Hill v. Hill

• Citation: 113 So. 306,216 Ala. 435
• Decision Date: 07 April 1927
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 713
• Parties: HILL v. HILL et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

113 So. 306

216 Ala. 435

HILL v. HILL et al.

7 Div. 713

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 7, 1927

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1927

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cherokee County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by W.H. Cather against Maud Hill, as administratrix of the estate of M.A. Hill, deceased, on the one hand, and G.E. Hill and others on the other. From a decree for G.E. Hill and others, respondent Maud Hill, as such administratrix, appeals. Affirmed.

Hugh Reed, of Center, for appellant.

Chas J. Scott, of Ft. Payne, for appellees.

SAYRE J.

This cause, having been removed from the law side of the court to the equity docket on the interpleader of the original defendant, became a contest between the personal representative of M.A. Hill, deceased, appellant, and the heirs at law of W.C. Hill, deceased, appellees. The estate of W.C. Hill consisted in large part of lands. His widow, M.A Hill, joined his heirs at law in the conveyance of a parcel of land to one Jennings, who executed his several promissory notes for deferred installments of the purchase money payable to M.A. Hill. To arrange this purchase-money indebtedness, Jennings procured a loan from the Federal Land Bank, and the money was placed with Cather, the agent of the bank, to be delivered to M.A. Hill when the notes should be delivered up and the mortgage deed of trust executed by Jennings to M.A. Hill should be satisfied. Mrs. Hill died, after which, everything else being arranged, Cather was confronted by the adversary claims of appellant as administratrix, on the one hand, and appellees as heirs of W.C. Hill, on the other. Hence his bill of interpleader after which the cause proceeded as one between appellant and appellees. It is conceded on all hands that the heirs, in conveying the land and permitting the notes to be made payable to M.A. Hill, were making some sort of provision for their mother. The difference between the parties arises out of their different understandings of the nature of the provision for Mrs. Hill--whether the purchase-money notes were made payable to her as a gift, or whether the provision was intended as a trust for her support while she lived, with remainder of any unexpended balance to the donors.

Whether a gift or a trust was intended is a matter of pure intention, though, apart from the relation between the parties, the presumption in the first instance would be that a gift was intended but this was a mere presumption. The issue thus presented by the stated difference between the parties called for the admission of all parol evidence, otherwise competent, tending to throw light on the question. Montgomery v. McNutt, 214 Ala. 692, 108 So. 752.

Appellees' contention, heretofore stated in a slightly different form, is that they, the children of M.A. Hill and heirs of W.C. Hill, agreed among themselves that they would sell the parcel of land to Jennings, and that the fund thus produced should constitute, in effect, a trust for the support of their mother, the remainder of the fund, if any, at her death to revert to themselves, and that, with this understanding, they made title and the notes securing the purchase money were made payable to their mother. As we have already said, it was competent to prove this trust by parol; but most of the testimony adduced to this end was objected to, and was obnoxious to the objection that it violated the rule of section 7721 of the Code, which, in relevant part, is that--

"No person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit or proceeding shall be allowed to testify against the party to whom his interest is opposed, as to any transaction with, or statement by, the deceased person whose estate is interested in the result of the suit or proceeding."

The witnesses in question, parties to this suit and interested in its result, undertook to testify to a transaction in which it was agreed between them and their mother, whose interest and estate is represented by appellant, her administratrix substantially as we have stated the facts, sufficient, if competently proved, to establish the trust for which appellees contend. However, Elizabeth Nichols, a granddaughter of appellant's intestate, testified...