Hill v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:10–cv–2593–TMP.
• Parties: James HILL, as guardian and next friend of BHJ, a minor, Plaintiff v. MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

957 F.Supp.2d 1320

James HILL, as guardian and next friend of BHJ, a minor, Plaintiff

v.MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:10–cv–2593–TMP.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northeastern Division.

July 12, 2013.

Eric J. Artrip, Eric J. Artrip, Mastando & Artrip LLC, Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff.

Mark S. Boardman, Clay R. Carr, Boardman Carr Hutcheson & Bennett PC, Chelsea, AL, Howard M. Belser, III, Belser Law Firm LLC, Decatur, AL, for Defendants.

June Ann Simpson, Harvest, AL, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM, United States Magistrate Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants on July 19, 2012. (Doc. 86). In that motion, all remaining defendants,¹ the Madison County School Board, Ronnie J. Blair, Jeanne Dunaway, and Teresa G. Terrell, seek judgment in their favor and dismissal of plaintiff's various claims against them under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ( 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Alabama tort law. All remaining parties have consented to the exercise of full dispositive jurisdiction by the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Doc. 37.

I. Summary Judgment Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. There is no requirement, however, “that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56 “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court “shall” grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505;see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). However, the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The evidence supporting a claim must be “substantial,” Marcus v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 379 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1981); a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir.2004); Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249–1250 (11th Cir.2004). If the non-movant's evidence is so thoroughly discredited by the rest of the record evidence that no reasonable jury could accept it, the evidence fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact requiring a jury determination. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (“Respondent's version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have reviewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n. 3 (11th Cir.2009). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989). Furthermore, the court must “view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden,” so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505;Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir.1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988).

II. Facts for Summary Judgment Purposes

Applying these standards to the evidence before the court, the following facts are treated as undisputed and taken in a light favorable to the non-moving plaintiff.

At the time of the events giving rise to this action, in January 2010, the minor plaintiff, BHJ, was a 14–year–old female student in the eighth grade at Sparkman Middle School, a school operated by the defendant Madison County School Board. Defendant Ronnie Blair was the principal of the school, and defendants Jeanne Dunaway and Teresa Terrell were both assistant principals. Defendant Julie Ann Simpson was a teacher's aide at the school. Another defendant who was previously dismissed from this action without prejudice was CJC, a 16–year–old male student in the eighth grade at Sparkman. This case arises out of the events leading up to and including CJC's sexual assault of BHJ in a boys' restroom during school hours on January 22, 2010.

CJC had a troubled academic and disciplinary history at Sparkman. He came to the attention of Sparkman administrators for disciplinary action at least fourteen times, including at least four instances raising questions about sexual harassment of female students. As early as February 4, 2009, CJC was suspended from school for “sexual harassment” involving “making inappropriate comments to a young lady.” During the 2009–2010 school year, before the assault on BHJ, CJC had accumulated the following disciplinary infractions ²:

• September 23, 2009—Defendant Terrell disciplined CJC with three days of suspension for offering a girl money to beat up another girl and stating he would “like to kill her”; ³

• September 29, 2009—Defendant Blair disciplined CJC with one day of “in-school suspension” for failure to follow directions while in “AAP” ⁴;

• October 16, 2009—Terrell disciplined CJC with one day of “in-school suspension” for a “verbal altercation” while in AAP;

• October 23, 2009—Terrell suspended CJC from the bus for ten days for saying “fuck you” to the bus driver; ⁵

• October 28, 2009—Terrell disciplined CJC with three days of “in-school suspension” for “inappropriate touching”; ⁶

• October 30, 2009—Terrell disciplined CJC with one day of “out of school suspension” for disruption and disrespect while in in-school suspension;

• November 18, 2009—Terrell suspended CJC from riding the bus for 24 days for failing to obey the driver and failing to “keep his hands off of a female student”; ⁷ • November 25, 2009—Terrell disciplined CJC with two days of “in-school suspension” for disobedience involving “kissing”; ⁸

• December 15, 2009—Principal Blair disciplined CJC with one day of “in-school suspension” for a verbal confrontation with another student;

• December 18, 2009—Assistant Principal Terrell disciplined CJC with two days of “out of school suspension” for “threats/intimidation” involving threatening another student in AAP with him.⁹

Blair testified that he was aware that, as early as the 2008–2009 school year, CJC had been disciplined for harassment of female students. Included in CJC's disciplinary record produced by the defendants is a copy of a disciplinary report from Ardmore High School (part of...