Hill v. First Atl. Bank

Decision Date20 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. A13A1723.,A13A1723.
PartiesHILL v. FIRST ATLANTIC BANK.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John Samuel Choate Jr., Brunswick, J. Alexander Atwood Jr., Casey Jean Viggiano, for Appellant.

Nathan Christopher Johnson, for Appellee.

RAY, Judge.

This appeal arises out of the lower court's grant of First Atlantic Bank's (“First Atlantic”) motion for summary judgment against defendant Cecily Hill. On appeal, Hill claims that the trial court violated a legislative stay under OCGA § 9–10–150 by allowing a summary judgment hearing to continue while Hill's attorney, Alex Atwood, who is a state representative from House District 179, was attending the 20122013 session of the General Assembly. Because we believe the trial court misconstrued OCGA § 9–10–150, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The record indicates that in February 2011, First Atlantic sued Hill and Lynn Knox for breach of a promissory note in Glynn County Superior Court. On April 14, 2011, Atwood requested and was issued an order granting a legislative stay under OCGA § 9–10–150. In November 2011, the trial court granted First Atlantic's motion for default judgment against Knox, and the case against Hill was transferred to the Superior Court of Camden County. The Camden County trial court entered an order continuing the legislative stay.

First Atlantic filed a motion for summary judgment on April 10, 2012, and Hill requested oral argument on the motion. The trial court issued a notice of hearing scheduling oral argument on the summary judgment motion for January 18, 2013. As January 18, 2013, fell within the regular session of the General Assembly, Atwood and his partner, Samuel Choate, sought and obtained a continuance due to Atwood's legislative service. First Atlantic objected to this continuance, claiming that because two other attorneys from Atwood's firm were “actively involved in this case, there is no reason to further delay” and requesting that the court withdraw its order staying this matter and set this case for hearing instanter.” Pursuant to First Atlantic's objection, the trial court re-scheduled the hearing for February 15, 2013, when the General Assembly was still in session.1 Despite protests by the defense counsel, the trial court held the hearing on February 15, 2013, and ultimately granted First Atlantic's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Hill appeals the summary judgment ruling, claiming the trial court did not have discretion to deny Atwood's legislative stay while he represented his district in the regular session of the General Assembly. We agree.

On appeal, we review the lower court's interpretation of a statute de novo, as statutory interpretation is a question of law. Brantley Land & Timber, LLC v. W & D Investments, Inc., 316 Ga.App. 277, 279, 729 S.E.2d 458 (2012). The statute at issue states, in relevant part, the following:

A member of the General Assembly who is a party to or the attorney for a party to a case, or any member of the staff of the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives, or the chairperson of the Judiciary Committee or Special Judiciary Committee of the Senate or of the Judiciary Committee or Judiciary, Non-civil Committee of the House of Representatives who is the lead counsel for a party to a case pending in any trial or appellate court or before any administrative agency of this state, shall be granted a continuance and stay of the case. The continuance and stay shall apply to all aspects of the case, including, but not limited to, ... appearance at any hearing, trial or argument. Unless a shorter length of time is requested by the member, the continuance and stay shall last the length of any regular or extraordinary session of the General Assembly and during the first three weeks following any recess or adjournment.

(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9–10–150. It is undisputed that Atwood was Hill's counsel in the case at bar, as his name appears on all relevant court documents.

First Atlantic argued and the trial court accepted the proposition that a presiding judge may override a legislative stay if other actively involved attorneys are available to appear on the behalf of the legislator/attorney. First Atlantic claims that the legislature's use of “ the ” when describing “attorney for a party to a case in OCGA § 9–10–150 indicates that “the statute plainly and unequivocally provides for a legislative stay only when the attorney is a member of the General Assembly and is sole counsel for a party.” We do not agree.

“Language in one part of the statute must be construed in light of the legislature's intent as found in the whole statute.” (Footnote omitted.) Echols v. A.G. Thomas, 265 Ga. 474, 475, 458 S.E.2d 100 (1995). OCGA § 9–10–150 describes two sets of protections: those for members of the General Assembly and those for the staff of high-ranking officials in the Senate and House of Representatives. Both of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Gottschalk v. Woods
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 2014
    ...while the claim is pending.” Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review is de novo. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga.App. 731, 732, 747 S.E.2d 892 (2013). In interpreting federal statutes, we must strive “to give effect to the will of Congress,” Griffin v. Oceanic Cont......
  • Massey v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 24, 2017
    ...not to umbrella policies. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank , 323 Ga.App. 731, 732, 747 S.E.2d 892 (2013). "When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and sa......
  • Gundy v. Balli
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 19, 2022
    ...Because the issues raised on appeal involve the interpretation of this statute, we apply a de novo review. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank , 323 Ga. App. 731, 732, 747 S.E.2d 892 (2013).The facts are largely undisputed. In 2016, Georgia voters amended the state constitution to alter the structu......
  • ARCO Design/Build, LLC v. Savannah Green I Owner, LLC.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 21, 2022
    ...730, 870 S.E.2d 53 (2022). Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank , 323 Ga. App. 731, 732, 747 S.E.2d 892 (2013). And, as lien statutes are in derogation of the common law, they "must be strictly construed in favor of the pr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT