Hill v. Harding

• Decision Date: 13 May 1889
• Citation: Hill v. Harding, 130 U.S. 699, 9 S.Ct. 725, 32 L.Ed. 1083 (1889)
• Parties: HILL v. HARDING et al. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

130 U.S. 699

9 S.Ct. 725

32 L.Ed. 1083

HILL v. HARDING et al.¹

May 13, 1889.

[Statement of Case from pages 699-701 intentionally omitted] George W. Brandt, for plaintiff in error.

John M. Glover, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented by this writ of error is quite distinct from that which arose when the case was before this court at a former term, as reported in 107 U. S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404. The only point then decided was that the defendant, on his application made after verdict and before judgment, was entitled to a stay of proceedings to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy upon the question of his discharge. The question not then passed upon, and now presented, is whether, since he has obtained his discharge in bankruptcy, there is anything in the provisions of the bankrupt act to prevent the state court from rendering judgment on the verdict against him, with a perpetual stay of execution, so as to prevent the plaintiffs from enforcing the judgment against him, and leave them at liberty to proceed against the sureties in the bond or recognizance given to dissolve an attachment made more than four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Such attachments being recognized as valid byt he bankrupt act, (Rev. St. § 5044,) a discharge in bankruptcy does not prevent the attaching creditors from taking judgment against the debtor in such limited form as may enable them to reap the benefit of their attachment. When the attachment remains in force, the creditors, notwithstanding the discharge, may have judgment against the bankrupt, to be levied only upon the property attached. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 623; Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642. When the attachment has been dissolved, in accordance with the statutes of the state, by the defendant's entering into a bond or recognizance, with sureties, conditioned to pay to the plaintiffs, within a certain number of days after any judgment rendered against him on a final trial, the amount of that judgment, the question whether the state court is powerless to render even a formal judgment against him for the single purpose of charging such sureties, or, in the phrase of Chief Justice WAITE in Wolf v. Stix, 99 U. S. 1, 9, whether 'the judgment is defeated by the bankruptcy of the person for whom the obligation is assumed,' depends, not upon any provision of the bankrupt act, but upon the extent of the authority of the state court under the local law. Whether that authority is exercised under the settled practice of the court, as in Illinois, or only by virtue of an express statute, as in Massachusetts, there is nothing in the bankrupt...