Hill v. Iron Workers Local Union No. 25
| Citation | 520 F.2d 40 |
| Decision Date | 19 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-2299,74-2299 |
| Parties | 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2113, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,067 Lloyd HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IRON WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 25 et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Lynn L. Lower, Charles J. Taunt, Farmington Hills, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.
Sheldon L. Klimist, Miller, Klimist, Cohen, Martens & Sugerman, Murray A. Gorchow, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Hill, who describes himself as a "nonunion iron worker," filed a complaint against defendant-appellee, Local 25 of the Iron Workers Union. He alleged in five counts that Local 25 was depriving him of membership in the union, the opportunity to work in his trade, and the benefits of a pension system into which he had paid the required contributions. He also alleged (or implied) that all of these acts were in violation of the labor-management contract in the industry in which he had worked and desired to work, and that, hence, he was entitled to a remedy under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
Local 25 responded with a motion to dismiss, contending that the court had no jurisdiction in the premises. The District Court thereupon dismissed plaintiff's complaint with an opinion and a judgment holding that it had no jurisdiction. The District Judge's reasoning was as follows:
From a fair reading of the entire Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court finds no contract provisions that would support plaintiff's belief as to the employers' freedom to hire without seeking or obtaining clearance from defendant Local Union. Nor do the collective bargaining agreement provisions create a third-party beneficiary status for the plaintiff by any language contained therein. The only article of the collective bargaining agreement that touches on plaintiff's beliefs is that entitled "Union Security," which is Article Three of the contract. This article provides in pertinent part: "All employees who are members of the . . . Association . . . shall be required to remain members as a condition of employment . . . All employees may be required to become and remain members of the Association . . . as a condition of employment after the seventh day following the dates of their employment . . ." Upon reading the "Union Security" provision as well as the remainder of the contract, the Court must conclude that it was never the intention of the parties to include plaintiff, a mere applicant for employment, as a beneficiary of their agreement. By the heading of Article Three of the agreement (i. e., "Union Security"), it is obvious that an outsider or a mere applicant for employment was not intended to be protected by the provision. The intent of this article was to protect the defendant Local Union.
However, the present plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the above rules of law for the reason that evidence clearly indicates that plaintiff was not in the same class or category as the members of defendant Local Union, nor a member of the employee class that defendant Local Union must represent. The fact that plaintiff was an outsider not a member of the union nor even an employee, but only an applicant for employment rather clearly demonstrates that defendant Local Union did not represent plaintiff, persons like plaintiff, or those in plaintiff's class or category while negotiating the collective bargaining agreement. The Court further finds that the interest of plaintiff is nowhere represented in the contract, and the parties did not intend to benefit plaintiff or persons like plaintiff when negotiating said agreement.
In conclusion, the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction in cases that involve violations of collective bargaining agreements brought under Section 185 of Title 29, United States Code; and individual employees The remainder of the complaint does not state any jurisdictional allegations that would allow this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction of this action under Title 29, U.S.C., Section 185. Since the allegations of Count Three fail to state sufficient grounds for the Court to take subject matter jurisdiction over the action under 29 U.S.C. § 185, the remainder of the complaint cannot be considered.
as third-party beneficiaries to collective bargaining agreements may bring actions to enforce said agreements under the above statute, but the matter presently before the Court is not such an action.
Without passing judgment on the truth or falsity of appellant's allegations, we reverse for trial as to the counts of appellant's complaint which serve to allege 1) unlawful interference with his right to work in his trade, and 2) the denial of his benefits (if any) under the pension plan in his industry. 1 We believe that these claims 2 allege violations of the union-management contract and that, hence, the District Court has jurisdiction to hear them under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964); Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974); Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 382 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1967). See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298-99, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).
The District Judge's reasoning is not without logic and we cannot be certain that the Supreme Court in this difficult area of the law will view the matter as we view it now. See generally Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra. But we are confident that it will be better to present these issues (if they survive trial) upon a record which includes findings of fact rather than mere allegations.
The collective bargaining agreement involved in this dispute has a number of provisions which appear to be applicable to employees working under the contract, whether they are members of the union or not:
This agreement is entered into by collective bargaining to prevent strikes and lockouts and to facilitate peaceful adjustment of grievances and disputes between Employer and Union in this trade and to prevent waste, unnecessary and avoidable delays and expense, and, so far as possible, to provide for labor's continuous employment, such employment to be in accordance with the conditions herein set forth and at wages herein agreed upon; also, that stable conditions may prevail in the building industry and building costs may be as low as possible, consistent with fair wages and conditions, and further, the establishment of the necessary procedures by which these ends may be accomplished.
All employees who are members of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers on the effective date of this agreement shall be required to remain members of the association in good standing as a condition of employment during the term of this
agreement. All employees may be required to become and remain members of the Association in good standing as a condition of employment after the seventh day following...
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