Hill v. State

Decision Date24 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 36054,36054
PartiesHILL v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Robert M. Boulineau, Milledgeville, for appellant.

Joseph H. Briley, Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Michael R. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWLES, Justice.

This is a death case. Defendant was convicted of the forcible rape and murder of a twelve-year-old girl. The jury sentenced him to death for the murder, finding two aggravating circumstances. One, that the offense of murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, to wit: rape. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(2). Two, that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(7). Defendant was sentenced to life for the rape.

The jury was authorized to find the following facts:

Around 11:00 a. m. on the date of her death the victim was observed buying candy at the West End Service Station by the station owner. Shortly thereafter the owner also noticed defendant standing outside the station. The station owner testified that at that time defendant had one arm in a white sling.

At approximately 12:30 p. m. that day the victim and defendant were seen by three witnesses walking together near the place where her body was later found. The witnesses who observed them testified that defendant had one arm around the victim's waist; his other arm was in a white sling. About an hour later defendant was again seen at the West End Service Station. The station owner testified that defendant was "talking filthy and wild, crazy..." "about how he had killed somebody over some change or something or other." The station owner noticed that defendant had bleeding scratches on his face and neck and did not have on the arm sling he had been wearing earlier. Defendant responded to questions concerning the scratches by saying that he had fallen into some briars. A short while later defendant told some neighbors that he had gotten scratched when he fell into briars while walking in the woods.

Several hours after these events occurred defendant telephoned the sheriff's office and told his brother, a deputy sheriff, that he had discovered a human body while walking through the woods. Because the body had been found inside the city limits of Milledgeville the Milledgeville police were called in. Defendant led a search party to an area of dense undergrowth where, about 15 feet off the trail, the body of the victim was found. The body was almost completely covered with pine straw. Law officers testified that the covered body was not immediately recognizable as human because it was so well concealed.

Police officers uncovered the body and asked defendant if he recognized the victim. Defendant twice denied knowing "that broad," although he later admitted he was well-acquainted with her. Features of the victim were not so distorted as to render her unrecognizable.

The victim had been bludgeoned to death. She sustained massive injuries to the abdominal area, including a ruptured spleen and pancreas. Three ribs had been broken. Both sides of the victim's head were severely bruised and her brain was badly swollen. Fingernail marks were found on her face and chest. Blood was discovered on the trail leading to the body and on two trees, approximately two and one-half feet apart, at a height of three and one-half feet, indicating that the victim had been beaten up against the trees. The medical examiner testified it would have taken 5-15 minutes for the victim to die and that she would have experienced considerable pain.

When found the victim was clad only in short brown pants. Two garments tied one arm to her chest; her other arm was free. The autopsy revealed non-mobile sperm and a high level of acid phosphatase; the medical examiner concluded that the victim had engaged in sexual intercourse within twelve hours prior to her death. No massive injuries to her genitalia were found although some trauma around the vaginal opening was sustained.

Since defendant had reported his discovery of the body he was questioned by the police as to the circumstances under which he discovered the body. Upon noticing the scratches on defendant's neck the police became suspicious of him and read him his Miranda rights. Defendant made a voluntary statement to the effect that he had received the scratches on his neck while leading the search party to the body. Defendant also told police that he had either been with friends or at his home all day until he discovered the body.

The police obtained from defendant's mother clothes that defendant had worn earlier on the day of the murder. At first defendant denied that the clothes were his, but at trial admitted that they belonged to him. The shirt was covered with blood, but was so soiled that the lab technicians were unable to get an exact blood type due to bacterial interference. Both technicians did testify that the blood on the defendant's shirt was conclusively not that of defendant, but it was determined that it could have been that of the victim. Defendant testified that the blood on his shirt came from bleeding sores on his body. Fingernail scrapings taken from the victim revealed human blood, but of an amount too small to type.

Police found a white arm sling near the victim's bicycle. An officer fastened it so that it could not be adjusted and asked defendant if he would try it on. Defendant agreed. The officer testified that it was "a perfect fit." Defendant denied that the sling belonged to him.

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial on the general grounds.

I. Defendant first argues that the evidence adduced at trial does not support a conviction of forcible rape. There are three elements to this offense. "A person commits (forcible) rape when he has (1) carnal knowledge of a female, (2) forcibly and (3) against her will." Code Ann. § 26-2001. At trial the medical examiner testified that the victim had experienced sexual intercourse within twelve hours of her death. The victim's mother testified that the victim had been in her presence for 36 consecutive hours prior to her leaving the house at 11:00 a. m. on the morning of her death. The victim's age in this case indicates that, as a matter of law, the intercourse was non-consensual and "against her will." Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 236 S.E.2d 748 (1977). Due to the death of the victim there is no direct evidence available as to the use of force in committing the offense. However, the evidence showed that the victim had been severely beaten about the head, chest and abdomen; that one arm was bound to her chest by two garments; that her chest was covered with fingernail marks; that three ribs had been broken; and that there was evidence of some trauma around the genital area. Additionally defendant's neck was badly scratched and traces of human blood were found under the victim's fingernails. These facts would have authorized a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had used force in raping the victim. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of forcible rape. See Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759, 243 S.E.2d 20 (1978).

II. Defendant next contends that his conviction for murder should be reversed due to insufficient evidence. Defendant was observed by three witnesses walking with the victim on the day of her murder, wearing a white arm sling. A short while later defendant was seen acting "crazy" and "talking about how he had killed somebody." At this time defendant's neck was badly scratched and he was not wearing his white arm sling. A white sling fitting defendant's arm was found near the victim's bicycle. Traces of blood were found under the fingernails of the victim. The shirt defendant had been wearing on the day of the victim's death was covered with blood which was found to be conclusively not that of the defendant but could have been that of the victim. When asked by the police if he could identify the victim, defendant twice stated that he did not know her, although the evidence showed they were well-acquainted. Defendant also testified that he stumbled across the body while walking through the woods, yet the evidence at trial showed that the body was well concealed and could not be seen from the path in the woods. This evidence would authorize the jury's finding that defendant murdered the victim. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Therefore, there is no merit to this argument.

III. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the offense of statutory rape. Defendant argues that the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue of "whether the intercourse which (the victim) had with someone could have been statutory rape." Defendant cites McFall v. State, 235 Ga. 105, 107, 218 S.E.2d 839 (1975) for the proposition that it is "incumbent upon the court to instruct the jury to find either statutory rape or forcible rape where both are in issue" in a case where the alleged victim has not reached the age of consent. However, we discredited McFall in Drake v. State, supra. In Drake we said "(w)hen an act of sexual intercourse with a girl under 14 is shown, statutory rape is shown. If the state desires to convict a defendant of forcible rape, it must prove the element of force by acts of force (or mental coercion) age has nothing to do with it. Considerations of 'consent' and 'force' and 'against her will' are irrelevant in a statutory rape case, and the age of the victim is irrelevant in a forcible rape case except insofar as it may show her incapable of giving consent and thereby supply the 'against her will' element," supra, at 233, 236 S.E.2d 748. The elements of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Wellons v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1995
    ...crushed her throat with his hands, and that she struggled to free herself. This clearly constitutes torture. See Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 409-410, 271 S.E.2d 802 (1980); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 861, 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980). 9. The prosecutor did not improperly interject victim impact ......
  • State v. Collins
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 26, 1998
    ...§ 213.1 comment at 277 n. 11 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 4. Drake, 239 Ga. at 233, 236 S.E.2d 748; Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 405, 271 S.E.2d 802 (1980). 5. Drake, 239 Ga. at 233, 234, 236 S.E.2d 6. Id. at 235-236, 236 S.E.2d 748. 7. 256 Ga. 631, 352 S.E.2d 382 (1987). 8. 2......
  • Nelson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • January 27, 1981
    ...855 (1979); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417, 265 S.E.2d 553 (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688, 266 S.E.2d 499 (1980); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 271 S.E.2d 802 (1980); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520, 272 S.E.2d 487 HILL, Presiding Justice, concurring specially. I concur specially as to divisi......
  • Phillips v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1982
    ...15 (1981); Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. 172, 274 S.E.2d 317 (1981); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520, 272 S.E.2d 487 (1980); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 271 S.E.2d 802 (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688, 266 S.E.2d 499 (1980) [re-examined at 247 Ga. 233, 275 S.E.2d 318 (1981) ]; Bowen v. State, 244......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT