Hill v. City of Hammond

• Docket Number: 2:10-CV-393-TLS
• Decision Date: 21 July 2023
• Parties: JAMES HILL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA and MICHAEL SOLAN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

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JAMES HILL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA and MICHAEL SOLAN, Defendants.

No. 2:10-CV-393-TLS

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

July 21, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Motion for an “Indicative Ruling” Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62.1(a) Regarding the Parties' Joint Request to Vacate the Verdict and Judgment as a Condition Precedent to Settlement [ECF No. 399], filed on July 7, 2023. The parties represent that they have reached a settlement conditioned upon this Court's vacating the Jury Verdict [ECF No. 347], the Clerk's Entry of Judgment [ECF No 371], and the Court's grant of attorneys' fees [ECF No. 398]. In the Motion, the parties request that the Court indicate whether, upon remand from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court would grant a joint motion for vacatur of the jury verdict, judgment, and award of attorneys' fees. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motion and indicates that it would grant the parties' motion to vacate on remand.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff filed his Complaint [ECF No. 1] against the Defendants Frank DuPey, Richard Tumildalsky, Raymond Myszak Michael Solan, and the City of Hammond, Indiana, on October 24, 2010, alleging that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and bringing claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The parties dismissed Defendant Tumildalsky by stipulation on February 13, 2011. See ECF No. 35. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant DuPey on March 18, 2016, see ECF No. 205, and in favor of Defendant Myszak on March 30, 2016, see ECF No 207.

The Plaintiff proceeded to trial on his claims against Defendants Solan and the City of Hammond. The trial began on November 7, 2022, see ECF No. 325, and lasted eight days, see ECF No. 346. After closing arguments on the eighth day, the jury deliberated and reached a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. See ECF No. 347. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $25 million in compensatory damages against Defendants Solan and the City of Hammond, and it awarded $500,000 in punitive damages against Defendant Solan. Id. The Clerk of Court entered judgment on January 24, 2023. ECF No. 371. The Court granted the Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, with modifications, on May 31, 2023. ECF No. 398.

The Defendants filed notices of appeal with the Court on February 23, 2023. ECF Nos. 377, 378. The parties then jointly filed the instant Motion on July 7, 2023. The parties indicate that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered them to mediation, which took place on June 1, 2023. Mot. ¶ 5, ECF No. 399; see ECF No. 399-2. As a result of the meditation, the parties reached an agreement to settle this matter and another matter pending between them in this Court (Cause No. 2:22-CV-262). Mot. ¶ 5. The parties' agreement to settle is subject to multiple conditions precedent, including the vacatur of the jury verdict, judgment, and award of attorneys' fees in this Court and the approval of the parties' Settlement by the City of Hammond's Common Council. See Settlement 1-2, ECF No. 399-3.

On July 7, 2023, to satisfy the condition of settlement requiring vacatur of matters in this Court, the parties jointly filed the instant Motion. The parties represent as follows:

If this Court indicates that it is inclined to grant the parties' vacatur request as per this Joint Motion, then the parties will ask the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to remand this matter so that they can make a formal Motion To Vacate with this Court pursuant to RULE 60.

Mot. ¶ 6.

DISCUSSION

The parties request that the Court indicate, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a), whether it is inclined to grant their motion for relief under Rule 60(b). Rule 62.1(a) provides,

If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: . . . (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a).

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure explain that where a district court “states either that it would grant the motion or that the motion raises a substantial issue,” “the movant must promptly notify the circuit clerk.” Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(a). In such cases, “the court of appeals may remand for further proceedings but retains jurisdiction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal.” Fed. R. App. 12.1(b).

The Court's next step, then, is to consider the parties' motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6). “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [when] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or . . . [for] any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), (6). The relief provided under this rule is “fundamentally equitable in nature,” Ramirez v. United States, 799 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted), and must be “administered upon equitable principles,” Di Vito v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 361 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1966). In determining whether to vacate the jury verdict, judgment, and award of attorneys' fees in this case, “the Court will be guided by the array of equitable factors of justice and hardship traditionally balanced by district courts in considering requests for Rule 60(b) relief,” which include “the public interests in precedent, preclusion, and judicial economy” and “the circumstances, hardships, and interests of the private parties.” Mayes v. City of Hammond, 631 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Ind. 2008).

A. Public Interests

1. Precedential Value

Other than the persuasive value of the Court's award of attorneys' fees, there are no public interests in precedent that weigh against vacatur here. The parties have reached a settlement after years of litigation and numerous adjudications on the part of this Court, including a jury verdict, judgment, and award of attorneys' fees. The judicial decisions arising from a case, however, “are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (“Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole.”); see also Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[O]nce . . . a decision has been rendered we decline to allow [parties] to dictate, by purchase and sale, whether the precedent it sets will remain in existence.”);Matter of Mem'l Hosp. of Iowa Cnty., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1988) (“When a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent, however, the judicial system ought not allow the social value of that precedent, created at cost to the public and other litigants, to be a bargaining chip in the process of settlement.”).

In contrast with an appellate court's decision to vacate one of its precedents, here, the Court is not as concerned with the policy of preserving precedential value because district court decisions “[do] not have stare decisis effect; [they] are not . . . precedent.” Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc, 406 F.3d 453, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[D]istrict court decisions cannot be treated as authoritative on issues of law.”). Courts have also recognized that a jury verdict and judgment have little to no precedential value. Mayes, 631 F.Supp.2d at 1090 (noting that a judgment based on a jury verdict “has no precedential value”); Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 913 F.Supp.2d 598, 605-06 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that “a jury verdict alone has little or no precedential value” (internal citation omitted)); Orlowski v. Eriksen, No. 07 C 4015, 2010 WL 2401938, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2010) (same).

Although the Court's award of attorneys' fees does not have precedential value, it does have persuasive value. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 875 F.2d 1252, 1255 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (“If there is no rule in the court rendering a decision limiting the precedential value of its opinions, those opinions may be cited and are entitled to whatever weight the persuasive force of their reasoning warrants.”); Midlock, 406 F.3d at 458 (“[A district court decision] may be a wise, well-reasoned decision that persuades by the quality of its reasoning ....”). Courts or the public may find value in the opinion's substantive construction of the law, see Mayes, 631 F.Supp.2d at 1090 (distinguishing cases with little to no precedential value with those containing substantive constructions of the law), or in the opinion's benchmark for a reasonable fee that speaks to the prevailing market rate for attorney services, see Hill v. City of Hammond, No. 2:10-CV-393, 2023 WL 3735593, at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. May 31, 2023) (concluding that a $350 hourly rate is reasonable in light of rates charged by similarly experienced attorneys in the community); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ates awarded in similar cases are clearly evidence of an attorney's market rate.”). The Court proceeds in evaluating the balance of equities that weigh in favor of or against vacatur keeping in mind the slight persuasive value of the Court's award of attorneys' fees.

2. Preclusive Effect

The Court is not concerned with issue preclusion, particularly in light of the parties' Settlement. “Issue preclusion...