Hill v. State

Decision Date06 September 2019
Docket NumberNo. 114,403,114,403
Citation448 P.3d 457
Parties Sage HILL, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v. STATE of Kansas and Ernest Garcia, Appellees/Cross-appellants.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Michael T. Miller, of McCauley & Roach, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Morgan L. Roach, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

M.J. Willoughby, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with her on the briefs for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Biles, J.:

Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Sage Hill alleges the KHP retaliated by requiring him to move across the state to keep his job after the Kansas Civil Service Board ordered the agency to reinstate him to work. State law expressly provides no civil service employee—including a KHP trooper—may be disciplined or discriminated against "in any way because of the employee's proper use of the appeal procedure." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2949(g). No one claims Hill improperly exercised his civil service right. This appeal presents three questions before this court: (1) whether a common-law cause of action for employer retaliation may be based on an adverse job action short of dismissal or demotion; (2) whether the State's sovereign immunity bars the claim regardless of its merits; and (3) whether the uncontroverted material facts entitle defendants to summary judgment against Hill. The first two are matters of first impression.

The lower courts disagreed with each other in answering these inquiries although both ultimately held Hill's case could not go to a jury. Hill v. State , 53 Kan. App. 2d 155, 157, 388 P.3d 122 (2016). We granted review. A majority now affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands to the district court for further proceedings.

We hold the common-law tort of retaliation may be premised on an employer's action short of dismissal or demotion, such as the involuntary job relocation alleged in this case. To hold otherwise would undermine the purposes supporting common-law job retaliation claims and the important public policy expressed in the Kansas Civil Service Act, K.S.A. 75-2925 et seq. We further hold sovereign immunity does not bar Hill's claim. Finally, we conclude there are genuine issues of material facts precluding summary judgment. Remand is necessary for the district court to resolve these remaining controversies.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Given the procedural posture, all facts and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence are resolved in Hill's favor because the district court decided this case against him on summary judgment. Lumry v. State , 305 Kan. 545, 547, 385 P.3d 479 (2016) ; Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kansas City Royalty Co. , 297 Kan. 1193, 1204, 308 P.3d 1238 (2013) ; O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. , 294 Kan. 318, 330, 277 P.3d 1062 (2012). Our factual statement is prepared with that recognition.

In January 2008, the KHP hired Hill as a trooper and assigned him to Troop H in Cherokee County, which is in our state's southeastern corner. Hill worked there until November 2011 when the KHP fired him over a dispute with a supervisor who was investigating a civilian complaint against him. Hill appealed to the Kansas Civil Service Board, which is statutorily created to provide civil service employees with an independent review for specific types of state agency employment actions. See K.S.A. 75-2929a (creation of board); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2929d(a) (board's authority to hear appeals concerning demotion, dismissal, or suspension of permanent employees in state classified service); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2935(1), (2) (including KHP troopers as classified state employees).

The board reversed the termination although it agreed Hill's misconduct warranted discipline. The board modified the sanction to a one-year suspension without pay and benefits. For the KHP, this was an unprecedented reversal of its command staff's decision to fire a trooper.

In reinstating Hill, the KHP decided to treat him as a new hire who could be "assigned" wherever needs were greatest. At that time, Finney County in southwestern Kansas had the greatest need. KHP Superintendent Ernest Garcia agreed and made the final decision. On December 13, 2012, Garcia sent Hill a letter, stating:

"In accordance with the Final Order of the Civil Service Board, your dismissal as a Trooper is being modified to a suspension without pay and benefits for a period of one year from the date of your dismissal.
"You are being returned to active duty effective November 6, 2012 and transferred from Troop H to Troop E, Finney County ." (Emphasis added.)

KHP admits it is undesirable to involuntarily relocate a trooper previously assigned to another geographic area because it disrupts the trooper's personal life. Multiple command staff members testified they could not remember ever involuntarily transferring a trooper after an initial area assignment as a new hire. Garcia also could not recall ever involuntarily changing a trooper's job placement. KHP further agrees no other trooper was involuntarily transferred to remedy the trooper shortage in southwestern Kansas, which was the ostensible reason for transferring Hill. The evidence before the district court showed no KHP trooper had been involuntarily transferred for at least the past four decades. KHP acknowledges it was more challenging to get troopers to serve in western Kansas.

Hill tried to administratively challenge his relocation. He asked the Civil Service Board to amend its reinstatement order to prevent it. The board denied the request by finding that it was untimely and that the KHP complied with its order by returning Hill to active duty. Hill then sought to appeal the transfer under the Civil Service Act, but the board determined it lacked jurisdiction because the Act limits its authority to agency initiated demotions, dismissals, or suspensions. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2929d(a)(1).

Undeterred, Hill sought a hardship assignment from the KHP premised on caring for his mother, who suffered health problems including multiple sclerosis. Command staff recommended against this, believing the hardship was insufficiently documented and because troopers were needed in western Kansas. Garcia agreed and denied the request.

In February 2013, Hill reported for duty in Finney County. That same month, he requested relocation back to southeastern Kansas under the KHP's biannual voluntary transfer program called "make a wish." This gives troopers a chance to express a location preference and for the KHP to determine if that preference can be accommodated. The "make a wish" announcement included Cherokee County, Hill's prior assigned area, as needing manpower. Nevertheless, Hill's troop captain in southwestern Kansas and the command staff recommended against his request. Garcia agreed by letter, stating: "Sage, a greater need exists for your services in your present duty assignment. It would not be practical or in the best interest of the agency to authorize a move."

In May 2013 Hill sued the KHP and Garcia in district court. He alleged his transfer was retaliatory and violated the public policy imbued in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2949(g) (prohibiting discipline or discrimination "in any way" against employees who properly pursue civil service appeals). He later amended the lawsuit to substitute the State of Kansas as a defendant for the KHP.

In October 2013 Hill made a second "make a wish" request to Cherokee County in response to another announcement listing that county as needing manpower. Again, his southwestern Kansas troop captain opposed transfer, citing the southwest region's continued staffing needs. Garcia denied Hill's request on the same rationale as before.

Also that October, Hill requested transfer to Troop G, which covers the Kansas Turnpike. He was the most senior trooper to bid for the position, and Garcia approved. Since December 2013 Hill has lived in Augusta, worked as a trooper along the turnpike, and received a promotion to a master trooper.

The district court proceedings

The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. Relevant for this appeal, they claimed: (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Hill's exclusive remedy was under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. ; (2) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there is no private right of action under the Civil Service Act; (3) Hill failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (4) sovereign immunity shielded the defendants from liability under three provisions of the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq. : K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-6103(a) (governmental entity liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of its employees acting within scope of employment under circumstances in which the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable), K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-6104(c) (no liability for enforcement or failure to enforce a law), and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-6104(e) (no liability for discretionary function).

The district court denied the motions, concluding: it had subject matter jurisdiction; Hill stated a valid common-law retaliation claim based on the protection embedded within K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-2949(g) (prohibiting discipline or discrimination "in any way" against employees using the civil service appeal process); and the defendants had no sovereign immunity. In a follow-up order, the court clarified the decision to transfer Hill was an agency action under the KJRA but held that did not matter because Hill was seeking redress for the agency's tortious conduct—not for judicial review of the agency's administrative action.

Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor, noting Hill did not establish a prima facie retaliation case based on the uncontroverted record. It reached this...

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