Hill v. Hill

• Decision Date: 25 January 1925
• Citation: 127 A. 584
• Parties: HILL v. HILL.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

127 A. 584

HILL

v. HILL.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Jan. 25, 1925.

Suit for divorce from bed and board by Paula Swerak Hill against Charles Hill. Decree for complainant.

George W. Babcock, of Hackensack, for petitioner.

Hart & Vanderwart, of Hackensack, for defendant.

BENTLEY, V. C. This is a suit for divorce from bed and board on the ground of extreme cruelty.

The parties were married in 1912, and resided together until the early part of 1918, when the wife withdrew from the defendant's home for a short time, returning to him, however, and remaining with him until December, 1922. She alleges that the hiatus in their cohabitation was due to attempts upon his part for sexual intercourse in perverted form. Although this is strenuously denied by him, I am inclined to believe that what she says is true, both because of corroborating circumstances proved in the cause and the man's undoubted salacious mind. His entire appearance and manner would tend to classify him as of a rather undeveloped mind and of habits that would account for his possession of an exceedingly revolting picture under the circumstances detailed by his wife rather than in the innocent manner alleged by him. In addition, there was the testimony of several witnesses, such as Mrs. Bey and Mrs. Spath, to indicate an unrestrained and unrestrainable sexual appetite.

The main ground is an unwarranted accusation of sexual infidelity against the petitioner. She swears that the defendant constantly accused her of adultery, in which she is corroborated by her daughter and the postmaster at Hackensack in an incident where the husband discontinued the delivery of mail at his home and called for it in person at the general post office, in the hope, unquestionably, of thus securing some incriminatory letters from her suspected paramours. It should be said that there was not a scintilla of evidence of adultery produced. The. petitioner says that on one occasion, in the lobby of a theater, her husband said to her:

"Turn around; it looks as though you were lying on the flat of your back in the grass some place."

He says that he said no such thing, but did say to her:

"Look at your coat; it looks terrible; looks as though you were laying in the grass."

I also believe the wife rather than the husband in this respect, and look upon his testimony as the customary effort of one who cannot deny a conversation, garbling it, so as to give an entirely different impression from the true state of fact. In addition, he was guilty of the most atrocious remarks to his wife, sometimes alone and sometimes in the hearing of their own daughter, such as when reading a newspaper, and saying:

"Look here; here's another woman who got children from another guy. No man knows if the children are his. How do I know what guy comes in here at night?"

The only act of threatened violence to which the petitioner testifies took place in December, 1922, just prior to the final separation of the parties; but I must confess that I do not consider it of any importance in this case because it was an isolated instance never repeated, and because from her future conduct I do not believe that the petitioner was really placed in fear for her personal safety. I believe that it was the occasion of her leaving her husband, but not the cause.

Thus there is presented a case wherein there has been no violence exhibited against the wife and no reasonable fear thereof, but only a systematic and persistent course of the vilest accusations of adultery against a woman by her husband who not only presents no evidence thereof, but in his denial of her testimony concedes her to be a virtuous woman, and, in fact, says that there never was any doubt of her virtue in his mind. I have been considerably puzzled as to the decision that ought to be reached in this case. In the language of the bar, it is a very close one. At the close of the hearing, it was my first impression that extreme cruelty had not been proved. It appeared to be a case similar to Linnekogel v. Linnekogel, 95 N. Eq. 265, 122 A. 372. But in that proceeding there was no persistent charge of adultery, or any at all, in fact, and comment thereon was made and such accusations were characterized as "the most grievous insult that can be put upon a woman." But, taking into consideration all the circumstances, I have determined that this woman is entitled to the decree she seeks. For many years it was seriously mooted by members of the bar as to whether or not there should be a finding of extreme cruelty in the absence of at least some specific act of violence. As early in the annals of this court as Graecen v. Graecen, 2 N. J. Eq. 459, Chancellor Pennington...