Hill v. Silsbee Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 14 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:95CV102. |
| Citation | 933 F. Supp. 616 |
| Parties | Glen HILL v. SILSBEE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, and H.C. Muckleroy, in his individual and Official Capacities. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
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Laurence W. Watts, Watts & Associates, Houston, Texas, for Plaintiff.
David Feldman, Dennie M. Feldman, Feldman & Associates, Houston, Texas, for Defendants.
BEFORE THE Court this day for consideration is the Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Silsbee Independent School District, and H.C. Muckleroy in his Individual and Official Capacities. The Court, having considered the Motion and the argument of counsel at hearing, concludes that the Defendants have conclusively established that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning one or more essential elements of Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims and, therefore, renders its decision in accordance with the discussion below.
The Plaintiff, Mr. Glen Hill ("Hill"), was employed as a teacher with the Silsbee Independent School District ("SISD" or "District") prior to 1990, and is still employed by SISD as a teacher. The Defendant, Mr. H.C. Muckleroy ("Muckleroy"), now retired, was the Superintendent of SISD in 1993, during which the events leading to Plaintiff's cause against SISD and Muckleroy occurred. Prior to his retirement after the 1992-1993 school year, Mr. Ray McGallion was the Athletic Director of SISD, and his wife, Rose McGallion was a long-time employee of SISD. The McGallion's daughter, Amy McGallion, also was employed by SISD as a teacher and volleyball coach. Shortly after Mr. McGallion retired from SISD, his wife passed away in September 1993.
During the 1993-1994 school year, the Plaintiff Hill worked for SISD pursuant to a two-year contract which encompassed the school years 1992-1994. In accordance with the terms of that contract, Hill was also assigned supplemental coaching duties as an assistant football coach under Coach Charlie Woodard, for which he received a stipend. The contract also provided that Hill was subject to reclassification, transfer, assignment and reassignment of positions or duties at any time during the contract term (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter Defendants' Motion), Exhibit A-6). This cause of action arises out of Defendant Muckleroy's reassignment of Hill's supplemental coaching duties.
The reassignment of Hill's coaching duties resulted from Ms. Amy McGallion's complaint to Superintendent Muckleroy that Hill had made derogatory and offensive remarks concerning Mr. McGallion and his deceased wife. Specifically, on October 11, 1993, Amy McGallion reported to Defendant Muckleroy that Hill had made derogatory and offensive remarks concerning her parents, Mr. McGallion and his wife, and requested that Muckleroy take steps to end Hill's misconduct. The remarks that Hill was reported to have made during a conversation with other coaches regarding Mrs. McGallion's death, was to the effect that the "wrong one in the family died" and "the wrong one's in the box" (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit A). After being informed of the reported remark, Muckleroy scheduled a meeting for October 12, 1993 to address the situation.
Prior to the October 12, 1993 meeting, Ron Nash, Silsbee High School's principal, and Coach Charlie Woodard were sitting in the field house when Hill approached them and asked what the meeting was about. Principal Nash informed Hill that it concerned statements that he (Hill) reportedly made concerning Mrs. McGallion's death, and recited the remark made by Mr. Hill that "the wrong McGallion was in the box". According to the affidavit of Charlie Woodard, Hill did not deny making the remark and stated that he had no excuse for the statement and would apologize to Amy McGallion. Those present during the October 12, 1993 meeting included Hill, Muckleroy, Amy McGallion, Coach Charlie Woodard, Ron Nash, and Bluford Hicks, SISD's personal director. Although Hill now declares that he cannot remember making the offensive statement even though he apologized for making Amy McGallion upset (Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 2, page 98), the overwhelming evidence shows he did not deny making the statement during the meeting and that he could not justify the statement (Defendant's Motion, Exhibit A). Based upon this initial inquiry, Muckleroy informed Hill that he was suspended pending further investigation. Muckleroy continued to investigate the allegations against Hill during which several witnesses confirmed that Hill reportedly had made offensive remarks concerning Mr. McGallion and Mrs. McGallion's death. Additionally, Coach Woodard, Hill's immediate supervisor, asked for Hill's immediate resignation based on the reported remark being detrimental and disruptive to the coaching staff.
Based on Superintendent Muckleroy's review of the information gathered in the investigation, Muckleroy made the decision to relieve Hill only of his coaching duties but not his teaching duties (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit A). On October 14, 1993, Hill was given written notice of Muckleroy's decision to relieve Hill of his supplemental coaching duties. Hill received his full coaching stipend for the remainder of his contract term. Thereafter, Hill requested a hearing before the SISD Board of Trustee's regarding Muckleroy's decision, and retained an attorney for the hearing.
The SISD Board scheduled Hill's hearing for November 22, 1993 before the Board in an open meeting. Prior to the hearing, Hill was provided with a copy of the agenda to be followed during the hearing, as well as the list of potential witnesses the SISD administration planned to call and a summary of their expected testimony. Additionally, Hill was informed of his right to (1) be represented by counsel, (2) present evidence and witnesses on his own behalf, and (3) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. However, at the hearing, Hill's counsel, would not proceed with the hearing in an orderly and professional manner and, therefore, the hearing was aborted.
Instead of requesting another hearing before the SISD Board of Trustees, Hill filed the instant action in the State District Court of Hardin County in May of 1994, alleging that his state constitutional rights had been violated. Hill asserted that he was reassigned because of previous comments he allegedly had made to Coach Woodard and Mr. Michael Day, Assistant Principal of Silsbee High School. These alleged comments concerned Hill's disapproval of certain SISD financial expenditures by Mr. McGallion, Hill's perceived conflict of interest concerning Mr. McGallion's position as Athletic Director and his children's employment with SISD, and abuse by other football coaches of SISD's prohibition of tobacco use policy. However, on February 16, 1995, the Texas Supreme Court in City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995), held that, in Texas, violation of an individual's free speech state based constitutional rights does not give rise to an independent cause of action for damages.
Subsequent to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Bouillion, Hill amended his State Court Petition alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations of the United States Constitution by the Defendants. The Defendants removed the case to the Federal District Court on February 27, 1995 based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (West 1993) and 1441(a) (West 1994). Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed his First and Second Amended Complaint in which he alleges that the Defendants violated his freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that Defendant Muckleroy denied his substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint). The Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment on August 28, 1995 and Plaintiff filed his response on September 11, 1995. Thereafter, the Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion on November 8, 1995, at which time the Court took the motions under advisement, and allowed the parties to file Supplemental Briefs within seven days of the hearing. The Court, after considering the briefs and the argument of counsel, hereby renders its decision in accordance with the discussion below.
In the federal courts, a party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial". Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (). Summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural short-cut, but rather an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action'". Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). In assessing the proof, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Finally, evidence on summary judgment may be considered to the extent that it is not based on hearsay or other information excludable at trial. See Martin v. John W. Stone...
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