Hill v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 16 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 45, September Term, 2006.,45, September Term, 2006.
• Citation: 396 Md. 700,914 A.2d 1193
• Parties: Christopher HILL v. Daniel KNAPP.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

914 A.2d 1193

396 Md. 700

Christopher HILL v. Daniel KNAPP.

No. 45, September Term, 2006.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

January 16, 2007.

Peter Max Zimmerman, Towson (Lee Saltzberg, Towson, on brief), for appellant.

James W. Bartlett, III (Alexander M. Giles, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, P.C., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

RAKER, J.

Christopher Hill, appellant, was injured when a load of plywood dropped on him from a forklift while he was working on a pier in Baltimore. Hill filed a state common law negligence action against the forklift operator, appellee Daniel Knapp. The primary issue we must decide is whether the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, preempts a state tort claim for damages by a longshoreman against a co-employee in the "twilight zone." We shall hold that the federal act preempts such a claim.

I.

On August 14, 2004, Christopher Hill, a dockworker, was on Pier C, Clinton Street, in Baltimore City, assisting the Rukert Terminals Corporation with the discharge of bundles of plywood from the vessel M/V TOFT ON. While performing this work, Hill was struck by a load of plywood dropped on him by a forklift operated by Knapp. Hill was a borrowed servant of Rukert,¹ Knapp was an employee of Rukert, and the two were co-employees.²

Hill filed a claim for compensation and medical expenses under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, Md.Code (1999, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor & Employment Article,³ for accidental injury suffered in the course of employment. The Workers' Compensation Commission notified Hill in October 2004 of his award. Hill received compensation beginning on February 18, 2004 at a rate of $294 per week as well as necessary medical treatment and services as provided by the Labor and Employment Article, § 9-660 through § 9-664 and § 9-689 of the Maryland Annotated Code. The Commission's award listed Onsite Commercial Staffing as Hill's employer. Hill was eligible for compensation under the LHWCA, but he did not file a claim under the Act.⁴

Hill filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Daniel Knapp on June 2, 2005, alleging that Knapp was negligent in that "he failed to observe dockworkers around him, failed to stop in order to avoid an accident, failed to keep his vehicle under control, and failed to operate his vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner." Hill sought one million dollars in compensation for the emotional and physical damages he suffered.

Knapp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Hill filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Circuit Court held a hearing and granted Knapp's motion, denied Hill's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and entered summary judgment in favor of Knapp. The Circuit Court determined that "the remedies a state may apply within the twilight zone include tort remedies," but "it is still necessary to decide whether a particular provision of state law is preempted by federal law." In analyzing whether the LHW CA's prohibition against co-employee suits preempts state law, the trial judge examined the purpose of the preemption provision. The Circuit Court noted that Congress enacted the immunity provision because it was concerned with "the hazardous work in which the parties to this suit were engaged" and that depriving "a worker of the immunity conferred upon him would frustrate the purpose of the Act." The Circuit Court held that the LHWCA preempted the state co-employee claim.

Hill filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own initiative prior to decision by that court to consider (1) whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act precludes a state negligence claim against a co-employee in the "twilight zone," and (2) whether an employee who is eligible for benefits under the LHWCA is a "covered employee" under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. Hill v. Knapp, 393 Md. 477, 903 A.2d 416 (2006).

II.

As originally enacted in 1927, the federal LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., established a compensation scheme for maritime employees injured on navigable waters of the United States if recovery was unavailable through state workers' compensation law. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 717-18, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 2435, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980); see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (describing history of the LHWCA); Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935 (3d Cir.1990) (providing detailed history of Supreme Court decisions interpreting LHWCA). As a result, longshoremen were provided, theoretically, with workers' compensation coverage regardless of the location of their injury. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 718, 100 S.Ct. at 2435. In practice, however, individuals injured at the boundary at which state remedies gave way to federal remedies were often forced to make a jurisdictional guess before filing a claim, and an improper guess resulted in, at best, additional expense and, at worst, foreclosure of the claim by statute of limitations. Id.; Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 254, 63 S.Ct. 225, 228, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1942).

Since passage of the LHWCA, several Supreme Court cases have interpreted the applicability of state and federal workers' compensation in order to address the jurisdictional challenges of particular claims. We note briefly the historical development of the key cases to provide context for our analysis of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA and the leading Supreme Court case interpreting the 1972 amendments, Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980).

In Davis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a distinct "border" between federal and state compensation schemes did not exist. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 718, 100 S.Ct. at 2435; Davis, 317 U.S. at 256, 63 S.Ct. at 229. Instead, the Court recognized a "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction where state and federal coverage overlapped. Davis, 317 U.S. at 256, 63 S.Ct. at 229. Because it was difficult to determine whether state or federal law should apply in the "twilight zone," a case-by-case analysis was required to determine the permissible recovery scheme. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 718, 100 S.Ct. at 2435; Davis, 317 U.S. at 256, 63 S.Ct. at 229. In Calbeck, the Supreme Court further extended applicability of the LHWCA to "all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law." Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 117, 82 S.Ct. at 1198. Calbeck did not make federal compensation the exclusive remedy, but indicated that either state or federal law could provide compensation. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 719, 100 S.Ct. at 2435-36; Calbeck at 126-32, 82 S.Ct. at 1203-06. The Supreme Court also held that the acceptance of payments under the state act "does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the Longshoremen's Act." Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 131, 82 S.Ct. at 1206.

In 1972, Congress made significant amendments to the LHWCA. See Oct. 27, 1972, Pub.L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251. The purposes of the 1972 amendments were to extend the coverage of the LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of navigable waters, to raise the amount of compensation available to longshoremen, to eliminate the longshore worker's strict liability seaworthiness remedy against shipowners, to eliminate the shipowner's claims for indemnification from stevedores, and to promulgate certain administrative reforms. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 313, 103 S.Ct. 634, 645, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983); see S.Rep. No. 92-1125, at 1-2 (1972); H.Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4698-4711. The 1972 amendments extended coverage to protect additional workers, for example, by amending 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) to include injuries that occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2006) (emphasis added to show 1972 amendment); Oct. 27, 1972, Pub.L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251.

Congress did not amend the sections of the LHWCA, adopted in 1959, that immunize workers from suits by fellow employees. Both sections 933(a) and 933(i) preserve the right of longshore and harbor workers to recover damages from third persons other than "the employer or a person or persons in his employ." 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (2006) (emphasis added to show 1959 amendment); Aug. 18, 1959, Pub.L. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391. Section 933(i), adopted in 1959, reads as follows:

"The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when he is injured, or to his eligible survivors or legal representatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of any other person or persons in the same employ: Provided, That this provision shall not affect the liability of a person other than an officer or employee of the employer."

S.Rep. No. 428, at 4-5 (1959); Aug. 18, 1959, Pub.L. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391; see also Bynum v. The S.S. Mormacteal, 188 F.Supp. 763 (E.D.Pa.1960) (noting that the 1959 amendments to § 933 insulate "not only the employer, but also the fellow employees of the injured party from any liability in damages to the injured party").

The Supreme Court interpreted Congress' 1972 amendments in Sun Ship, Inc., v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980). The five individuals injured in Sun Ship were eligible for benefits under the 1972 amended...