Hill v. Konecranes, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:17-cv-165

• Decision Date: 16 June 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:17-cv-165
• Parties: EMMA HILL and WILLIAM HILL, Plaintiffs, v. KONECRANES, INC.; and MORRIS MATERIAL HANDLING, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

EMMA HILL and WILLIAM HILL, Plaintiffs, v. KONECRANES, INC.;and MORRIS MATERIAL HANDLING, INC., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:17-cv-165

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

June 16, 2020

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 32.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion.

This lawsuit arises out of a fatal crane accident that occurred in June of 2015 inside a paper plant in Augusta, Georgia owned by International Paper Company ("IP"). Plaintiffs' son, Michael John Hill, worked for IP and was operating a gantry crane ("the crane") within the plant when a gust of wind pushed the crane down the tracks resulting in a collision that derailed the crane. The collision and derailment caused Mr. Hill to be ejected from the crane's cab, and he fell to his death. The crane was designed to be equipped with four storm brakes to prevent such an accident by stopping the crane from traveling during a wind event. Unfortunately, however, at the time of the incident, only one of the crane's storm brakes was functional.

Defendants were aware of deficiencies with the crane's storm brakes prior to the accident. Defendants had overhauled and refurbished the crane years before the incident, and they later entered into a contract to inspect, repair, and maintain the crane. They inspected the crane on five occasions in 2014 and performed several repairs to the crane during the first six months of 2015 including days before the incident. While IP had an in-house maintenance department that performed some services on the crane, IP relied upon Defendants to periodically inspect the crane, to notify IP of needed repairs to the crane, to prioritize those repairs, and to warn IP if any deficiencies with the crane posed a safety risk or warranted shutting the crane down. However, prior to the incident, Defendants failed to prioritize repairs to the crane's storm brakes and failed to apprise IP of the risks associated with the condition of the storm brakes. Additionally, the operating manual that Defendants drafted when they overhauled the crane years prior to the incident did not apprise IP and operators of the crane of the maximum wind speed in which the crane could be safely operated or the minimum number of storm brakes necessary to operate the crane safely.

Plaintiffs sued Defendants seeking to hold them accountable for Mr. Hill's death. Following a significant amount of discovery and in the midst of a bevy of pleadings, Defendants filed the instant motion arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants' arguments for summary judgment are vague and poorly advanced. Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed the record in this case and measured it against Defendants' contentions. As explained below, that review reveals sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants' negligence proximately caused Mr. Hill's death.

BACKGROUND¹

Mr. Hill worked for IP at its plant located in Richmond County, Georgia. (See doc. 1-2, pp. 5-6.) IP used the crane to move timber within an area of the plant known as the Woodyard. (Id.; doc. 33, p. 2; doc. 49, p. 2.) Years before the accident, Defendant Morris Material Handling, Inc. ("Morris Material") became the successor to the company that had manufactured and installedthe crane at IP's plant. (Doc. 56-1, p. 10.) Defendant Konecranes, Inc. ("Konecranes") later purchased Morris Material.² (Id.) After that purchase, in 2008, Defendants performed an overhaul and modernization of the crane including changing the controls, updating the motors and drives, and adding storm brakes. (Id.)

Following the modernization, the crane had two types of braking systems: gantry (or "holding" or "operating") brakes and storm (or "emergency") brakes. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, pp. 3-4; doc. 56-1, p. 16.) The twelve gantry brakes held the drive motors—and, thus, the crane—in place during operations when the crane was not traveling. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, pp. 3-4.) The four storm brakes were hydraulically-released friction brakes that pressed directly against the crane's rails. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, pp. 4-5.) The storm brakes were designed to stop the crane during a weather event or other emergency. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, pp. 4-5.) The cab of the crane had an emergency stop button that, when pushed, should have set all of the storm brakes and stopped the crane. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, p. 9.) Additionally, if the crane lost power, the storm brakes should have automatically engaged. (Doc. 48-2, p. 3; doc. 48-8, p. 9.) In a wind event or other emergency, the storm brakes were the only means to stop the crane if the gantry brakes failed to do so. (Doc. 56-1, p. 15.) Thus, the storm brakes were designed to protect the crane and the crane's operator, (id. at pp. 15-16), and "were a critical safety feature for safe crane operations as well as emergency situations," (doc. 48-2, p. 16).

At the time of the 2008 overhaul and modernization, Defendants created and provided to IP an "entirely new" operating manual for the crane ("the manual"). (Doc. 56-1, p. 11; doc. 48-4.) The manual addressed the operation and maintenance of the entire crane—not just the modernized components. (Doc. 56-1, pp. 11-12.) Aside from the manual, from the time the crane was modernized in 2008 to the date of Mr. Hill's death in 2015, Defendants did not provide IP with any guidelines or manuals regarding the operation of the crane, the storm brakes on the crane, or the wind speeds in which it was safe to operate the crane. (Id. at pp. 12, 53-54, 56.)

Because there are multiple design elements that may vary from crane to crane, the maximum wind speed in which a specific crane can be operated safely is unique to that crane. (Id. at p. 53.) Thus, IP would not have known the crane's maximum safe wind speed without Defendants providing that specific information to it. (Id.) However, the manual did not specify the safe wind speed and, following the 2008 modernization and prior to the accident, Defendants never informed IP of the maximum wind speed in which to safely operate the crane. (Id. at pp. 53-54, 61-62.) The manual did include the following warning: "Do not operate the crane in high winds. If the weather becomes threatening, move the crane to the parking area. Stop crane operation, tie down the crane, and set the storm brakes." (Doc. 48-4, p. 23.) Yet, the manual did not define "high winds" or provide any information regarding how the number of operable brakes affected the maximum safe wind speed. (Id.) Similar to the safe wind speed, absent some information from Defendants, IP would not have known the number of functional storm brakes necessary to safely operate the crane. (Doc. 56-1, p. 60.) However, the manual did specify the number of functional storm brakes or gantry brakes required for safe operation. (See doc. 48-4; doc. 48-1, p. 14.)

It is standard industry practice for a crane owner or user, like IP, to hire a crane inspection company, like Defendants, to inspect cranes and "identify conditions and deficiencies that require attention." (Doc. 48-2, p. 15.) In such a relationship,

when the third party inspection company identifies conditions and/or deficiencies that require immediate attention prior to further operation, it is standard practice in the industry for the third party inspection company to immediately notify the crane owner/user of the conditions as well as emphasiz[e] the urgency of the repairs. For example, when the conditions of a crane affect the safe operation of the crane, it is incumbent on the inspection company to recommend to the crane owner or user that the equipment not be used until such repairs are completed that would bring the crane back to a condition in which it is safe to operate the crane. This is commonly referred to as red-tagging a crane, or removal from service.

(Id. at pp. 15-16.) Additionally, where the inspection company is also the manufacturer of the crane, as Defendants were as to IP's crane,³ "there is a reasonable expectation that the inspection company/manufacturer has superior knowledge beyond the owner/user in all aspects of the crane's design and construction characteristics and limitations." (Id. at p. 16.) Given that superior knowledge, a crane owner/operator like IP should reasonably expect the inspection company/manufacturer "to correctly identify and promptly warn against any such conditions or deficiencies, particularly safety critical components such as the braking system of the involved crane." (Id. at p. 16.)

In November 2013, IP hired Defendants to "provide all supervision, labor, equipment and tools to perform inspections, maintenance and repair services to [IP's] overhead cranes, hoists, and wood yard cranes at [IP's] facilities" including the plant in Augusta. (Doc. 48-3, p. 1.)⁴ Because Defendants are "expert[s] on cranes," they were hired by IP to identify any problems, recommend repairs and parts replacement, prioritize the severity of any repairs and replacements, and identify emergency hazards. (Doc. 56-1, p. 19.) While IP had an in-house maintenance department that worked on equipment in the plant including the crane, IP relied upon the "expertise" of contractorslike Defendants. (Doc 48-5, pp. 3-4.) Specifically, IP's maintenance department relied on Defendants to identify "hazardous conditions," to tell IP if "a condition was unsafe and someone shouldn't operate the crane," to "provide . . . warnings about the crane," and to inform IP "if there were certain conditions that the crane was in that would prevent the crane from being operated in [] normal circumstances" and in "storm circumstances," if "there's a condition that would prompt the crane to need to operate in a different manner under storm circumstances," and "if the crane could not operate safely." (Id. at p. 8.)

Defendants and IP's...