Hill v. OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC
Decision Date | 15 September 2020 |
Docket Number | AC 42397 |
Citation | 200 Conn.App. 149,239 A.3d 345 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Alicia HILL v. OSJ OF BLOOMFIELD, LLC |
Bruce H. Raymond, with whom was Evan K. Buchberger, Glastonbury, for the appellant (defendant).
Domenic D. Perito, with whom, on the brief, was Richard E. Joaquin, Manchester, for the appellee (plaintiff).
"Drawing logical deductions and making reasonable inferences from facts in evidence, whether that evidence be oral or circumstantial, is a recognized and proper procedure in determining the rights and obligations of litigants, but to be logical and reasonable they must rest upon some basis of definite facts, and any conclusion reached without such evidential basis is a mere surmise or guess." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp ., 250 Conn. 14, 34, 734 A.2d 85 (1999). This important principle lies at the heart of this premises liability appeal. The defendant, OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC, doing business as Ocean State Job Lot, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Alicia Hill, for injuries she sustained when two empty cardboard boxes fell onto her head and shoulder from the top shelf of the aisle she was browsing. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly applied the mode of operation rule as a basis for finding the defendant liable in negligence, and (2) erroneously found that the defendant's merchandise stacking methods caused the boxes to fall on the plaintiff.1 The plaintiff argues that the judgment should be affirmed because she proved her premises liability claim under the affirmative act rule. We conclude that the evidence adduced at trial does not support the imposition of liability on the basis of the mode of operation rule or the affirmative act rule. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to render judgment for the defendant.
The trial court's memorandum of decision sets forth the following recitation, which is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. "The plaintiff testified that [on July 1, 2015] she was walking down the stationery aisle of the [defendant's] store when two empty boxes fell off of a shelf to her right and struck her in the head and right shoulder. [Devin] Gordon, [another shopper in the store], testified that he was in the same aisle and saw the boxes fall off the shelf and strike the plaintiff. The plaintiff testified that prior to the boxes falling on her, she saw two employees of the defendant stocking merchandise in the Internet coupon aisle directly adjacent to the stationery aisle. [The defendant's store manager, Aron Moore] admitted that he and another employee were stocking merchandise in the Internet coupon aisle in the moments preceding the incident, and that as soon as they heard a loud noise, they entered the stationery aisle where they saw the plaintiff and Gordon, who was holding one of the boxes.
On June 13, 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that she sustained injuries to her head
, neck, and right shoulder as a result of the boxes falling onto her and that the incident was caused by the negligence of the defendant. On November 8, 2018, the case was tried to the court. Three witnesses testified: Moore (the store manager), Gordon (the eyewitness), and the plaintiff. Thereafter, the parties submitted posttrial briefs. On December 7, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Setting forth the principles from this court's decision in Meek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 72 Conn. App. 467, 806 A.2d 546, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 912, 810 A.2d 278 (2002), the court concluded that the plaintiff "sustained her burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the empty display boxes fell and struck the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence." Specifically, the court found that "Moore and another employee of the defendant were stocking merchandise in the Internet coupon aisle when one of the nine inch fan boxes on the top shelf of the Internet coupon aisle toppled over and into the display boxes on the top shelf of the stationery aisle, thereby causing the display boxes to fall off the shelf and onto the plaintiff." The court awarded the plaintiff $23,001.96 in past medical expenses and $7500 for pain and suffering for a total of $30,501.96 in damages. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant principally claims on appeal that the trial court improperly applied the mode of operation rule in finding the defendant liable. Specifically, the defendant maintains that the record is devoid of any evidence that (1) the defendant employed a particular mode of operation that is distinct from a similar business, (2) such mode of operation created a regularly occurring or inherently foreseeable hazard, and (3) the plaintiff's injury occurred within a limited zone of risk. We agree with the defendant and conclude that the evidence at trial did not support the application of the mode of operation rule.
We begin with the standard of review and general principles of premises liability. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc ., 281 Conn. 768, 776, 918 A.2d 249 (2007). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Platner , 325 Conn. 737, 755, 159 A.3d 666 (2017). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppedge v. Travis , 187 Conn. App. 528, 532, 202 A.3d 1116 (2019).
2 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC , 306 Conn. 107, 116–17, 49 A.3d 951 (2012). As this court recently explained, to succeed in a traditional negligence action that is based on premises liability, "the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a defect, (2) that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known about the defect and (3) that such defect had existed for such a length of time that the [defendant] should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bisson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 184 Conn. App. 619, 628, 195 A.3d 707 (2018).
There exist at least two circumstances, however, in which a plaintiff, as a business invitee, may recover in a premises liability case without proof that the business had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition alleged to have caused the plaintiff injury. In connection with the first exception, in Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc ., supra, 281 Conn. 768, 918 A.2d 249, our Supreme Court adopted "the so-called ‘mode of operation’ rule, a rule of premises liability pursuant to which a business invitee who is injured by a...
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