Hill v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MCCULLOCH, J.
• Citation: Hill v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, 109 S.W. 523, 85 Ark. 529 (Ark. 1908)
• Decision Date: 30 March 1908
• Parties: HILL v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

109 S.W. 523

85 Ark. 529

HILL v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 30, 1908

Appeal from White Circuit Court; Jesse N. Cypert, Special Judge reversed.

Reversed and remanded.

J. H Harrod, for appellant.

The testimony shows that appellant was a passenger, that as he alighted from the train at Beebe he discovered the loss of his book and papers, and got permission of a brakeman to return to them, which he immediately did, and came out of the car as soon as he could get them, and that just as he went to alight the train started, causing him to fall. If the testimony was true, he had a meritorious cause of action, and it was for the jury to say whether or not it was true.

T. M Mehaffy and J. E. Williams, for appellant.

Appellant was not a passenger at the time of the accident, and permission by the brakeman to re-enter the train for the purpose only of getting the articles negligently left by him would not bind the appellee, nor continue the relation of cartier and passenger. 74 Am. Dec. 254; 12 Am. Rep. 475; 15 Am. Rep. 513; 30 Am. Rep. 98; 52 Am. Rep. 705; 2 Am. St. Rep. 373; 4 Am. St. Rep. 394; 59 Ark. 395; 37 Am. St. Rep. 382; 6 Am. St. Rep. 730; 39 F. 596; 60 Ark. 106; 70 Ark. 606. Such permission to re-enter the train, etc., was not the proximate cause of the injury. 65 Ark. 64; 52 Am. Rep. 790; 51 Id. 284; 48 Id. 74; 59 Id. 632; 82 Ark. 590; 73 Ark. 548; 55 Ark. 64; 69 Ark. 81; 60 Ark. 106; 68 Miss. 9; 102 Mo.App. 430; 182 Pa.St. 457; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3 Ed.), 1126.

2. Appellant was guilty, as a matter of law, of such contributory negligence as to preclude a recovery. 44 Am. Rep. 505; 62 Am. Dec. 323; 61 Id. 214; 56 Am. Rep. 842; 66 Am. Dec. 406.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, J.

Appellant, E. P. Hill, sued the railway company to recover damages for personal injuries received while he was attempting to alight from a passenger train, and on the trial of the case before a jury the court gave a peremptory instruction in favor of the defendant. The question, therefore, presented on the appeal is whether the evidence, giving it the strongest probative force in favor of appellant's cause of action, is sufficient to warrant a verdict in his favor. The testimony tended to establish the following state of facts:

Appellant was a passenger on one of appellee's trains en route from Little Rock to Beebe. When the train reached Beebe, about seven o'clock in the evening, appellant stepped off, but immediately discovered that he had left a package containing his bank book and other papers on the seat, and went back into the car to get them. Before doing so, he spoke to the brakeman, who was standing at the steps assisting passengers to alight, and asked him whether he would have time to go back after his papers before, the train started, and the brakeman replied that he would have ample time to do so. He went back into the car and secured his package, hurrying back as rapidly as he could, and as he attempted to alight the train started, and he was thrown down and injured. The brakeman suddenly picked up his lantern and step-box just as appellant was in the act of stepping down on the box, and appellant fell or was knocked down. The duties of the brakeman, while the train stood at the station, were to assist passengers to alight and to signal the conductor when all passengers for that station had got out of the car.

These facts, if established by evidence, were sufficient to warrant a verdict in appellant's favor, and the case should not have been withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.

Appellant was still a passenger at the time he was injured, and was entitled to protection as such. The precise time at which one who rides on a train ceases to be a passenger is generally dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of each case, and it is difficult to lay down a rule on the subject applicable to all cases. The relation of carrier and passenger ceases only after the train has reached the passenger's destination and he has had a reasonable time and opportunity to alight safely and to leave the premises of the carrier. What is a reasonable time and opportunity is generally a question of fact for the jury. Barringer v. St. Louis. I. M. & So. Ry. Co., 73 Ark. 548, 85 S.W. 94; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, § 1016.

If a passenger, through forgetfulness in hurriedly debarking from a train, leaves a package in the car, and re-enters for the purpose of getting it, he does not necessarily cease to be a passenger. He is still within his...