Hill v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-00076-GFVT |
| Parties | ROBERT HILL, Plaintiff, v. DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Change Venue. [R. 58.] ¶ 2014, Plaintiff Robert Hill filed his complaint in a multidistrict litigation action in the Northern District of Texas. [R. 1 at 3.] After consolidated pretrial proceedings, the Northern District of Texas transferred the case to this Court so that it might be consolidated with a similar case in this District. [R. 49.] But the prospect of consolidation does not allow the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Accordingly the Eastern District of Kentucky is an improper venue for Mr Hill's case. The Court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion to Change Venue and transfer this case to the Western District of Kentucky.
In 2004, Mr. Hill underwent a total hip arthroplasty at a hospital in Nashville, Tennessee. [R. 20 at 4.] The surgery used a Pinnacle Hip metal-on-metal implant device, which the Defendants developed and sold across the country. Id. at 1-3. After experiencing pain, Mr. Hill had a second total hip arthroplasty to remove the implant. Id. at 5. Mr. Hill alleges twelve causes of action against the Defendants, arguing that they are liable for his injuries and expenses. Id. at 6-19.
Many other recipients of Pinnacle products had similar complaints. Accordingly, the cases were consolidated as a multidistrict litigation action in the Northern District of Texas for pretrial proceedings, including discovery, and the court allowed plaintiffs to directly file their case in the MDL. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, Civil Action No. 3:11-md-2244-K, R. 20, at 4-5 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2011). After pretrial proceedings concluded, the court transferred Mr. Hill's case to the Eastern District of Kentucky for trial. [R. 48; R. 49.]
The Defendants move to transfer this action to another judicial district, arguing that the Eastern District of Kentucky is an improper venue for this action. [R. 58.] Mr. Hill argues that the Court should not revisit Judge Kinkeade's decision to transfer the action to this jurisdiction. [R. 64 at 2.] And even if the Court should question Judge Kinkeade's decision, Mr. Hill argues that venue in the Eastern District of Kentucky is proper. Id. at 4.
Mr Hill contends that Judge Kinkeade's decision to transfer the case to this Court should continue to govern any venue dispute under the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine “encapsulates a simple idea: courts generally decline to redecide issues that they have already decided.” Samons v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 25 F.4th 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). The doctrine promotes judicial efficiency by prohibiting parties from indefinitely relitigating the same issues that the Court resolved in an earlier part of the case. Id. ().
The law of the case doctrine is discretionary. See id. It “does not limit a court's power to make an independent decision; rather it ‘directs a court's discretion'” and “merely expresses the practice of courts generally.” Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)); Messenger, 225 U.S. at 444. The Sixth Circuit does not “impose any conditions or limitations upon a court's power to review a prior ruling of another court.” United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990).
This case began when Mr. Hill filed his complaint directly into the multidistrict litigation action in the Northern District of Texas. [R. 1.] After pretrial proceedings, the parties submitted a joint status report that recommended jurisdictions for trial. [R. 41.] The Defendants proposed the Middle District of Tennessee, and Mr. Hill proposed either the Eastern District of Kentucky or the Western District of Kentucky. Id. at 1-2. The special master then recommended transferring the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky “pursuant to the recommendation in the parties' joint status report.” [R. 48.] The recommendation appeared in the docket text only and did not include any reason for the decision or articulation of the arguments considered. Id. Judge Kinkeade ordered the transfer of 28 cases, including Mr. Hill's, to various districts the same day in keeping with the special master's recommendations. [R. 49.] The order also did not include any explanation. Id.
The Court will not acquiesce to Judge Kinkeade's determination. First, the law of the case may not apply because there is no indication that Judge Kinkeade specifically considered and resolved the parties' venue arguments. See Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980) (); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000) ( the same). But even if the law of the case applied to the transfer, this Court will exercise its discretion to make an independent venue determination and find that venue is improper in this District. See Moses, 929 F.2d at 1137.
The Defendants contend that the Court should transfer the action because this District is not a proper venue for Mr Hill's claims against the Defendants. [R. 58 at 4.] Indeed, a court should dismiss or transfer a case laying venue in the wrong district. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A proper venue for an action includes a district in which any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state where the district sits and a district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2). Mr. Hill argues that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Kentucky because all Defendants reside in Kentucky and DePuy Orthopardics, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson reside in the Eastern District. [R. 64 at 5.]
For venue purposes, the Defendants reside in any judicial district in which they are subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction for Mr. Hill's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Because Kentucky has multiple judicial districts-the Eastern and Western Districts-the Court treats the Eastern District and the Western District as if they are separate states for determining where the Defendants reside. Id. at § 1391(d). So, Mr. Hill must show that a court in the Eastern District of Kentucky has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, which Mr. Hill cannot establish by showing that a court in the Western District has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. But because this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over any defendant, it must transfer the action.
When determining whether a defendant not domiciled in the state is subject to personal jurisdiction, a Kentucky court follows a two-step process.[1] First, the court “must proceed under KRS 454.210 to determine if the cause of action arises from conduct or activity from the defendant that fits into one of the statute's enumerated categories.” Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Ky. 2011). If not, then the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction. Id. Second, the court determines whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would offend the defendant's due process rights. Id. Here, Mr. Hill's claims do not arise from the Defendants' relevant activities under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210. Moreover, exercising personal jurisdiction would offend the Defendants' due process rights for the same reason.
First, Mr. Hill contends that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction because DePuy Orthopaedics and Johnson & Johnson “marketed and sold Pinnacle line of hip implants throughout the United States, including within the Eastern District of Kentucky.” [R. 64 at 5.] Additionally, Mr. Hill alleges that DePuy Orthopaedics maintains a registered agent and registered office in the Eastern District. Id. Yet Mr. Hill did not serve DePuy's registered agent, which may have conferred personal jurisdiction. See Haven Point Enters., Inc. v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1985). Rather, Mr. Hill contends that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction because his claims arise from these activities. [R. 64 at 5-6.]
For the defendant's activities to confer personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claim “must have arisen from the conduct and activities of the defendant.” Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC 336 S.W.3d at 58. For a claim to arise from activity, the claim “must have originated from, or came into being, as a result of the” activities. Id. In other words, a court properly exercises jurisdiction when there is a “reasonable and direct nexus between the wrongful acts alleged in the complaint” and a defendant's qualifying activities in the jurisdiction. Id. at 59. Here, Mr. Hill underwent hip replacement surgery with the alleged defective device in the Middle District of Tennessee. [R. 20 at 4.] Mr. Hill lives in the Western District of Kentucky, where he experienced hip complications. Id. at 3, 5. He does not allege that the specific device he received has a connection to the Eastern District of Kentucky. Therefore, Mr. Hill's claims regarding his hip implant do not come into being as a result of the Defendants' marketing or sale of other hip implant products in this District because those...
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