Hill v. Relyea, 39530

• Decision Date: 23 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39530,39530
• Citation: 34 Ill.2d 552,216 N.E.2d 795
• Parties: Helen HILL et al., Appellants, v. George T. RELYEA et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 795

216 N.E.2d 795

34 Ill.2d 552

Helen HILL et al., Appellants, v. George T. RELYEA et al., Appellees.

No. 39530.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 23, 1966.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Richard A. Michael, A. Zola Groves, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jerome F. Goldberg, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for appellant Department of Mental Health.

Krusemark & Bertani, Joliet (Louis R. Bertani, Joliet, of counsel), for appellees.

HOUSE, Justice.

The appellant Helen Hill was found to be in need of mental treatment and was ordered detain in the Manteno State Hospital by the circuit court of Will County on April 29, 1965. The superintendent of the hospital granted her an absolute discharge on May 17, 1965, pursuant to authority vested in him by section 10-6 of the Mental Health Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 91 1/2, par. 10-6.) The appellant Hill filed a motion in the circuit court of Will County asking the court to enter its order discharging her and restoring her person to legal competence in accordance with section 10-7 of the Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 91 1/2, par. 10-7.) The court denied her motion and held both sections 10-6 and 10-7 of the Code unconstitutional. Helen Hill filed her notice of appeal and we granted leave to the Department of Mental Health to file its appearance as an additional party appellant in this cause.

Section 10-6 of the Mental Health Code provided: 'When a mentally retarded person, or a person in need of mental treatment has been hospitalized on court order, the superintendent of the hospital in which such person is detained ('detained' changed to 'hospitalized' by 1965 amendment) shall have the power and authority to grant an absolute discharge or a conditional discharge, as the welfare of such person and of the community may require, under such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Department.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 91 1/2, par. 10-6.

Section 10-7 of the Code provided that when the superintendent granted an absolute discharge, he should immediately notify in writing the court entering the original order of hospitalization. Upon receipt of such notice the court should 'as a matter of record,' enter its order discharging such person, and if the person was previously adjudged legally incompetent under any prior statute the court should enter a further order restoring the person to legal competence unless the notice alleged that the patient's condition required continuance of his status as legally incompetent.

In denying Helen Hill's motion for discharge and restoration to legal competence the court held sections 10-6 and 10-7 of the Code unconstitutional on the grounds that '(1) it is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, (2) it is a legislative attempt to supply to the administrative action of the Superintendent the dignity of a Court adjudication, (3) the legislature delegates to the Department the authority to make rules and regulations pertaining to the absolute or conditional discharged of persons hospitalized by Court Order without providing standards for such rules and regulations, * * *.'

The first question is whether the provisions of section 10-6 constitute an unconstitutional delegation of powers by the General Assembly. Appellees argue that the statute fails to provide adequate standards to guide the superintendent's action. Appellants, on the other hand, contend that administrative discretion is controlled by the standard set forth in the statute, whereby the superintendent may discharge patients only 'as the welfare of such person and of the community may require, under such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Department.'

There is a distinction between the delegation of true legislative power and the delegation to a subordinate of authority to execute the law. (Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 356 Ill. 230, 190 N.E. 273.) The former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be; the latter is merely an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. (People v. Warren, 11 Ill.2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28; City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N.E.2d 78, 106 A.L.R. 789; McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 58 N.E.2d 899, 156 A.L.R. 1058.) It is an established rule that the General Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative power to determine what the law shall be. However, it may delegate to others the authority to do those things which the legislature might properly do, but cannot do as understandingly or advantageously. (Board of Education v. Page, 33 Ill.2d 372, 211 N.E.2d 361; People ex rel. Daesch v. Mayor of Belleville, 22 Ill.2d 226, 174 N.E.2d 678; City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N.E.2d 78, 106 A.L.R. 789.) Absolute criteria whereby every detail necessary in the enforcement of a law is anticipated need not be established by the General Assembly. The constitution merely requires that intelligible standards be set to guide the agency charged with enforcement, (Memorial Gardens Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 16 Ill.2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587; People v. Warren, 11 Ill.2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28) and the precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved. Board of Education v. Page, 33 Ill.2d 372, 211 N.E.2d 361; People ex rel. Daesch v. Mayor of Belleville, 22 Ill.2d 226, 174 N.E.2d 678.

In this case the legislature gave the superintendent of the hospital the power and authority to discharge patients 'as the welfare of such person and of the community may require.' The legislature has determined who shall discharge patients and the criteria for discharge but it has granted authority to the Department of Mental Health and to the hospital superintendent to use discretion in executing the law and in granting the discharge. This discretion must be exercised within the standard set forth by the General Assembly. The difficulty in attempting to establish more precise legislative standards is readily apparent. The superintendent of the hospital and his staff examine, work with and treat the hospitalized person. They can determine more understandingly and advantageously when the welfare of the person and of the community...