Hill v. Martinez
| Citation | 87 F.Supp.2d 1115 |
| Decision Date | 11 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97-B-786. |
| Parties | Sherry HILL and Gregory Hill, individually and as personal representatives of the estate of Preston Alexander Hill, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph MARTINEZ, individually and as a police officer of the City of Aurora, the City of Aurora, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
C. Lamont Smith, Smith & Schaffer, P.C., Denver, CO, for plaintiffs.
Marc F. Colin, Richard A. Stubbs, Bruno, Bruno & Colin, P.C., Denver, CO, Charles H. Richardson, Julia A. Bannon, Office of the City Attorney, Aurora, CO, for defendants.
Defendants move for summary judgment, and for reconsideration of my November 12, 1999 order granting Plaintiffs' motion to supplement their response to Defendants' summary judgment motion with an affidavit. Alternatively, Defendants move for permission to file a supplemental reply in support of their motion for summary judgment so that they can reply to the new affidavit. Plaintiffs oppose the former motion. The issues are adequately briefed and oral argument would not materially aid their resolution. For the reasons stated below, I grant in part and deny in part Defendants' summary judgment motion, and deny as moot Defendants' motion for reconsideration, or, in the alternative, for permission to file a supplemental reply. Jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiffs filed suit on April 17, 1997. The action arises from the death of the Hills' son, Preston Alexander Hill (Preston Hill). Defendant Martinez shot and killed Preston Hill on October 23, 1995 during an arrest incident to a narcotics investigation. The original complaint named only Sherry Hill and Gregory Hill as plaintiffs.
On June 2, 1997, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' original complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert certain claims. On October 22, 1997, while Defendants' motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint added the "Estate of Preston Alexander Hill" as a named plaintiff, and alleged seven claims for relief on behalf of the Hills and the Estate of Preston Hill. In light of the Amended Complaint, Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on November 24, 1997.
On June 29, 1998, I issued an order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss in part and dismissing three claims in the Amended Complaint. I also dismissed two defendants, Verne St. Vincent and Nancy Freed, and directed the amendment of the caption to reflect that Plaintiffs are proceeding "individually and as personal representatives of the Estate of Preston Alexander Hill." Order at 18. The claims remaining after my order are: (1) deprivation of the fundamental right of familial association embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997), brought by Plaintiffs in their individual capacities against Officer Martinez and the City of Aurora (the City); (2) an excessive force claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought by Plaintiffs in their capacities as personal representatives of the estate of their son against Officer Martinez; (3) deprivation of various rights secured by the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought by Plaintiffs in their capacities as personal representatives of the estate of their son against the City. In addition, I indicated that the seventh claim for exemplary damages is not a claim, but part of the prayer for relief.
On December 9, 1998, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. On November 10, 1999, Plaintiffs moved to supplement their response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment with an affidavit. On November 12, 1999, I granted that motion. On December 9, 1999, Defendants moved for reconsideration of my November 12 1999 order, or, in the alternative, for permission to file a supplemental reply in support of their motion for summary judgment in order to respond to the new affidavit.
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c). The very purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether a trial is necessary. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, that demonstrate the absence of genuine issues for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., Inc., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir.1992). Once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the non-moving party has the burden of showing that issues of undetermined material fact exist. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In so doing, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in the complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried. Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980); Rule 56(e). These specific facts may be shown "by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Unsupported allegations "without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint" are insufficient, White, 45 F.3d at 360 (internal quote and citation omitted), as are conclusory assertions that factual disputes exist. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate if genuine issues of material fact exist. James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 132 F.3d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir.1997).
In ruling on summary judgment, I must view the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. If no reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence present in the motion and response, then summary judgment is proper and a trial is unnecessary. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment should not enter if a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Mares, 971 F.2d at 494.
Defendant Martinez first argues that Plaintiffs' familial association claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed. Specifically, Defendant Martinez asserts that no evidence exists that in killing Preston Alexander Hill, he directed his action at either individual Plaintiff, or otherwise intended to interfere with their relationship with their son. I agree.
Plaintiffs' right of familial association is included in the substantive due process right of freedom of intimate association, which is consonant with the right of privacy. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 927 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1993)). The right is based on the liberty interest inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Nevertheless, "`[n]ot every statement or act that results in an interference with the rights of intimate association is actionable.'" Id. (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548). On the contrary, a familial association claim results only if the state actor "inten[ded] to interfere with [the] relationship." Trujillo v. Board and County Commissioners of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir.1985). Such intent is shown by establishing that the defendant or defendants "directed" their challenged conduct or statement "at the intimate relationship with knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship." J.B., 127 F.3d at 927 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548).
Here, the individual Plaintiffs have made no such showing. Indeed, both individual Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that (1) they have no reason to believe that Defendant Martinez's actions were directed at them, (2) prior to the death of their son they had minimal contacts with the Aurora Police Department and none with Defendant Martinez, (3) they are not aware that their deceased son ever encountered or otherwise knew Defendant Martinez prior to the chain of events that led to his death, and (4) they are not aware that Defendant Martinez knew of them or either of their sons prior to the date of their son's death. See Defendants' Summary Judgment Brief at Ex. J (67-69, 83-85, 111-12); Ex. K (42-43). In addition, in their interrogatory responses, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Martinez's conduct was in "reckless disregard" of their rights to familial association. Id. At Ex. G. (answers to interrogatories eight through ten); Ex. H (answers to interrogatories eight through ten). As indicated above, however, a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on familial association must be based on specific intent to interfere with that association. See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. The allegations noted above do not establish that Defendant Martinez acted with the requisite intent.
Plaintiffs respond in effect that Trujillo's intent requirement in section 1983-based familial association claims has been undermined by subsequent Tenth Circuit authority. Although the Tenth Circuit later determined that some section 1983 claims...
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