Hill v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America

• Decision Date: 16 April 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 91743
• Citation: 403 N.W.2d 147,157 Mich.App. 383
• Parties: Marta HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant- Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 147

403 N.W.2d 147

157 Mich.App. 383

Marta HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant- Appellee.

Docket No. 91743.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 30, 1986.

Decided Jan. 21, 1987.

Released for Publication April 16, 1987.

Green, Renner, Weisse, Rettig, Rademacher & Clark, P.C. by George C. Renner, Escanaba, for plaintiff-appellant.

Davis, Olsen, Filoramo & Plackowski, P.C. by Gary L. Olsen, Escanaba, for defendant-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P.J., and CYNAR and LIVO, ^* JJ.

ALLEN, Presiding Judge.

In this case of first impression in Michigan, we are asked to decide if a "physical contact" requirement in an uninsured motorist provision of a policy of insurance precludes the policyholder from recovery when an unidentified vehicle propels a rock through the windshield of the policyholder's automobile, the impact killing the policyholder. The trial court ruled that Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. Methner, 127 Mich.App. 683, 339 N.W.2d 234 (1983), was controlling and granted summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

On June 30, 1985, plaintiff's husband was driving his car in a westerly direction on M-138 in Delta County. In the front seat next to him was his wife, Marta Hill. A camper-truck approached in the eastbound lane. Exactly what then happened is stipulated by the parties as follows:

"On that date, time and place the testimony of Plaintiff would be that a large rock which was airborne, went through the windshield of Plaintiff's decedent's vehicle, causing his death. The rock came through the windshield just as a camper passed Plaintiff's vehicle traveling in the opposite direction. The testimony of Plaintiff would be that the camper propelled the rock. Defendant has no evidence of what caused the rock to become airborne."

On August 2, 1985, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court for Delta County. Count I sought recovery of no-fault survivor benefits and Count II asked the policy limits of the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. Settlement was made on count I.

On count II both parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition to determine the legal effect of the "physical contact" requirement of the uninsured motorist provision in the policy. The provision reads:

"3. 'Hit-and-run Automobile' means an automobile which causes bodily injury to an Assured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the Assured or with an automobile which the Assured is occupying at the time of the accident...."

A stipulation of facts, set forth above, was prepared by the parties and submitted to the court together with briefs on the question raised. Following a March 21, 1986 hearing on the motions, the trial court granted the defendant's motion stating from the bench:

"... I believe that case [Auto Club Ins, supra ] to be controlling. It, to the best of my knowledge, is the last word on this narrow issue, and holds that a contract requirement that there be physical contact with an uninsured vehicle in order to recover under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile insurance policy is valid and enforceable. They go into great lengths to examine the old Bromley [v Citizens Ins Co of America, 113 Mich App 131; 317 NW2d 318 (1982) ], case and your cases of Lord [v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 22 Mich App 669; 177 NW2d 653 (1970) ] and Citizens [Mutual Ins Co v Jenks, 37 Mich App 378; 194 NW2d 728 (1971) ], and they ultimately rule that the arbiters in that particular case had committed an error of law.

"They very pointedly set out that these provisions are not contrary to the public policy of this state, that the Legislature intended to change long-standing public policy, and that this is in fact contractual language to be construed.

"With the repeal of the Michigan motor vehicle claims act, the court then becomes persuaded that the language that is set forth in that New York opinion referred to by Mr. Renner applies equally to the State of Michigan, and I refer to that case [Smith v Great American Ins Co, 29 NY2d 116; 324 NYS2d 15; 272 NE2d 528 (1971) ].

"If asked to rule as a part of this ruling whether or not a rock thrown up by a vehicle passing on a country highway would be contact--physical contact, I would rule that it is not. I believe in the state of the law in the State of Michigan since no fault and the repealer of the Michigan motor vehicle act is that the court must look to the contract itself.

"This particular contract which is attached to defendant's brief defines hit and run automobile does require actual physical contact, and would lead the court to the conclusion that the motion requested by plaintiff be denied; the motion requested by defendant be granted and summary disposition will be ordered."

On appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that direct physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle itself is required in order to qualify plaintiff for benefits under the "physical contact" provision in the policy. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites three cases. In Lord v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 22 Mich.App. 669, 177 N.W.2d 653 (1970), plaintiff was allowed recovery where hit-and-run car A struck an intermediate car B which in turn struck plaintiff's car C. Our Court said at 672, 177 N.W.2d 653.

"It is clear that ever since the time of Sir Isaac Newton man has recognized and lived by certain physical laws of impact and motion. Accordingly, we hold, as did the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (applying Florida law) in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Spinola, 374 F2d 873 (CA 5, 1967), that an insured party is covered where the impact of the hit-and-run car was transmitted to his car through an intermediate car. We find as did Sir Isaac, that this acceptance of a fundamental property of natural phenomena is the more sensible and consistent view as regards transfer of impact through intermediate objects."

In the second case, Kersten v. DAIIE, 82 Mich.App. 459, 267 N.W.2d 425 (1978), plaintiff was injured when the vehicle she was driving struck an unidentified tire and rim assembly spinning in front of her on the passing lane of the highway. Plaintiff sought recovery under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (MVACA), M.C.L. § 257.1101 et seq., M.S.A. § 9.2801 et seq., § 12 of which provided that "physical contact by the unidentified vehicle with the plaintiff or with a vehicle occupied by the plaintiff, is a condition precedent to such action." The trial court allowed recovery. On appeal defendant insurer contended, as does defendant in the instant case, that direct physical contact with the unidentified vehicle itself was required and that contact by a propelled object, such as a tire, was insufficient. This jurist, writing of the opinion of the Court, disagreed saying:

"The physical contact requirement has been further stretched to permit recovery where an object is propelled into the insured vehicle by another vehicle which does not stop. The primary example of such a situation is the case of a stone thrown off by the tires of a passing vehicle. Barfield v Ins Co of North America, 59 Tenn App 631; 443 SW2d 482 (1968), and Gavin v Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp, 57 Misc 2d 335; 292 NYS2d 745 (1968), and Anno: 25 ALR3d 1299, supra. In Allied Fidelity Insurance Co v Lamb, 361 NE2d 174 (Ind App, 1977), the court upheld recovery where a truck propelled a rock through the windshield of the insured vehicle because 'a substantial physical nexus between the unidentified vehicle and the intermediate object is established.'

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"A common thread runs through the cases cited and explains the difference between recovery in some instances and no recovery in others. Recovery is permitted where the evidence discloses a direct causal connection between the hit-and-run vehicle and plaintiff's vehicle and which connection carries through to the plaintiff's vehicle by a continuous and contemporaneously transmitted force from the hit-and-run vehicle." 82 Mich.App. 470, 471, 267 N.W.2d 425.

Nevertheless, because the Court found the testimony insufficient to show a continuous and contemporaneously transmitted force between the phantom truck and the tire and rim assembly on the highway, recovery was denied. ¹

The third case is Adams v. Zajac, 110 Mich.App. 522, 313 N.W.2d 347 (1981). Plaintiff's wife brought suit against the Secretary of State pursuant to the hit-and-run provision of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act for the death of her husband who was killed when a truck he was operating went out of control and plunged into a creek after striking or swerving to avoid striking a tire and rim assembly lying on Interstate 75. The trial court granted the Secretary of State's motion to dismiss on grounds that there was no "physical contact" between the Adams vehicle and the unidentified vehicle. On appeal, this Court first held that physical contact did not require direct contact:

"Physical contact has been construed to include situations where no direct contact occurs. The most common circumstances in which recovery is permitted is when (1) the hit-and-run vehicle strikes a second or intervening vehicle which in turn is propelled into plaintiff's vehicle, Lord, supra, and (2) an object is propelled into the plaintiff's vehicle by another vehicle which does not stop. Barfield v Ins Co of North America, 59 Tenn App 631; 443 SW2d 482 (1968) Allied Fidelity Ins Co v Lamb, 361 NE2d 174 (Ind App, 1977). Contra, Smith v Great American Ins Co, 29 NY2d 116; 324 NYS2d 15; 272 NE2d 528 (1971). Courts have found that the purpose and intent of the physical contact requirement is served by accepting as sufficient a substantial but indirect physical contact with the claimant's vehicle, although not of the exact nature described in the statute." 110 Mich.App. 526-527, 313 N.W.2d 347.

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