Hill v. Lincoln Prop. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:10 CV 675 DDN,4:10 CV 675 DDN |
| Parties | JOYCE O. HILL, Plaintiff, v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This action is before the court on the motion of defendant Lincoln Property Company for summary judgment against plaintiff Joyce O. Hill. (Doc. 14.) The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 8.) Oral arguments were heard on September 17, 2010.
Plaintiff commenced this judicial action against defendant in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri. (Doc. 1-1 at 3-5; Doc. 4.) Defendant removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.)
In her state court petition, plaintiff alleges that on April 18, 2007, she "was caused to trip on an area of the carpet in the passageway between her bedroom and the living room area" of her apartment. She alleges this area of the carpet was raised which "constituted a dangerous condition" of which defendant knew or should have known. She alleges that this "condition resulted from the placement of a board underneath the carpet of the threshold of the entryway from the hallway into the living room." The petition attributes the alleged condition of the carpet to "negligence of the Defendant." (Doc. 1-1, at 4.) As a result of her fall, plaintiff alleges that her right ankle muscles, ligaments, tendons, and soft tissues were bruised, confused, sprained, and strained, and plaintiff's right cuboid was fractured. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.)
"In every federal case the court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction before it turns to the merits of other legal arguments." Carlson v. Arrowhead Concrete Works, Inc., 445 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006). In removed cases such as this one, the district court reviews the pleadings, including the removal petition, pending at the time of removal to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938); see Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (). The defendant, as the party invoking jurisdiction, bears the burden of proving that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. See In re Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Defendant invokes diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Such jurisdiction requires complete diversity of the parties' citizenship and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). There is no dispute that complete diversity of citizenship exists. Plaintiff alleges she is a resident of St. Charles, Missouri, and that defendant is a Texas corporation. (Doc. 1-1, at *1.)
At issue is whether the case involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. Federal courts must strictly construe the amount in controversy requirement. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969). In this regard, the removing party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In re Minnesota Mut. Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2003). Some specific facts or evidence are required to demonstrate that the jurisdictional amount is met. Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
In this case the amount in controversy is based on the damages resulting from plaintiff's personal injury suffered from her fall whenshe tripped on the raised carpet in her apartment. She alleges that as a result of her fall, she sustained permanent injury to her right ankle, pain and suffering, and lost wages and income. (Doc. 1-1 at 3-4.) The state court petition seeks recovery of "such sums as will adequately and justly compensate plaintiff for her damages." (Id.)
In its removal notice, defendant alleges that the amount in controversy "is believed to exceed" the $75,000.00 jurisdictional amount. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The removal notice also describes defendant's unsuccessful efforts to discover the monetary extent of the damages plaintiff seeks, including an inquiry into whether plaintiff would stipulate to an amount in controversy less than the required $75,000.00. (Id. at 1-2.) At the hearing held on September 17, 2010, plaintiff's counsel indicated that such a stipulation might be filed. However, no such stipulation has been filed.
The record is sufficient to establish the jurisdictional amount of the amount in controversy between the parties. Aside from plaintiff's allegations that her damages include permanent, serious bodily injury and pain and suffering, plaintiff testified in her deposition that she is unable to work as a result of her injuries, and that she had previously earned between $17 and $20 per hour when needed by several employers. Her deposition testimony was unclear about the number of lost hours claimed by her. (Doc. 23-5 at 31-47.) Plaintiff also testified that her injuries are so severe that she cannot stand for longer than 20 minutes at a time or hold an infant, and that her pain and suffering continue. (Id. at 96, 139-41). Using the allegations in her state court petition that her injuries are permanent and the factual evidence of her testimony, the court agrees with defendant and finds that plaintiff's asserted damages, and the amount in controversy, exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Cf. Murray v. Lumiere Place Casino & Hotels, No. 4:10 CV 0458 TCM, 2010 WL 1936179, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2010) (); Gerbert v. United Rentals (North America), Inc., No. 4:05 CV 717 SNL, 2005 WL 2789332, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2005). The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's sole claim against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); (Doc. 14.) Defendant argues that at least one of several exculpatory clauses contained in contracts between it and plaintiff bar her recovery. Defendant argues that the clauses are enforceable under Missouri law, even if plaintiff did not carefully read them, and encompass the alleged condition and negligence in this action. (Docs. 14, 15.)
Plaintiff responds that the exculpatory clauses are unenforceable because they are contained in contracts of adhesion. She also argues that the alleged condition and negligence otherwise does not fall within the scope of the exculpatory clauses, and that she did not carefully read the contracts. (Docs. 19, 21.)
Defendant replies that the alleged conduct falls within the scope of at least one of the exculpatory clauses. Defendant further argues that the clauses are enforceable, even if the contracts were contracts of adhesion, and are enforceable because plaintiff signed the contracts, even if plaintiff did not carefully read them. (Doc. 17.)
Plaintiff, Joyce O. Hill, is a high school graduate who can read English. (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 11, 15.) Plaintiff received a certificate in business and office education from Redding Area Community College, and a nursing certificate from Upper Banks County, Pennsylvania Community College. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff is currently pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in Science in Nursing through online courses from Excelsior College in Albany, New York. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
On April 21, 2006, plaintiff read and signed an Agreement to Rent or Lease one of defendant's apartments. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) Paragraph 16 of the Agreement to Rent or Lease states: 16. LIABILITY / DAMAGE RESPONSIBILITY. Resident agrees to hold Landlord harmless from all claims of loss or damage to property, and of injury or death to persons caused by the intentional acts, unintentional acts or negligence of the Resident, his guest or invitees, or occurring on the premises rented for Resident's exclusive use. Resident releases Landlord from any and all liability for any loss or damage to Resident's property or effects arising out of water leakage, or breaking pipes, or theft, or other causes beyond the reasonable control of Landlord.... In no event shall resident be entitled to any compensation due to any extra expense, annoyance, or inconvenience for loss of use due to casualty beyond the control of the landlord....
(Doc. 16-2 at 3, ¶ 16.) That same day, plaintiff moved into defendant's apartment complex. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 3.)
On April 25, 2006, plaintiff read through, agreed to, and initialed each page of an Apartment Lease Contract. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.) Paragraph 23 of the Apartment Lease Contract provides:
23. RESIDENT SAFETY AND PROPERTY LOSS.
...
Casualty Loss. We're not liable to any resident, guest, or occupant for personal injury or damage or loss of personal property from any cause, including but not limited to: fire, smoke, rain, flood, water and pipe leaks, hail, ice, snow, lightning, wind, explosions, interruption of utilities, theft, or vandalism unless otherwise required by law....
(Doc. 16-3 at 3, ¶ 23.)
Later that day, plaintiff read and signed several addendums, including a Community Policies, Rules and Regulations Addendum. (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 9-10.) Paragraph 1 of the Community Policies, Rules and Regulations Addendum states:
I. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR USE OF APARTMENT PROPERTY AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES.
...
Additionally, Resident(s) expressly agrees to assume all risks of every type, including but not limited to risks of personal injury or property damage, of whatever nature or severity, related to Resident's use of the amenities at the Community. Resident(s) agrees to hold Owner harmless and release...
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