Hill v. Blake

• Decision Date: 09 March 1982
• Citation: 441 A.2d 841,186 Conn. 404
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: James HILL v. Richard E. BLAKE.

Page 841

441 A.2d 841

186 Conn. 404

James HILL v. Richard E. BLAKE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 1, 1981.

Decided March 9, 1982.

Ira B. Grudberg, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Karen F. Tross, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

John A. Connelly, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Francis M. McDonald, State's Atty., and Bradford J. Ward, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (defendant).

Before SPEZIALE, C. J., and PETERS, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO and SHEA, JJ.

PARSKEY, Associate Justice.

The issues presented in this case are whether the indictment and requesting papers sent to the state of Connecticut by the state of New Jersey were sufficient to extradite the plaintiff to New Jersey under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ¹ (the act) and whether the rendition of the plaintiff as a nonfugitive under section 6 of the act ² was in error.

On September 11, 1978, the plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury of the state of New Jersey for conspiracy to obtain, possess and distribute a controlled dangerous substance, approximately 18,000 pounds of marijuana, in violation of New Jersey law. The plaintiff was arrested on June 11, 1979 at Bethlehem, Connecticut by Connecticut state police pursuant to a warrant issued by a New Jersey judge and was arraigned the following day at the Superior Court in Waterbury, Connecticut. At that arraignment, the plaintiff refused to waive extradition to the state of New Jersey. On September 5, 1979, the governor of New Jersey requested that the governor of Connecticut cause the plaintiff to be apprehended and delivered to certain named police officers of the state of New Jersey for conveyance to that state to be dealt with according to law. On or about September 6, 1979, the governor of Connecticut issued her extradition warrant ordering the plaintiff to be turned over to New Jersey authorities.

While in the custody of Connecticut State Trooper Richard E. Blake, the plaintiff applied for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that (1) the Connecticut rendition was not responsive to the New Jersey requisition because the governor of New Jersey requested the plaintiff as a "fugitive" and the governor of Connecticut extradited him as a "non-fugitive," (2) the New Jersey indictment and requisition papers failed substantially to charge him with a crime against the laws of the demanding state, and (3) section 6 of the act which permits the extradition of nonfugitives is unconstitutional. On July 25, 1980, the court, Henebry, J., denied the plaintiff's application and this appeal followed, presenting issues one and two, supra, for determination by this court. Issue three has not been pursued on appeal.

I

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was prepared in 1926 to codify the practice of interstate extradition of fugitives, a right created by the United States constitution ³ and a process incompletely regulated by federal law. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 52-53. See Narel v. Liburdi, --- Conn. ---, 441 A.2d 177 (43 Conn.L.J., No. 24, p. 9) (1981); Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 395n, 311 A.2d 86 (1972). Section 6 of the act, however, was a creation of the National Conference and was intended to reach extradition of one who commits a crime against the laws of a state by acts done outside of that state, a situation not covered by existing law. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws & Proceedings 591 (1926). "Modern communication and transportation facilitate the commission of crimes across state lines.... (T)he criminal who operates from without the state's borders poses a continuing threat. Since his conduct may be undetected or apparently harmless in the state where he acts, the only effective impetus for prosecution may come from the state that suffers the harm. Far more divisive than a state's refusal to extradite a fugitive for a past offense would be its unwitting provision not only of a base of operation but of an asylum for those who commit crimes without being personally present at the place where their crimes are consummated." In re Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 772, 776, 3 Cal.Rptr. 140, 349 P.2d 956, 959 (1960). By an amendment approved in 1932, the present version of section 6 permits extradition not only from the state in which the nonfugitive acted but also from any state into which he may thereafter move. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws & Proceedings, p. 407 (1932). Since the extradition clause of the United States Constitution neither requires nor prohibits enactment of state laws governing nonfugitive extradition, enforcement of section 6 is a matter of comity between the states. ⁴ Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 53. See also In re Cooper, supra, 775, 3 Cal.Rptr 140, 349 P.2d 959; Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 107, 314 P.2d 906 (1957); cf. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6, 79 S.Ct. 564, 568, 3 L.Ed.2d 585 (1959) (enforcement of uniform act to secure attendance of out-of-state witnesses in criminal proceedings is a matter of comity). Because the act is a uniform law, decisions from other states are valuable for the interpretation of its provisions. Cain v. Moore, --- Conn. ---, ---, 438 A.2d 723 (42 Conn.L.J., No. 25, pp. 8, 9) (1980); Dutil v. Rice, 34 Conn.Sup. 78, 82, 376 A.2d 1119 (1977). In addition, at oral argument, both sides agreed, as do we, that the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), involving fugitive extradition applies by analogy to cases of nonfugitive extradition. ⁵

We turn to the plaintiff's claim that the rendition warrant was void because the governor of Connecticut extradited him as a nonfugitive when the requesting papers had referred to him as a "fugitive." Where it clearly appears from the requisition papers read together that the accused is sought as a fugitive, a rendition warrant referring to him as a nonfugitive is ineffectual. Matthews v. People, supra, 136 Colo. 106-107, 314 P.2d 906; cf. Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 222, 268 P.2d 409 (1954) (rendition warrant is void if accused is sought as a nonfugitive and sent as a fugitive). Inattention to certain technicalities, however, will not render void the extradition of the accused, as the effect of such a decision would be to exalt form over substance. In re Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.2d 779, 3 Cal.Rptr. 140, 349 P.2d 959; Moser v. Zaborac, 514 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1973). When it appears that the requesting papers were deemed sufficient by the executive authority of the respective states for requisition and rendition, "the judiciary should not interfere, on habeas corpus, and discharge the accused, upon technical grounds ... unless it be clear that what was done was in plain contravention of law." Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 8, 29 S.Ct. 605, 607, 53 L.Ed. 885 (1909) (review of fugitive extradition); see also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925). Although the requesting papers at times referred to the plaintiff as a "fugitive," the same papers clearly described him as a nonfugitive: "said JAMES HILL did intentionally commit various Overt Acts outside the State of New Jersey resulting in the offense of conspiracy within the State of New Jersey...." The rendition warrant, a standard fugitive form altered for use for nonfugitive extradition, conforms to the request in that it indicates that the plaintiff committed acts in Connecticut and elsewhere "resulting in a crime in the State of New Jersey." We will not grant the plaintiff's request to focus our inquiry on designation rather than characterization. ⁶

II

The plaintiff also challenges the sufficiency of the requesting papers claiming that, on their face, they fail substantially to charge him with a crime against the laws of New Jersey. The court below in reviewing extradition under the guidelines of Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 289, 99 S.Ct. 535, was limited to the question of whether the documents charged the plaintiff with a crime under section 6 of the act.

The plaintiff concedes that the return of an indictment against him constitutes probable cause that he committed a crime. Michigan v. Doran, supra, 290, 99 S.Ct. 536; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). The principles of comity and full faith and credit in the United States constitution require that the sister states honor this finding in the context of extradition. ⁷ Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 287-90, 99 S.Ct. 534-36. The plaintiff contends that it is not enough to show that he has been charged with a crime by the demanding state but that the papers must facially show the commission of a section 6 crime. According to the plaintiff, the finding of probable cause as evidenced by the fact of the returned indictment is insufficient substantially to charge him with violating the laws of New Jersey; see Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 404-405, 28 S.Ct. 714, 719-720, 52 L.Ed. 1113 (1908); Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 374, 25 S.Ct. 282, 285, 49 L.Ed. 515 (1905); unless a description of his allegedly criminal activity appears on the face of the documents. The plaintiff claims that the indictment names him among various people who committed various acts in various states and countries which resulted in the violation of New Jersey law but that it fails to show acts by the plaintiff himself which specifically demonstrate his intent to violate New Jersey law. We agree that the documents must not simply charge the plaintiff with a crime but that they must specifically charge him with committing acts outside New Jersey which intentionally resulted in the violation of New Jersey law. We think, however, that this indictment does in fact adequately describe acts done outside the state which resulted in probable...