Hill v. Hoover Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:06–CV–00096–SPM.
• Citation: 899 F.Supp.2d 1259
• Parties: Jennifer HILL, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The HOOVER COMPANY and Hoover Company, I, Foreign Corporations doing business in Alachua County, Florida, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

899 F.Supp.2d 1259

Jennifer HILL, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.The HOOVER COMPANY and Hoover Company, I, Foreign Corporations doing business in Alachua County, Florida, Defendants.

Case No. 1:06–CV–00096–SPM.

United States District Court,

N.D. Florida,

Gainesville Division.

Oct. 1, 2012.

Paul Stuart Rothstein, Paul S. Rothstein PA, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff.

Christopher C. Genovese, Samuel Keith Hutto, Nelson Mullins Riley etc., Columbia, SC, James Andrew Bertron, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley etc. LLP, Martin Bruce Sipple, Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

STEPHAN P. MICKLE, Senior District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes for consideration upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum in Support (doc. 86) (“Motion to Dismiss”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (doc. 91). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in part and denies in part.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

On or about December 21, 2003, Jennifer Hill (“Plaintiff”) purchased a brand new Hoover Steam VacTm Dual VTm Deep Cleaner (“Steam Vac”), which is manufactured by The Hoover Company and Hoover Company I (together “Defendants”), for her personal use from a Wal–Mart store in Gainesville, Florida. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 15). At the time of the Plaintiff's purchase, the Steam Vac was being marketed for a retail price of over two-hundred dollars ($200). (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 3). The Plaintiff alleges that, unbeknownst to her, the Steam Vac was defective in design, manufacture, and workmanship. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 16–17). As a result of these defects, the Plaintiff's Steam Vac failed to function properly, as “the clean water tank was leaking water from the bottom valve, one of the plastic handles for the tanks had broken, and one of the plastic cord hooks had broken.” (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 26). Consequently, the Plaintiff delivered the Steam Vac to Authorized Appliance and Tool Service (“Authorized Appliance”) within the warranty period for repairs. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 26).

Newly purchased Steam Vacs manufactured by the Defendants come standard with a warranty. The Defendants' warranty explicitly states that, “Your Hoover® appliance is warranted in normal household use, in accordance with the Owner's Manual against original defects in material and workmanship for a period of one full year from date of purchase.” (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 20–21). The Plaintiff alleges that she complied with the terms of the Defendants' warranty by (1) purchasing the Steam Vac from a Wal–Mart store; (2) delivering the faulty Steam Vac to Authorized Appliance; (3) presenting proof of purchase to Authorized Appliance; and (4) affording the Defendants an opportunity to repair, replace, or refund the price of the Steam Vac within a reasonable time. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 29).

Upon delivery of the Steam Vac to Authorized Appliance for repairs, the Plaintiff was informed that Authorized Appliance had received several Steam Vacs with malfunctioning clean water tanks, and that the Defendants were allegedly redesigning the clean water tank of the Steam Vac. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 26). Since the clean water tank was on back order, Authorized Appliance was unable to complete the repair of the Plaintiff's Steam Vac for nine and one-half weeks. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 27). As such, Authorized Appliance was unable to timely repair the Steam Vac prior to the institution of the instant action.

In addition to the warranty described above, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made several other representations and warranties, whether express or implied, which the Defendants failed to satisfy. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 22–31). The Plaintiff specifically alleges that these representations and warranties include: (1) that the Steam Vac was a dependable vacuum steam cleaner; (2) that the Steam Vac was suitable for ordinary use; (3) that the Steam Vac was of good workmanship, materials and design; and (4) that defects in the design of the Steam Vac would be remedied and repaired in a timely and efficient manner. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 22–25).

As a result of the aforementioned conduct, the Plaintiff brought the instant action against the Defendants alleging (a) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat., §§ 501.201–213; (b) violation of the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq.; (c) breach of express warranty; (d) breach of implied representations and warranties; and (e) unjust enrichment.¹ The Defendants seek to dismiss all five causes of action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court looks to the plausibility standard as set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), Plaintiff is only required to plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

Generally, the Court accepts a plaintiff's allegations as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Yet, any allegations which are merely legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). After an initial identification of factual allegations, the Court assumes the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations and determines if those allegations plausibly give rise to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint is adequate if it contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. Facial plausibility is established when the Court can draw a reasonable inference from the factual allegations that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

III. DISCUSSION(a) Counts I–II: Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) should be dismissed on two grounds. First, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's allegations consist solely of conclusions and formulaic recitations and thus do not meet the pleading standard of Rule 8(a) as interpreted by Iqbal and Twombly. Second, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to plead with specificity her FDUTPA claim under the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). The Court will first address whether the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies to the Plaintiff's claim, and then address whether the Plaintiff has adequately pleaded her claim under the appropriate pleading standard.

(i) Applicability of Rule 9(b) to the Plaintiff's FDUTPA claim.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to plead her FDUTPA claim with the specificity required under the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), drawing analogy to the application of Rule 9(b) to a plaintiff's FDUTPA claims in Jovine v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 795 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla.2011). (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 5–6). More specifically, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) because the Plaintiff failed to (1) identify any specific packaging or advertising materials, (2) quote any allegedly false language, and (3) allege when or where the Plaintiff saw any allegedly false advertisements. Id.

The Plaintiff argues that the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) does not apply to her FDUTPA claim because the Plaintiff is not alleging fraud as the basis of her claim. The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendants inaccurately portrayed the holding in the Jovine case as requiring all FDUTPA claims to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). (Pl.'s Resp. 7).

The Court finds that the Defendants' use of Jovine for the proposition that the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) should apply to the Plaintiff's FDUTPA claim is inapposite. In Jovine, the plaintiff's FDUTPA claims were separated into two categories: (1) those claims based on fraudulent conduct and (2) those claims based on unfair or unlawful conduct. Jovine, 795 F.Supp.2d at 1343–44. The court in Jovine applied Rule 9(b) to the those claims based on fraudulent conduct and applied Rule 8(a) to those claims based on unfair or unlawful conduct. Id. As discussed infra, the Plaintiff's claim is based on unfair or unlawful conduct. As such, the Jovine case cannot be used to support the proposition that all FDUTPA claims, including the Plaintiff's claim, must be pleaded with the specificity required under Rule 9(b). Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff must plead her claim in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8(a).

(ii) Application of Rule 8(a) to the Plaintiff's FDUTPA claim.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's FDUTPA claim consists solely of conclusions and formulaic recitations, and thus such claim should be dismissed since it does not meet the pleading standard of Rule 8(a), as interpreted by Iqba...