Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.

Decision Date18 December 2018
Docket NumberWD 81448
Citation570 S.W.3d 95
Parties Leontae HILL, Appellant, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Jeannie Willibey, Assistant Appellate Defender, Kansas City, MO, Attorney for Appellant.

Joshua D. Hawley, Attorney General, and Michael J. Spillane, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Before Division Four: Karen King Mitchell, Chief Judge, and Victor C. Howard and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judges

Karen King Mitchell, Chief Judge

Leontae Hill appeals the denial of his declaratory judgment petition against the Department of Corrections (DOC), which sought a declaration that §§ 558.019 and 556.061 do not require Hill to serve a mandatory minimum term of 85% of his life sentences for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, committed on January 1, 2000. Hill also requested that the court order DOC to remove the 85% requirement from his sentences. Because the applicable statutes do require Hill to serve a minimum of 85% of his sentence, we affirm.

Background

At 12:30 a.m. on January 1, 2000, four officers who were on patrol heard automatic gunfire and drove toward its source. Hill v. State , 181 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). They saw Hill and two other men on the steps of an apartment building, where the men had apparently been trying to shoot out streetlights. Id. As the officers passed, Hill advised one of the other men, " ‘If they ride back through[,] I'm going to get them,’ and he [said] that his New Year’s resolution was to shoot the police." Id. "When the police circled back, ... Hill fired his automatic weapon some thirty times at the car, hitting [one o]fficer ... in the head and [another o]fficer ... in the neck." Id.

The State charged Hill with four counts of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer and four counts of armed criminal action. Id. at 615. On December 20, 2001, the jury found Hill guilty as charged, and, on February 11, 2002, the trial court sentenced Hill to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each count of assault of a law enforcement officer and fifteen years' imprisonment for each count of armed criminal action. Id. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Hill , 114 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).

Hill then filed a post-conviction relief motion, arguing that three of his four convictions for armed criminal action violated his right to be free from double jeopardy and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness and request instructions on lesser-included offenses. Hill , 181 S.W.3d at 615, 617. This court vacated three of Hill’s four armed criminal action convictions upon concluding that they violated his right to be free from double jeopardy but rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 615-21.

In 2016, while serving his sentences, Hill was notified by DOC that his sentences would be subject to an 85% mandatory minimum time served before he would become parole eligible. Shortly thereafter, Hill filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that §§ 558.019 and 556.061 did not require him to serve a mandatory minimum term of 85% of his life sentences for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer and requesting that the court order DOC to remove the 85% requirement from his sentences. Hill argued (1) that, at the time he committed his crimes, first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer did not constitute a "dangerous felony" subject to a requirement that the offender serve a mandatory minimum of 85% before becoming parole eligible and (2) that DOC could not apply a 2003 amendment to § 556.061, which specifically added "assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree" to the definition of "dangerous felony." In 2017, Hill filed an amended petition, reasserting his declaratory judgment request and arguing, in the alternative, for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that "his trial counsel and the sentencing court, at the time of the pretrial plea offer and at the time of sentencing, believed that assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree was not an eighty-five percent crime." After filing an answer to the amended petition, DOC moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the request for judgment on the pleadings as it pertained to the declaratory judgment action and denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Hill appeals the adverse judgment on his declaratory judgment petition.1

Standard of Review

"The appellate court reviews the trial court’s grant of ... a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. " Barrett v. Greitens , 542 S.W.3d 370, 375 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). "In determining whether a motion to dismiss should have been granted, the appellate court reviews the petition, in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case." Id. at 375-76 (quoting Mo. Mun. League v. State , 489 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Mo. banc 2016) ). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 376.

Analysis

Hill raises three claims on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of DOC because he should not be required to serve 85% of his sentence for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer. Second, he argues that the court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of DOC because applying this court’s decision in Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (rejecting the very claim raised in Hill’s first point on appeal) violates the doctrine of fundamental fairness in Hill’s situation. And, finally, Hill argues that DOC was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hill was misinformed about his parole eligibility.

A. Hill is required to serve at least 85% of his sentences.

Hill committed his crimes in 2000. At that time, § 558.019.3, RSMo. Supp. 1998, provided:

[A]ny offender who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of a dangerous felony as defined in section 556.061, RSMo., and is committed to the department of corrections shall be required to serve a minimum prison term of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed by the court or until the offender attains seventy years of age, and has served at least forty percent of the sentence imposed, whichever occurs first.

Section 556.061(8), RSMo. Supp. 1999, defined "dangerous felony" as "the felonies of arson in the first degree, assault in the first degree , forcible rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree." (Emphasis added.) Hill was convicted on December 20, 2001, and he was sentenced on February 11, 2002. The legislature amended the definition of "dangerous felony" in 2003 to expressly include, among other crimes, "assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree."

In his first point, Hill argues that, because the definition of "dangerous felony" in § 556.061(8), RSMo. Supp. 1999, did not expressly include first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, the provision of § 558.019.3, RSMo. 1998, requiring offenders convicted of "dangerous felon[ies]" to serve a minimum of 85% of their sentence before becoming parole eligible, cannot be applied to him. We disagree.

We addressed this exact issue just last year in Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). In Mann , the defendant was convicted of first-degree assault on a law enforcement officer in 2002. Id. at 288. The Board of Probation and Parole, after initially granting the defendant parole, rescinded its order before his release upon determining that first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer constituted a "dangerous felony," requiring the defendant to serve 85% of his sentence. Id. The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court, seeking to compel the Board to reinstate his parole release date; when the circuit court denied the petition, the defendant appealed. Id. This court determined that, contrary to the defendant’s argument, "assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree constitutes a type of ‘assault in the first degree,’ and therefore [fell] within the statutory definition of ‘dangerous felony’ " in the 1999 version of the statute. Id. at 290. Thus, under the holding in Mann , Hill’s claim is without merit.

Recognizing the negative implications of Mann on his claim, Hill argues that we should either reconsider Mann or find it distinguishable. We decline both invitations.

Hill first argues that Mann was incorrectly decided insofar as it unnecessarily employed statutory interpretation where the plain language was clear. But the only application of statutory interpretation in Mann was in the argument made by the defendant, when he argued that the 2003 amendment adding first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer implied that the offense was not previously included in the definition of "dangerous felony." This court’s analysis was merely responsive to that argument. This court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that (1) because first-degree assault was a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, a conviction for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer necessarily included a determination of guilt of first-degree assault; (2) the legislative history of § 556.061 ’s definition of "dangerous felony" reflected the definition’s application to categories of offenses rather than specifically designated offenses; and (3) the interpretation proposed by the defendant...

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4 cases
  • Hill v. Cassady
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 2019
    ...issued on December 18, 2018, we affirmed the circuit court’s judgment denying declaratory relief. Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. , No. WD81448, 570 S.W.3d 95, 2018 WL 6611875 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). We held that, under the Mann decision, Hill’s offenses constituted "dangerous felonies" at the tim......
  • Ruiz v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., ED 106926
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • September 3, 2019
    ...Missouri case law suggesting that legal malpractice claims did not survive the death of the claimant. See Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 570 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (rejecting an appellant’s claim that an opinion interpreting the definition of ‘dangerou......
  • Riley v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 2020
    ...granted if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hill v. Missouri Dep't of Corr. , 570 S.W.3d 95, 99 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). Here, Riley was convicted of the class B felony of manufacturing a controlled substance under § 195.211. Riley ......
  • Jackson v. Stange
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • April 12, 2023
    ... ... sentence. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and ... Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no ... constitutional or inherent right of a ... judgment action against the MDOC in state court. See, ... e.g., Hill ... ...

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