Hill v. Mazerac

• Docket Number: 4:23-CV-00061-MW-MAF
• Decision Date: 25 May 2023
• Parties: TROY M. HILL, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY MAZERAC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

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TROY M. HILL, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY MAZERAC, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:23-CV-00061-MW-MAF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division

May 25, 2023.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The pro se plaintiff, Troy M. Hill, an inmate convicted on a federal charge of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, initiated this civil rights case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed an amended complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 20. Hill alleged certain defendants violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, fabricated evidence to conduct an illegal arrest and used excessive force during the arrest. See ECF No. 12, pp. 5-15.

The Undersigned conducted an initial screening of the operative complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that excessive use of force against Defendants Mazerac and Rodgers PROCEED, but all other claims be DISMISSED.

I. Hill's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 20.

Hill sued six defendants all of whom were officers with the Tallahassee Police Department at the time of the events in question. ECF No. 20, pp. 1-3, 14. Hill sued Jeffrey Mazerac, Justin Rodgers, and Joshua Carswell, in their individual- and official capacities. Id., pp. 1 -3. Hill sued Andrew Mixion, Corey Hale, and “Farmer” solely in their official capacities. Id., p. 14. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth- and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., p. 15.

According to Hill, on February 16, 2021, he was sitting in a vehicle when five officers -- Mixion, Rodgers, Farmer, Mazerac, and Hale -- “wearing ski mask(s) pointing guns screaming obscene and threatening language” beat on the window and yelled “put your hands up . . . don't move!” Id., pp. 56. Hill states he fully complied and did not try to flee but was “snatched from the vehicle slung on the ground.” Id. Officers put their knees on Hill's neck and back to restrain him. Id. During the incident, a firearm fell to the ground and slid away from Hill. Id. The five officers became more aggressive and were on Hill's back. Id. Hill and family members informed the officers that Hill had a tumor on his back, but they stayed on Hill. Id.

Officers eventually let Hill get up, but he could not walk because he lost feeling in his right leg; his leg was “damaged” from the assault, though Hill does not explain any injury or necessary treatment. Id. Mazerac tried shutting the door on Hill's legs because he thought Hill was faking. Id.

Hill claims that the arrest was based on Rodgers' complaint that, four days earlier, he observed Hill conduct a drug sale and flee from law enforcement. Id., pp. 6-7. Rodgers and Carswell “fabricated evidence” that led to the probable cause affidavit used in his arrest and detention; Hill described Rodgers' and Carswell's allegations and testimony. Id., pp. 8-11. Hill maintains he was detained in Leon County Jail until November 2021, when the state charges were dismissed. Id. According to Hill, the state dismissed the charges because the evidence and allegations were fabricated. Id., p. 7.

Hill also claims that Defendants' actions and his subsequent ten-month pretrial detention in Leon County Jail resulted in being charged with violating the terms of his probation for certain Wakulla County convictions. Id., p. 11. Hill had to pay $9,500 in a bond for the state criminal case. Id., p. 12

Hill seeks punitive damages for the time he was held in state custody “on fabricated evidence,” $9,500 for the bond he had to post, an unclear amount of damages (“$1,2500”) from Rodgers, Mazerac, and Carswell; and $50,000 against Mixion, Hale, and Farmer for excessive force. Id., p. 15.

II. Standard of Review

Hill is a prisoner seeking redress against governmental entities, employees, or officers. Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C § 1915A, which does not distinguish between IFP plaintiffs and non-IFP plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed.Appx. 939, 942 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A, a complaint must be dismissed if the court determines a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Wright v. Miranda, 740 Fed.Appx. 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the complaint under § 1915(e), the court takes the allegations as true and construes them in the most favorable light. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003).

The same standard is used for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). The court may dismiss a complaint that fails “[t] state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). “To ‘[a]void dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright, 470 Fed.Appx. at 694 (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)).

Complaints filed by pro se prisoners are held to “[l]ess stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404, U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). However, although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it still must “[s]uggest that there is some factual support for a claim.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. Official Capacity Claims

Hill sued all Defendants in their official capacities. These claims are due to be dismissed. The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars suit against a state in federal court absent valid congressional override, waiver of immunity, or consent to suit. See Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach, 614 Fed.Appx. 389, 393 (11th Cir. 2015). This principle is not abrogated by § 1983 for damage suits; and Florida has not waived its immunity from § 1983 suits. Id. A state and an agency of a state are, thus, immune from liability under § 1983. See Williams v. Robbins, 153 Fed.Appx. 574, 576 (11th Cir. 2005). This Eleventh Amendment Immunity bar applies regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks money damages or prospective injunctive relief. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “Suits against state officials in their official capacities therefore should be treated as suits against the State.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 Fed.Appx. 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017).

Florida's sovereign immunity extends to its agencies, subdivisions, or officers. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Fitzgerald v. McDaniel, 833 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1987). That “bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986). Naming a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of naming the governmental entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). A state official, however, may be sued in his official capacity when the suit alleges a constitutional violation by the official, acting in his official capacity and seeks only prospective injunctive relief. See Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).

Here, Hill does not seek any injunctive relief; he only seeks compensatory and punitive damages. At the time of the incident, Defendants were employed as Tallahassee Police Department officers, a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. This immunity extends to Defendants. Accordingly, the official capacity claims against all Defendants should be dismissed. Since Hill sued Mixion, Hale, and Farmer solely in their official capacities, no claims can survive against them. Rodgers and Carswell were also sued in their individual capacities for allegedly fabricating evidence or other actions leading to Hill's arrest and pretrial detention, but those claims are foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent as explained in the next section.

IV. Futility of Claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Certain Claims are Moot.

A. Claims of fabrication of evidence, illegal arrest, and deprivation of a fair trial are Heck barred.

Hill's claims against Defendants Rodgers and Carswell (in their individual capacities) alleging their fabrication of evidence led to Hill's illegal arrest and detention in Leon County Jail are barred by Heck. There are “two broad categories of prisoner petitions: (1) those challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself; and (2) those challenging the conditions of confinement.” McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges “the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).

Further, a prisoner may not bring a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. As the Supreme Court has noted, the most obvious example of an action barred by Heck is one in which the plaintiff seeks relief directly attributable to conviction or confinement. In the Eleventh Circuit, attacks on the validity of probation revocations are also barred under Heck. See Cobb v. Fla., 293 Fed.Appx. 708, 709 (11th Cir. 2008).

“The Court's purpose was to limit the...