Hill v. Davis
| Decision Date | 19 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CA 18-00287-JB-C |
| Parties | DONISHER R. HILL, Plaintiff, v. DON DAVIS and DAVID ZIMMERMAN in their official and personal capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the undersigned on Plaintiff Donisher R. Hill's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 49)1 following the district court's adoption of the Report and Recommendation filed on March 6, 2019. (Doc. 45). Having considered Plaintiff's instant Motion and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 32) and supplemental filings (Docs. 34, 40), it is determined that Plaintiff's Motion is due to be denied, and Defendant's Motion is due to be granted, for the reasons outlined in the earlier Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 45, pp. 18 - 25). It is also determined that an award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $2,926.24 would constitute an appropriate sanction pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. Background As more fully set out in the earlier-filed Report and Recommendation (Doc. 45, pp. 1 - 5) Plaintiff commenced this action on June 25, 2018, claiming Don Davis, Probate Judge of Mobile County, and Mr. David Zimmerman, an attorney, violated her state and federal rights. (See Docs. 1 & 5).2 Thereafter, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, (see Docs. 7 & 18), arguing several grounds upon which the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Judge Davis also filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $5,806.33. (Doc. 32, p. 3). On September 25, 2018, Judge Davis supplemented his Motion for Sanctions with a "Supplemental Filing," which contained invoices from his counsel for fees and costs incurred as a result of this litigation. (see generally, Doc. 40).
After taking the parties' pleadings and motions under submission, the undersigned found that Plaintiff's claims were due to be dismissed (Doc. 45, pp. 7 - 15) and that sanctions were appropriate. (Id. at pp. 16 - 25). Specifically, it was found that sanctions were appropriate as Plaintiff was put on notice that her claims were frivolous (at least as early as July 9, 2018, and no later than September 19, 2018), Plaintiff was put on notice that sanctions would be recommended because she failed to withdraw her claims or cure her pleading deficiencies by the deadline set by the Court, and that Plaintiff continued this litigation after being put on such notice. (Doc. 45, pp. 17 - 18; 20 - 24). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Report and Recommendation.3 The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation in toto on March 28, 2019. Plaintiff then filed a "Motion for Reconsideration of the Sanction Provision of Document Number 48." (Doc. 49). In her Motion, Plaintiff argues that her conduct does not warrant sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and cites Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 1989) as grounds for reconsidering the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, the undersigned construes Defendant's argument to include objections to the finding that sanctions are warranted, as well as to any amount of fees that the Court imposes. Each issue will be addressed in turn below.
"A post-judgment motion may be treated as made pursuant to either Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or 60—regardless of how the motion is styled by the movant—depending on the type of relief sought." Mays v. U.S. Postal Service, 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir.1997). Plaintiff's undesignated post-judgment motion for reconsideration is construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment of March 28, 2019 (Doc. 48) for two reasons. First, the motion was filed within the time period for filing Rule 59(e) motions and the Eleventh Circuit uses this factor when determining how to classify the motion. Cormier v. Green, 141 Fed.Appx. 808, 815, 2005 WL 1620475, at *6 (11th Cir. 2005) () (citing Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 258-59 (11th Cir.1988).4
Secondly, Plaintiff is clearly seeking to have the Court reconsider that portion of the judgment wherein it was determined that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, a request fitting neatly into the Rule 59 domain. Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 729 F.2d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir. 1984) (); see also Hayes Family Trust v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 845 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2017) ().
The Eleventh Circuit admonishes that "[p]arties, however, cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to re-litigate old matters, Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.2005), or to raise new legal arguments which could and should have been made during the pendency of the underlying motion, Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir.2001)." U.S. v. Klohn, 2010 WL 1379961, at *2 (M.D.Fla.,2010). As this Court has explained:
Motions to reconsider under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to a stringent legal standard. In that regard, it is hornbook law that "[i]n the interest of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly." Longcrier v. HL-A Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1246 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (citations omitted). [...] "Nor are motions to reconsider properly filed as a kneejerk reaction by a dissatisfied federal court loser." Lee v. Thomas, [No. 10-cv-0587-WS-M,] 2012 WL 3137901, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2012). Rather, under Rule 59(e), [...] "a party may move for reconsideration only when one of the following has occurred: an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Longcrier, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Courts will impose Rule 11 sanctions: "(1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2) when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law; or (3) when the party files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose." Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
A two-step inquiry is normally conducted in the evaluation of a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. First, the court will determine whether the non-moving party's claims are objectively frivolous. Next, the court will consider whether the pro se party should have been aware that the claims were frivolous. Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 503 Fed.Appx. 699, 703, 2013 WL 56640, at *3 (11th Cir. 2013) ().
Claims are deemed frivolous when it is determined that no reasonably competent attorney (or pro se party) could conclude that they have any reasonable chance of success or that there is a reasonable argument to change existing law. Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996). "A factual claim is frivolous if no reasonably competent attorney (or pro se party) could conclude that it has a reasonable evidentiary basis." Woodhull v. Mascarella, 2016 WL 3660527, at *2 (N.D.Fla., 2016) (). "As such where a party does not offer any evidence or only 'patently frivolous' evidence to support factual contention, sanctions can be imposed." (Id.) (quoting Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d at 536). A pro se litigant's "obligations under Rule 11 are not measured solely at the time of filing" but reasonable inquiries must be made during the proceeding to determine if a violation has occurred. Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 953 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1992) ().
"Rule 11(c) permits sanctions for any violation of Rule 11(b). "The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to reduce frivolous claims, defenses, or motions, and to deter costly meritless maneuvers." Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Sanctions, if found necessary, "must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The available sanctions include "nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court;...
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