Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 04-0621.
| Decision Date | 30 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-0621.,04-0621. |
| Citation | 705 N.W.2d 665 |
| Parties | Janice Irene HILL, Appellant, v. FLEETGUARD, INC. and Travelers Insurance Co., Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mark S. Soldat of Max Schott & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard G. Book of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe & Lanz, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Janice Hill appeals from a district court's judgment affirming the denial of permanent partial disability workers' compensation benefits by the industrial commissioner. Hill claims the district court erred by ignoring the deputy's determinations of witness veracity. We do not reach this issue because we find it was not properly preserved for appellate review. Hill also claims the commissioner injected unsupported material facts into his decision. We find Hill's substantial rights were not prejudiced by these alleged errors. Hill also challenges the commissioner's conclusion that Hill suffered no permanent disability. We find there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner's decision and affirm the district court.
Hill had been out of the workforce for twenty years before she began her employment with Fleetguard, Inc. During this time she was treated for numerous medical conditions. Hill consulted various doctors complaining of pain in her chest, abdomen, back, neck, shoulder, as well as numbness and tingling in her right thumb. Between 1982 and 1998 she was diagnosed with cervical strain, lumbosacral strain, degenerative cervical osteophytes (bone spurs), and costochondritis (inflammation of the rib joints, and attachments of intercostal muscles to the ribs). She was also diagnosed with mitral valve prolapse, a heart condition which she treated with medication as needed. Doctors prescribed treatment ranging from ibuprofen and heating pads to more advanced treatments such as pain medication, anti-inflammatory medication, physical therapy, and cervical traction. Hill had approximately twenty different visits to various doctors, including two trips to the Mayo Clinic, relating to pain in her neck, back, and chest.
In November of 1998, Hill, at the age of forty-nine, reentered the workforce as an assembler on the production line at Fleetguard. Hill rotated amongst different positions on the line assembling, inspecting, and packaging filters. She soon found the filters she was required to handle on one part of the line were too heavy, and caused her chest pains.1 In January of 1999, she went to her primary care physician, Dr. Susan Sieh, for this latest episode of chest pain. Dr. Sieh recommended she change to a less weight-intensive part of the assembly line. Her supervisor followed this request and moved her to a welding machine off the assembly line.
Hill eventually moved back to the assembly line placing center tubes in filters. After only three weeks she returned to her doctor complaining of chest pain. Her doctor took her off work and recommended she refrain from activities that exacerbated the pain.
Hill returned to the Mayo Clinic for cardiac evaluation in October of 1999 and was diagnosed with musculoskeletal chest wall pain and a minimal mitral valve prolapse. In January of 2000, she was assigned to work on center tubes again. Two weeks later she returned to the doctor because of "musculoskeletal chest pain due to her work." Her doctor told her to never work on center tubes again. Hill returned to work at various positions, ranging from the assembly line to the welding machine. Hill began to develop right hip, leg, and back pain, from the repetitive motion of pressing the welding machine foot pedal ten times per minute, or approximately 4800 times per shift.
Hill returned to the doctor complaining of discomfort in her right leg. Her doctor diagnosed sciatic neuritis (burning pain or numbness and tingling that runs down the back side of the leg) and prescribed new medication along with physical therapy. The doctor also restricted her from working at the welding machine for three weeks.
Hill filed three separate petitions with the workers' compensation commission alleging injuries to her upper body, including her upper extremities, neck and chest, right elbow, and right hip. Fleetguard and its insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Company, denied the injuries alleged in all three petitions. These petitions were consolidated into two claims.
These two claims came for hearing before a deputy workers' compensation commissioner in July of 2002. At the hearing, Hill described her continuing health problems and explained how she could no longer hike or go on long walks. She also indicated she was currently on voluntary layoff from Fleetguard. Three doctors gave medical opinions concerning Hill's condition.
Dr. Donna Bahls, a physician obtained by Fleetguard, opined Hill's neck, shoulder, and back pain were due to temporary aggravations of a preexisting degenerative spine problem. Dr. Bahls determined the work activities temporarily aggravated Hill's costochondritis, but found they caused no structural change or permanent physical impairment. Dr. Bahls assigned no impairment ratings for any of the injuries.
Dr. Justin Ban, Hill's evaluating physician, concluded her "work activities caused, contributed or materially and permanently aggravated her costochondritis, medical epicondylitis, tendonitis, and cumulative trauma disorder," but also concluded her conditions were unratable under the AMA guidelines.
Dr. Susan Sieh, her primary care physician, discussed how Hill's preexisting costochondritis would "flare" during some work activities and concluded, "[t]he more she does and the heavier she works, the more pain she will have." She determined the costochondritis would not result in permanent impairment, but her "right hip [pain] may or may not be permanent." Dr. Sieh, like the other doctors, declined to assign any permanent impairment ratings.
The deputy concluded, under the first claim, Hill sustained a ten percent permanent industrial disability to her body as a whole as a result of the injury to her chest. Under the second claim, the deputy determined Hill suffered a twenty percent permanent industrial disability to her body as a whole as a result of the injury to her hip, and a five percent industrial disability to her right arm as a result of the injury to her elbow. The deputy also awarded healing period benefits, payment for her medical expenses, and penalty benefits for non-payment of permanent partial disability compensation.
Fleetguard appealed to the industrial commissioner. The commissioner generally adopted the findings and conclusions of the deputy commissioner with one major exception. He determined Hill "failed to prove ... the injuries caused any permanent disability of any type" and denied Hill any award for permanent partial disability benefits because her work-related injuries were "merely temporary."
Hill sought judicial review through the district court. The district court affirmed the commissioner's decision noting substantial evidence supported the ruling in light of Hill's past history of medical problems and the lack of permanent impairment ratings. Hill appealed.
Hill argues three issues: (1) the court should have treated the deputy's determinations of witness veracity "as a piece of evidence" to be placed on the scales weighing the supporting and detracting evidence for substantiality, (2) the commissioner's decision should be reversed because he injected material facts in the final decision without any basis for such facts in the evidentiary record, and (3) the commissioner incorrectly decided Hill was not entitled to permanent partial disability compensation benefits.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, governs judicial review of the commissioner's decisions. Iowa Code § 86.26 (2001). In exercising its judicial review power, the district court acts in an appellate capacity. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa 2004). When reviewing the district court's decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. Id. at 464. If the conclusions are the same, we affirm; otherwise we reverse. Id.
Hill's arguments on appeal deal with whether the commissioner made an error of law, whether there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner's findings, and whether the commissioner correctly applied the law to the facts. The following provisions of section 17A.19(10) are relevant:
The court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action ... if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is any of the following:
....
c. Based upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.
....
f. Based upon a determination of fact ... that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.
....
m. Based upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (f), (m). The commissioner has not been vested with the final authority to interpret the law by which permanent partial disability compensation benefits are awarded, so we will not defer to the agency's interpretation of such law and we are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the commissioner's interpretation. See Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 2005); Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (11)(b).
The factual findings regarding the award of benefits are within the commissioner's...
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