Hill v. Lockhart, PB-C-92-240.
Citation | 791 F. Supp. 1388 |
Decision Date | 30 April 1992 |
Docket Number | No. PB-C-92-240.,PB-C-92-240. |
Parties | Steven Douglas HILL, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant/Respondent. |
Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Eastern District of Arkansas |
Mark Cambiano, Morrilton, Ark., for plaintiff/petitioner.
Jack Gillean, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ark., Little Rock, Ark., for defendant/respondent.
Petitioner Stephen Douglas Hill was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Pulaski County on March 8, 1985. His conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 713 S.W.2d 233 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1331, 94 L.Ed.2d 182 (1987). He subsequently filed a Rule 37 request for post-conviction relief, which was denied. Hill v. State, 292 Ark. 144, 728 S.W.2d 510 (1987). Review was again denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 208, 98 L.Ed.2d 159 (1987).
Hill then filed a federal habeas corpus petition asserting the following grounds:
After a full evidentiary hearing, I denied the first habeas petition in a lengthy opinion. Hill v. Lockhart, 719 F.Supp. 1469 (E.D.Ark.1989). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hill v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.1991), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 344, 116 L.Ed.2d 283 (1991). The State sought revocation of the stay of execution which I had placed in effect pending appellate review. The stay has been dissolved, and the Governor of the State of Arkansas has now set an execution date of May 7, 1992.
The petitioner Hill has filed a second successive habeas corpus petition and has contemporaneously filed an application for a stay of his execution. A second or successive writ is governed by Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. This rule reads as follows:
(b) Successive petitions. A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Each of the petitioner's contentions, infra, are embraced within its ambit. For the most part he fails to allege new or different grounds for relief. He simply restates the same grounds by altered terminology. The new grounds could have been asserted in the prior petition and thus constitute an abuse of the writ.
In his second habeas petition, Mr. Hill asserts four grounds for relief:
Petitioner's youth was an important feature of his defense during the jury trial and in the state appellate proceedings. It was argued thoroughly at the time of the first habeas hearing and on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claims that the jury's finding that "there was no evidence of any mitigating circumstances" was ambiguous and that the reviewing federal courts applied an incorrect presumption of correctness to the jury's finding. I find this argument to be without merit, as noted in my opinion denying the first habeas petition:
Hill v. Lockhart, 719 F.Supp. 1469, 1473 (E.D.Ark.1989).
The Court of Appeals made similar comments:
Hill v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1991).
The first ground raised in Hill's second habeas petition, which was thoroughly argued in the first habeas petition and rejected both by this court and the Court of Appeals, is clearly in violation of Rule 9(b) set out, supra.
The second ground raised in the present petition is that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing petitioner to plead guilty to two felonies involving force or violence prior to his capital murder trial. Petitioner now also contends that counsel should have challenged the procedure which allowed aggravating circumstances to be proved with unadjudicated conduct. He also attacks this procedure directly. These issues had not been raised previously and are therefore procedurally defaulted and are an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. See Rule 9(b), supra.
There have been three recent definitive opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the subject of successive habeas petitions.
In Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1990) the Court of Appeals held that the district judge abused his discretion in entertaining Fairchild's second petition. In his second habeas petition, Fairchild made a due process claim which could have been raised in the Arkansas courts. Fairchild was likewise barred from urging the due process point in his federal habeas petition since he was unable to show "cause" for his procedural default in the state courts and "prejudice" resulting from that default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Fairchild v. Lockhart, supra at 1294.
The Court of Appeals also held that "it is, with some exceptions, an abuse of the Great Writ to assert new grounds for relief that were available at the time of an initial petition." Id., citing Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380, 104 S.Ct. 752, 753, 78 L.Ed.2d 541 (1984) (per curiam) (Powell, J., concurring joined by a majority of the court) and Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 540 (8th Cir.1989). Fairchild abused the writ because his new claim and the evidence to support it were previously available and because none of the recognized exceptions applied.
Smith v. Armontrout, contains a cogent analysis of the limitations on successive habeas petitions. Judge Arnold summarized the governing principles: "An attempt to raise claims omitted from a previous petition should be rejected as an abuse of the writ if (1) the previous omission was the deliberate choice of the petitioner or (2) the previous omission is not excusable under the cause-prejudice-innocence approach of Wainwright and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)." Smith, 888 F.2d at 545.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the refusal of the district court to entertain a second habeas petition in Wilson v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 754 (8th Cir.1990), citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15, 83...
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