court that one who recommended a title to a purchaser could not be afterward heard to question it. Winchell v. Edwards, 57 Ill. 41; Jeneson v. Jeneson, 66 Id. 259; Bradley v. Luce, 99 Id. 234; Curyea v. Berry, 84 Id. 600.

The description of the land in the levy on the first execution as “west side,” etc., is sufficient. Colcord v. Alexander, 67 Ill. 581; Billings v. Kankakee Coal Co. Id. 489.

The second levy and sale were void for the reason that the debtor had no title remaining to be sold.

Messrs. LANE & COOPER, for the appellee:

The judgment in favor of Buford & Field was void, and so were all proceedings under it. Evans v. Pierce, 2 Scam. 469; Johnson v. Baker, 38 Ill. 99; Borders v. Murphy, 78 Id. 81.

On the redemption the title to the ten acres became subject to the sale made by the Loan and Trust company, and the title to the forty acres became absolutely vested in Harris.

The description of the levy on the first sale of the ten-acre tract was void for uncertainty. Schaumtoeffel v. Belm, 77 Ill. 567; Haskins v. Haskins, 67 Id. 446; Hughes v. Streeter, 24 Id. 650.

Hermann on Estoppel, 415, says: “By the application of this principle with respect to the title to real property it must appear, first, that the party making the admission, by his declaration or conduct was apprised of the true state of his own title; second, that he made the admission with the intent to deceive, or with such culpable and careless negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; and third, that the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title, but of all means of acquiring such knowledge.” See, to the same effect, Bigelow on Estoppel, 437. Nearly the same language is used in People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 439, and Dinet v. Eilert, 13 Bradw. 99, and cases cited.

On the doctrine of estoppel, see Hermann on Estoppel, 421, 439; Bigelow on Estoppel, 438.

To show that under the Statute of Frauds verbal statements of the parties could not operate as an estoppel, reference is made to Hermann on Estoppel, 439; Bigelow on Estoppel, 448; Brightman v. Hicks, 108 Mass. 246; Aherend v. Obiome, 118 Id. 268; Parker v. Barker, 2 Metc. 431; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 271; Butcher v. Buchanan, 17 Iowa, 81. There can be no estoppel if the party had notice of the title, as he had from the records. Bigelow on Estoppel, 467; Hermann on Estoppel, 428; Morris v. Hugh, 38 Ill. 155; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331; Krouff v. Thompson, 4 Harr. 361; Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 237; Mills v. Graves, 38 Ill. 465.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on a fraudulent purpose and a fraudulent result. Dorlarque v. Cress, 71 Ill. 380; Chandler v. White, 84 Id. 438.

The Buford & Field judgment being void, no rights could be acquired under it. Borders v. Murphy, 78 Ill. 81; Mulvey v. Carpenter, Id. 581; Johnson v. Baker, 38 Id. 99.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Montgomery circuit court dismissing a bill in chancery, brought by Dresser and Hill, against Blackwelder, to enjoin the prosecution of an action of ejectment by the latter against the two former, to recover possession of a certain forty-acre and a certain tenacre tract of land. Both parties claim title from a common source,--James A. Harris, deceased. The record shows that Harris was indebted to divers persons who had recovered judgments against him, among whom were Buford & Field, who recovered a judgment against Harris before a justice of the peace on September 8, 1874, a transcript of which judgment, to make it a lien on real estate, was filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court, as provided by the statute, September 9, 1874. There had been several successive sales and redemptions of the lands in question, under different judgments against Harris, the last of said judgments next prior to that of Buford & Field being one of Weil & Bro., which last judgment, together with all the prior judgments and redemptions, amounted to $829.49. To redeem from the sale under the execution of Weil & Bro. against Harris, Dresser paid said sum of $829.49, and afterwards, at the sheriff's sale under the execution upon the Buford & Field judgment, on November 13, 1875, Dresser became the purchaser of the lands, paying the further sum of $59.49. Dresser received a sheriff's deed for the lands, and afterward sold and conveyed them to Hill. This constitutes Hill's claim of title to the lands. Harris died in September, 1877, and the administrator of his estate subsequently, by virtue of an order of the county court of the county, sold the forty-acre tract to Blackwelder for the sum of $25. Neither Dresser nor Hill was made a party to the proceeding in which such order was made. This is Blackwelder's claim of title to the forty-acre tract. His claim of title to the ten-acre tract is different, and will be afterward spoken of.

The alleged defect in Hill's title to the forty acres is, that the judgment in favor of Buford & Field, against Harris, before the justice of the peace, under execution upon which Dresser bought the lands at sheriff's sale, was void for want of jurisdiction of the person of Harris, the summons in the suit having been served upon Harris by a special constable, and there having been no appearance by Harris. It is expressly decided in Gordon v. Knapp, 1 Scam. 489, that a justice of the peace can not appoint a constable pro tem to serve a summons or other personal notice in a civil suit.

The bill sets up the claim of an estoppel in pais against the defendant to make the above objection to the Buford & Field judgment, as arising from Harris' inducing Dresser to make the redemption and purchase under the judgment which he did, and the object of the bill is to have such estoppel declared and enforced.

The case made by the proofs is, that Dresser was the president of a certain bank which held a judgment in its favor against Harris and one Hunter, rendered upon a note against the two latter, Hunter being a surety on the note; that Hunter came to Dresser and stated that Harris had lands in Montgomery county, and that if the prior liens were paid off they could be sold for enough more than the liens to protect Hunter; that afterward both Harris and Hunter came to Dresser, and Harris requested Dresser to aid him by paying off the liens on the land, saying that Dresser could hold the lands, which would make him secure for the money he would advance, and then Harris thought he could sell the lands for enough more to protect Hunter and make the bank judgment out of the lands. Harris told Dresser to see Lane, Harris' attorney; that he would see that the title was good, and that whatever Lane said, would be all right. Dresser afterwards did see Lane, who told Dresser the title was good. Under the above arrangement, and at Harris' request, Dresser advanced the money ($829.49) to make the redemption, under the Buford & Field judgment, of the lands from the last preceding sale under the judgment of Weil & Bro., and bought the lands at sheriff's sale November 13, 1875, under execution upon the Buford & Field judgment, paying $59.41 more. Some two or three years after this, Harris came to Dresser and told him he would have to sell the lands and get his money out of them; that he (Harris) had been trying to find a purchaser, but could not find one. Dresser accordingly sold the lands to Hill, giving a warranty deed, and getting about what the land cost him, with the interest added.

The criticism is made upon this proof, that it does not show that this particular judgment of Buford & Field was in the view of the parties, that redemption was to be made under that judgment, or that the lands were to be bought by Dresser under that specific judgment. The evidence does fail in specific mention of this judgment; but it shows that Dresser made the purchase upon the execution under the previous arrangement with Harris, and at his request, and Harris' action subsequent to the sale was in recognition of the same fact. We think the whole evidence should be viewed as establishing that Harris requested Dresser to make the redemption and purchase under the judgment of Buford & Field against Harris, and we are of opinion it presents a clear case of an equitable estoppel. Dresser did not, of his own motion and for his own benefit, make the redemption and bid off the lands under the execution, but he was sought out by Harris and Hunter, and was by them requested and induced to do what he did for their benefit, in having the excess above the execution sale for which it was believed by Harris he could afterwards make sale of the lands. Any such excess would have gone in payment of the judgment against Harris and Hunter, and it being in favor of the bank, it may be said the bank would have thereby derived a benefit. Nothing appears but what Hunter was entirely solvent, and the judgment collectible from him, and the evidence does not show that the benefit of the bank in getting satisfaction of its judgment was at all a moving consideration with Dresser, and what he did appears to have been but a...