Hill v. Lee Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 24 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-cv-242-FtM-29SPC |
| Parties | EDDIE SNYDER HILL, Plaintiff, v. LEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, DEPUTY JACK LONG, DETECTIVE BARBARA BERG, SGT. JONATHAN WASHER, MIKE SCOTT, EVERBANK and FRANK HEINZ, all individually and in their official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on defendants', Lee County Sheriff's Office, Community Service Aide Jack Long1 , Detective Barbara Berg, Sergeant Jonathan Washer, and Sheriff Mike Scott, Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #44) filed on December 27, 2011. Plaintiff filed a response on January 23, 2012 (Doc. #47) and an amended response on July 4, 2012 (Doc. #73). Also before the Court is defendants', Everbank and Frank Heinz, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #66) filed on April 18, 2012. Plaintiff filed a response on April 30, 2012. (Doc. #68). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are granted and the Court dismisses Counts I and IV through XI pursuantto Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Counts II and III pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). "To survive dismissal, the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); see also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). The former rule-that "[a] complaint should be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief," La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)-has been retired by Twombly. James River Ins. Co ., 540 F.3d at 1274. Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662(2009). The Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory statements. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and/or affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2000). In order to avoid the entry of summary judgment, a party faced with a properly supported summary judgment motion must come forward with extrinsic evidence, i.e., affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions, which are sufficient to establish the existence of the essential elements to that party's case, and the elements on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322; Hilburnv. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000); Jaques v. Kendrick, 43 F.3d 628, 630 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d at 1225. "If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Tullius v. Albright, 240 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001)(citing Clemons v. Dougherty Cnty., 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982)). However, "[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor. Id.
The following facts are undisputed and taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Hill:
On November 17, 2008, an individual entered the Bank of Florida2 in Lee County, Florida and attempted to cash a fraudulent check in the amount of $2,867.56 which was made out to plaintiff Eddie Snyder Hill (Hill or plaintiff). In attempting to cash the fraudulent check, the individual showed plaintiff's Florida State driver's license and social security card. The banker was Frank Heinz (Heinz).
The following day, November 18, 2008, Deputy Jack Long from the Lee County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to the bank to investigate the incident. Heinz filled out an affidavit, which was notarized by Long, that stated that "a black male" had entered the bank and attempted to cash a fraudulent check. Heinz attested that the individual provided a check, a social security card, and a driver's license. The November 18, 2008, affidavit does not specifically identify the perpetrator.
On December 4, 2008, Detective Barbara Berg was assigned to the case and re-interviewed Heinz. On the same day, Heinz identified Hill in a photographic line up and completed a "Bank Teller/Clerk/Witness Statement" that identified Hill as the perpetrator.
On December 15, 2008, Detective Barbara Berg submitted a probable cause affidavit asserting there was probable cause toarrest Eddie Hill for uttering a forged instrument in violation of Florida Statutes § 831.02 and committed grand theft in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.014. On April 15, 2009, a warrant for Hill's arrest was issued. Hill, who was incarcerated on an unrelated charge in Hillsborough County Jail, was transferred to Lee County Jail pursuant to the arrest warrant on June 23, 2009.3 On December 11, 2009, the plaintiff was released and he was not prosecuted for the alleged crimes.4
Hill contends that his identity was stolen and he was not the individual who attempted to cash the fraudulent check. He contends that there are 24 color surveillance photographs that clearly demonstrate that he was not the perpetrator and that the investigators turned a "blind eye" to this evidence. As a result, he initiated this action. In his Amended Complaint, Hill asserts the following eleven causes of action, which plaintiff purports are pursuant to Section 1983: Due Process (Count I); False Arrest (Count II), False Imprisonment (Count III), Conspiracy (Count IV), Perjury (Count V), Excessive Punishment (Count VI), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VII), Respondeat Superior(Count VIII), Deliberate Indifference (Count IX), Falsifying Official Documents (Count X), and Profiling (Count XI). The Amended Complaint does not specify what counts are asserted against which defendants and construed liberally, it seeks to assert all eleven claims against each defendant. In addition, the heading of the Amended Complaint indicates that Hill seeks to assert claims against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Defendants Heinz and Bank of Florida (collectively, the Bank defendants) filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Fed. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants Lee County Sheriff's Office, Community Service Aide Jack Long (Long), Detective Barbara Berg (Berg), Sergeant Jonathan Washer (Washer), and Sheriff Mike Scott (Scott) (collectively, the State defendants) filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and in the alternative Rule 56. Both motions seek to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety.
Although Hill purportedly brings all of his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count XII asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is not a constitutionalclaim and instead arises under Florida law. To show intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that:
Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(citations omitted). "[T]he plaintiff must show conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So. 2d 921, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Whether the alleged conduct satisfies this high standard is a legal question "for the court to decide as a matter of law." Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573, 1575 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Baker v. Florida...
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