Hill v. Mutual Life Ins Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 23 January 1902
• Citation: 113 F. 44
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of Washington, Northern Division
• Parties: HILL et al. v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

113 F. 44

HILL et al. v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

United States Circuit Court, D. Washington, Northern Division.

January 23, 1902

Action upon a life insurance policy issued to George Dana Hill father of the plaintiffs. Tried before the court and a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Heard on a motion for judgment in favor of the defendant non obstante veredicto. Motion denied.

APPEAL-- REVERSAL ON SHINGLE POINT-- RETRIAL-- LAW OF CASE.

On the trial of an action in a United States circuit court, after a judgment of the same court in favor of the plaintiffs on the pleadings has been affirmed by the circuit court of appeals and then reversed by the supreme court, on the ground that the answer raises a material issue, said issue is the only issue to be tried, and the decision of the circuit court of appeals as to all other questions must be considered as the law of the case.

Stanton Warburton, Preston, Carr & Gilman, and Eben Smith, for plaintiffs.

Struve Allen, Hughes & McMicken and R. C. Strudwick, for defendant.

HANFORD District Judge.

Upon the facts alleged and admitted by the pleadings, a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was rendered by this court, which was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Thereupon the case was removed to the supreme court of the United States by a writ of certiorari, and by that court the judgment was reversed, and the case was certified back to this court, with a mandate for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice BREWER. For a complete statement of the case, reference is made to the decisions of the supreme court, reported in 178 U.S. 347-350, 20 Sup.Ct. 914, 44 L.Ed. 1097, and of the circuit court of appeals for the Ninth circuit, reported in 38 C.C.A. 159, 97 F. 263-270, 49 L.R.A. 127. The ground upon which the decisions of the two lower courts were reversed is stated in the opinion of the supreme court as follows:

'Here, as in the last two cases, is disclosed a distinct agreement on the part of the insured and the company to waive and abandon the policy, and all rights and obligations on the part of the parties thereto. But it is said that the insured was not the beneficiary,-- his wife, and, in case of her death, their children, being named as such,-- and that it was not in his power, by nonpayment of waiver or abandonment, to relinquish or cancel her or their rights in the policy. It is doubtless an interesting question how far the action of the insured can affect or bind the beneficiaries in a life insurance policy. If the answer in this case contained simply the allegation in respect to the insured's agreement with the company, we should be compelled to enter into an examination of that question; but it is alleged not only that the insured and the company agreed to abandon the contract, but also that the beneficiary, his wife, and the plaintiffs, their children, 'failed, neglected, and refused' to pay the premium. So we have a case in which not only did the insured and the company abandon the contract, but also the beneficiaries neglected and refused to do that which was essential to keep the policy in life. The allegation in the answer does not disclose a mere omission, for it is 'neglected and refused,' and, of course, there can be no refusal unless with knowledge of the opportunity or duty. A party cannot be said to refuse to do a thing of which he knows nothing. Refusal implies demand, knowledge, or notice. The case, therefore, is one in which the beneficiaries refused to continue the policy, while the insured and the company abandoned it.'

After being reinstated in this court, the case was brought to a trial, and was submitted to a jury for decision of one issue only, which the supreme court of the United States held to be a material issue raised by the defendant's answer. The parties were permitted to introduce evidence relating to other facts which were not seriously disputed, for the purpose of developing the case fully and fairly, and to make a record which would enable the attorneys to argue the legal questions to their own satisfaction. The court afterwards declined to hear arguments on a motion for a new trial, for the reason that a new trial would be a useless proceeding for, if the plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment upon the verdict, they can never prevail, and the law applicable to the conceded facts exonerates the defendant from any liability whatever under the policy sued upon. The defendant then interposed the motion now under consideration, and upon that motion counsel on both sides have argued the case, earnestly and elaborately, as if the decision of the supreme court had completely expunged the previous determinations of this court and of the circuit court of appeals, and returned the case here, to be again considered with...