Hill v. Hill

• Decision Date: 03 April 1897
• Citation: 166 Ill. 54,46 N.E. 751
• Parties: HILL v. HILL.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

166 Ill. 54

46 N.E. 751

HILL

v.HILL.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 3, 1897.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Bill for divorce by Emma L. Hill against William Hill. A decree for complainant was rendered, which was affirmed by the appellate court (63 Ill. App. 366), and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

M. Salomon and W. M. Butterworth, for appellee.

BAKER, J.

This was a bill for divorce and alimony, filed in the circuit court of Cook county, by appellee against her husband, the appellant here. The bill alleges extreme and repeated cruelty. The cause was heard before the chancellor, who entered a decree granting the divorce, and allowing appellee alimony in gross in the sum of $700. That decree was affirmed by the appellate court, and appellant now brings the cause here by appeal.

But two questions are raised by the assignments of error:

1. It is contended there was no jurisdiction in the trial court to render said decree, because it is said the record fails to show that appellee is a resident of Cook county. Such, however, is not the case. The bill alleges the residence of appellee in Chicago, Cook county, and the decree recites that all the material allegations of the bill are true. The evidence appearing in the record is sufficient to prove this allegation and support the finding. Appellee testified that her residence was in Chicago; that she was working there at a place on La Salle street. Although it was denied in appellant's answer to the bill that appellee resided in Cook county, yet no evidence was offered in his behalf on this question. It is urged that, nevertheless, the fact shown by her own testimony, that appellee had lived in Chicago only eight days when she filed her bill, is sufficient to overcome her statement that she is a resident of that city. The question of residence, in its legal significance, is not necessarily to be determined by the length of time one has lived in a particular jurisdiction. The real inquiry here is: Did appellee go to Chicago in good faith, with the intention of permanently residing there, and of carrying on business there? Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406;Derby v. Derby, 14 Ill. App. 645.The rule that the domicile of the husband is also the domicile of the wife is cited in support of this contention; and it is insisted that this rule places the domicile of appellee in Lake county, because that of appellant is there. But this position is untenable, and the argument in support of it is...