Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WRIGHT
• Citation: Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal.3d 279, 98 Cal.Rptr. 785, 491 P.2d 369 (Cal. 1971)
• Decision Date: 13 December 1971
• Parties: , 491 P.2d 369 Josephine Mandl HILL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 29894. In Bank

Page 785

98 Cal.Rptr. 785

6 Cal.3d 279, 491 P.2d 369

Josephine Mandl HILL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 29894.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 13, 1971.

Carl K. Newton, City Atty., Colin Lennard, and Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Dudley Gray, Torrance, for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

This action for declaratory relief was brought to test the applicability of zoning and lot-split ordinances of the defendant City of Manhattan Beach to certain land owned by plaintiff. The trial court held that the various ordinances could not constitutionally be applied to plaintiff's property located in defendant city, that defendant abused its discretion denying plaintiff a variance, and that plaintiff was free to sell and develop the land as two separate building sites. We do not agree and reverse.

The parties have stipulated to the facts. After approval by the city, the property now owned by plaintiff became a record lot, designated Lot 1, Block 11 of Tract 3393, Los Angeles County, when a tract map was recorded in 1920. In 1928 plaintiff's predecessor in title purported to divide Lot 1 into two parcels, each with a 37.41 foot frontage. Parcel A, on a corner and containing 5,255 square feet, was retained by the owner. Parcel B, containing 5,341 square feet, was sold to a third party.

In 1941 the city adopted a zoning ordinance, establishing, inter alia, a minimum lot size of 4,800 square feet. Plaintiff acquired Parcel A later the same year and the following year built a house thereon. In 1945 plaintiff acquired Parcel B from the city by tax deed sale and since that time has held title to both parcels without interruption. No buildings or structures have been built on Parcel B. Municipal authorities levy on the two parcels by separate tax statements.

The city enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1958 which provides generally for an increased minimum single lot area of 7,500 square feet and a minimum frontage of 50 feet in the particular area where Lot 1 is located. The city thereafter enacted, in 1967, a lot-split ordinance which prohibits the division and sale of a lot into two or more parcels without prior approval of the city.

During March of 1969 plaintiff applied for a lot-split variance to establish the separate character of her two parcels as legal building sites. Following notice and public hearings in accordance with the ordinance, first defendant's board of zoning adjustment and then its city council denied plaintiff's application. Plaintiff thereafter sought the instant relief.

A building site in defendant city may consist of the ground area of one or more lots. (Manhattan Beach Municipal Code, § 10--3.216.) ¹ To be a 'lot,' a parcel of real property must have been designated on a plat, have been defined on a subdivision map, or must contain a prescribed area. ² Plaintiff's entire property was designated a lot on both a plat and a subdivision map and contains more than the minimum required square footage. Parcel B, as a separate parcel, does not qualify as a legal lot under any of the three definitions.

Development is, however, allowed on substandard lots. 'When A lot has less than the minimum required area or width as set forth in any of the zones and area districts contained in this chapter, or in a specific plan, and was of record on November 6, 1958, Such lot shall be deemed to have complied with the minimum required lot area or width. . . .' (§ 10--3.1421, italics added.) ³ This obviously pertains to 'lots' as defined by subsections (a) and (b) of section 10--3.251 (fn. 2, supra) and provides for the development of such lots which are currently substandard but were not when created by earlier small-lot subdivisions. We are aided to such conclusion in view of a further provision specifically relating to those instances wherein a parcel which is only a portion of a 'lot' may nevertheless be approved as a building site. 'That Portion of a lot containing an existing dwelling under separate ownership from the remainder of the original subdivided lot as of the date of the enactment of this section and constructed under lawful building permits is hereby declared to be a lawful building site. . . .' (§ 10--4.501.1(a), italics added.)

It is manifest that Parcel B does not qualify as a 'lot' or building site within the express meaning of sections 10--3.251, 10--3.1421, 10--4.501.1(a) or any other provision dealing with substandard lots as effected by particular or exceptional circumstances, and we cannot enlarge upon those provisions to qualify the parcel as a substandard lot in the absence of more specific directions.

We also conclude that there is nothing in the nature of the acquisition of the two parcels which together comprise Lot 1 or other circumstances which renders the property two separate and distinct 'lots' within general definitions of that term. It has already been delineated that under the controlling definition in the instant case only the entire property qualifies as a 'lot' for development purposes and that neither of the two parcels, considered separately, does. There is no significant authority which persuades us to reach a contrary conclusion. In a case closely in point the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has construed applicable and similar provisions consistently with the construction which we herein have given the ordinance. (Vetter v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro (1953) 330 Mass. 628, 116 N.E.2d 277; see also Galpin v. Village of River Forest (1962) 26 Ill.2d 515, 187 N.E.2d 233; Korby v. Township of Redford (1957) 348 Mich. 193, 82 N.W.2d 441. But cf. Schack v. Trimble (1957) 48 N.J.Super. 45, 137 A.2d 22 (separation of substandard parcels allowed where they otherwise met definition of lot but as combined unit, meeting area requirement, they failed to satisfy definition).)

In Vetter, the plaintiff owned adjacent lots, one developed and one undeveloped. The lots had been purchased at different times and were taxed separately. Neither lot contained the minimum area required by a zoning ordinance enacted subsequent to their acquisition. Thereafter the plaintiff sold the developed lot and sought a building permit to allow construction of a dwelling on the undeveloped lot. The applicable ordinance prohibited construction of a dwelling house 'on a lot containing less than such minimum area; but nothing contained in this section shall prevent the erection or placing of any building on any lot . . . containing a smaller area, provided such lot on the effective date hereof does not adjoin other land of the same owner available for use in connection with said lot. ( ) No lot on which a dwelling house . . . is situated, whether heretofore or hereafter placed, shall be reduced in area if such lot is smaller than is hereby prescribed, or if by such reduction it would be made smaller than is hereby prescribed. . . .' The Massachusetts court, indicating that neither the method of acquisition nor method of taxation was of significant consequence, concluded that the two parcels were, under the applicable ordinance, but one lot on which plaintiff could not construct a second dwelling.

In the instant case the controlling ordinance does not contain a 'merger clause,' expressly requiring that substandard parcels be considered in conjunction with adjacent, commonly owned property as did the ordinance in Vetter. Plaintiff contends that this distinction precludes application of the Vetter analysis and, indeed, compels a determination that her two parcels not be merged. Contrary to plaintiff's contention we cannot predicate a legislative intent proscribing merger on the mere absence of a merger clause. That intent can best be ascertained from an examination of the entire ordinance. Opposed to the implications raised by the absence of a merger clause are more compelling implications raised by those provisions which expressly preclude the individual development of a parcel, whether or not adjacent to other lands under common ownership, of less than the prescribed lot size. Only such substandard parcels which were record lots on November 6, 1958 (§ 10--3.1421), or on which, on the same date, a dwelling already existed (§ 10--4.501.1(a)), are accorded exceptional treatment by the legislative body. It is manifest that had there been a legislative intent to exempt other particular substandard parcels without regard to the possibility of merger, express provision would have been made therefor. Argument similar to that advanced by plaintiff has been rejected under a New York ordinance which likewise contained no merger clause. (Khare v. Incorporated Village of Massapequa Park (1970) 62 Misc.2d 68, 69--71, 307 N.Y.S.2d 996, affd. (1970) 35 App.Div.2d 653, 314 N.Y.S.2d 357, affd. (1970) 27 N.Y.2d 991, 318 N.Y.S.2d 746, 267 N.E.2d 481.)

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that Parcel B does not qualify as a lot or other lawful building site under the applicable provisions of the Manhattan Beach Municipal Code. If Parcel B had been separately improved prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance it would have qualified as a building site under section 10--4.501.1(a) and, it further appears, the city could not have constitutionally prohibited its development or sale. (Morris v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 856, 254 P.2d 935.) If Parcel B, even though substandard, had been recorded as a 'lot' on a plat or a subdivision map prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance, it would be exempt from that ordinance and could be developed or sold separately. (§§ 10--3.251(a)--(b), 10--3.1421.) Since neither of these contingencies occurred, the owner of Parcel B, like any other owner of a substandard 'non-lot' whether or not also the owner of adjacent land, cannot qualify such parcel as a building site under any provision of the ordinance....