Hill v. Hill, 62022
| Decision Date | 28 October 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 62022,62022 |
| Citation | 13 Kan.App.2d 107,763 P.2d 640 |
| Parties | Carolyn Kay HILL, Appellant, v. Albert Jack HILL, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs.
2. A school year means a twelve-month period ending June 30. K.A.R. 91-31-1(n).
3. Pursuant to K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1), child support payments are automatically extended, so long as the child attends high school, until June 1 of the school year during which the child becomes 18 years of age.
4. The legislative history of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1) reveals the legislature intended the statutory extension of child support payments to apply to child support orders entered prior to July 1, 1986.
Jack L. Lively of Hall, Levy, Lively, DeVore and Beloit, P.A., Coffeyville, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
Before ABBOTT, C.J., and RULON and GERNON, JJ.
Carolyn Kay Hill appeals from an order pursuant to K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1) terminating payment of child support.
Carolyn Kay Hill and Albert Jack Hill were married on December 12, 1962. Their only child, Lance Edward Hill, was born on August 6, 1969.
Carolyn and Albert were divorced in 1977, and Carolyn received custody of Lance. Albert was ordered to pay child support of $150 a month. The amount of child support was subsequently raised to $239 a month.
Lance, who turned eighteen on August 6, 1987, was enrolled as a senior in high school for the 1987-88 school year. In August 1987, Albert stopped making child support payments. On August 20, 1987, Albert moved to terminate child support, and the motion was granted.
The divorce decree ordered:
Carolyn contends on appeal that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1)(B) requires the trial court to extend child support payments until Lance finishes high school.
Prior to 1986, Kansas law provided the following rules for child support:
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A.1985 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1).
In 1986 the legislature amended the statute to add the following language:
"or (B) the child reaches 18 years of age before completing the child's high school education in which case the support shall not terminate, unless otherwise ordered by the court, until June 1 of the school year during which the child became 18 years of age if the child is still attending high school." L.1986, ch. 137, § 25.
The amendment became effective July 1, 1986.
In 1987 Lance turned eighteen before completing his high school education. The 1987-88 school year commenced July 1, 1987. K.A.R. 91-31-1(n). Albert moved the trial court to terminate child support based on the language of the original divorce decree. The trial court, in granting the motion, held that Carolyn had failed to petition the court for an extension of support before Lance turned eighteen, the 1986 amendment was not intended to be applied retroactively after a child turned eighteen, and the court had, therefore, lost jurisdiction to modify the obligations of the parties.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. Citizens State Bank of Grainfield v. Kaiser, 12 Kan.App.2d 530, 536, 750 P.2d 422 (1988). When construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning. In re Estate of Robinson, 236 Kan. 431, 436, 690 P.2d 1383 (1984).
In our opinion, the language of the 1986 amendment states that child support shall not terminate at eighteen if the high school education is incompleteunless the court so orders. An affirmative court action was required to terminate the support, not, as the trial court said, to extend it.
The trial court held that nothing in the legislative history of the amendment indicates the amendment is to apply retroactively.
Our Supreme Court has held that changes in child support requirements do not reach back to operate retrospectively, but only operate from the date of the change. See Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 213 Kan. 329, 335-36, 516 P.2d 904 (1973). In the present case, the court was not asked to retroactively change the child support obligation but to apply the statutory extension of the length of obligation. The legislative history of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610(a)(1) reveals the legislature intended this extension to apply to child support orders entered prior to July 1, 1986.
In 1988 the legislature again amended K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-1610 to add the following language:
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