Hill v. State, WD 64874.
Decision Date | 17 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. WD 64874.,WD 64874. |
Citation | 181 S.W.3d 611 |
Parties | Leontae C. HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Jackson County, Thomas C. Clark, J.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jeannie M. Willibey, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Shaun J. Mackelprang, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
Before: ROBERT G. ULRICH, P.J., PATRICIA A. BRECKENRIDGE, and JAMES M. SMART, JJ.
Leontae Hill appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Hill sought to vacate his convictions for four counts of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, section 565.081, RSMo 2000, and four counts of armed criminal action, section 571.015, RSMo 2000, and consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for each count of assault of a law enforcement officer and fifteen years imprisonment for each count of armed criminal action. Mr. Hill claims that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion because (1) his convictions and sentences for armed criminal action charged in Counts 4, 6, and 8 violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to call a witness to testify and failed to request the submission of instructions on the lesser included offenses of assault in the second degree and assault of a law enforcement officer in the second degree.
At 12:30 a.m. on January 1, 2000, Officers Steven Walker, Anthony White, Jeff Colvin, and Leon Bradley were on patrol in a marked police car. (Normally, only two officers ride in a car.) After hearing automatic gunfire, they drove toward its source, where they saw two men, Leontae Hill and Noah Sanders, on the steps of an apartment building at 2603 East 29th Street in Kansas City. Brandon Vaughn was a third person present.
The officers shined a light on Mr. Hill and Mr. Sanders, whose prior attempts to shoot-out streetlights had drawn the officers' attention. Mr. Hill then told Mr. Vaughn, "If they ride back through I'm going to get them," and he told Mr. Sanders that his New Year's resolution was to shoot the police. Mr. Sanders told him not to do this, but Mr. Hill ignored him. When the police circled back, Mr. Hill fired his automatic weapon some thirty times at the car, hitting Officer Walker in the head and Officer Colvin in the neck. The police car was extensively damaged but continued on.
After he finished firing, Mr. Hill said, "I think I hit them."
Officer Colvin drove the car two blocks away from the scene of the shooting and stopped. En route, dispatch was called. Soon thereafter, a tactical response team arrived at the scene of the shooting.
Without a warrant, the team members went from door to door, knocking and asking those who responded whether they were injured and whether they knew anything about the shooting. Officer Williams, the team's point man, knocked on the door of the apartment in which Mr. Hill was found. A young woman, Raphaela Moore, opened the door, and Officer Williams told Ms. Moore "we would like to come in and speak to [you]." Ms. Moore invited the police inside. Once inside, they saw, in addition to Ms. Moore, a young man lying on a couch in the front room. The only light in the apartment was the flickering of a TV screen.
Officer Williams asked Ms. Moore for her consent to search the apartment. She said that she was only a visitor and that they should ask the tenant, who was in the first bedroom. She also said that the only people in the apartment were she and the young man, the tenant and the tenant's children.
While moving down the hallway toward the first bedroom, the police saw movement in the back bedroom, which they then entered. Mr. Hill was lying in a bed in a fetal position facing away from the door, and Mr. Vaughn was crouched beside the bed, trying to hide. Officer Williams ordered both men to stand up. When Mr. Hill stood up, the police saw an automatic weapon lying on the bed. Both men were taken into custody, and their weapons—Mr. Vaughn had a .38 handgun—were confiscated.
Mr. Hill was charged by indictment with four counts of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree and four counts of armed criminal action. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the counts, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Hill to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each count of assault of a law enforcement officer and fifteen years imprisonment for each count of armed criminal action. Mr. Hill's convictions and sentences were affirmed in his direct appeal. State v. Hill, 114 S.W.3d 310 (Mo.App. W.D.2003).
Thereafter, Mr. Hill filed his pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion on Mr. Hill's behalf raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion court denied Mr. Hill's motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
Appellate review of the denial of a postconviction motion is limited to determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k); Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Mo. banc 2000). Findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Morrow, 21 S.W.3d at 822.
In Mr. Hill's first point on appeal, he claims that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief because the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering convictions and sentences for armed criminal action as charged in Counts 4, 6, and 8. Specifically, Mr. Hill contends that those convictions and sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because Counts 4, 6, and 8 charged identical offenses to the offense charged in Count 2.
Count 1 charged assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree alleging that Mr. Hill attempted to kill or to cause serious physical injury to Anthony White, a law enforcement officer, by shooting at him. Count 2 charged armed criminal action specifically alleging:
the defendant committed the felony of Assault of Law Enforcement Officer First Degree charged in Count 1, all allegations of which are incorporated herein by reference, and the defendant committed the foregoing felony of Assault of Law Enforcement Officer First Degree by, with and through the use, assistance and aid of a deadly weapon.
Count 3 charged assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree regarding Officer Jeffrey Colvin; Count 5 charged assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree regarding Officer Leon Bradley; and Count 7 charged assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree regarding Officer Steven Walker. Counts 4, 6, and 8 charged armed criminal action using the identical language as Count 2, referencing the assault of a law enforcement officer charge in Count 1. Mr. Hill contends that because Counts 2, 4, 6, and 8 all charged that he committed the felony charged in Count 1 through the use of a deadly weapon, he was "twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense.
The State argues that this claim is waived because Mr. Hill failed to raise it in the trial court, on direct appeal, or in his motion for postconviction relief and raises it for the first time in this appeal. The State further contends that even if the claim was not waived, Mr. Hill was not convicted of four counts of armed criminal action for the assault of Officer White because the jury instructions for each of the verdict directors for armed criminal action referenced a separate assault count.
The case of State v. Frances, 51 S.W.3d 18 (Mo.App. W.D.2001), controls. In Frances, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault, one count of second-degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal action for shooting Gregory Watson, Stanley Johnson, and Jonathon Barnes. Id. at 19. All three armed criminal action counts in the original indictment and the amended information incorporated and referred to the first degree assault against Gregory Watson, which was charged in count 1. Id. at 20. The case was tried to the court, and the court found the defendant guilty of all six counts. Id. The court's judgment did not set out the counts in detail but instead referred to the amended information and described the counts as either assault in the first degree or armed criminal action. Id.
On appeal, the defendant challenged two of the three convictions for armed criminal action contending that all three charges of armed criminal action were identical in that all related specifically to the shooting of Gregory Watson. Id. at 19-20. He claimed that his three convictions for the same offense violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 20. The State argued that the erroneous cross-referencing was merely a typographical error in the information that did not prejudice the defendant because the record taken as a whole, including statements made by the prosecutor in opening statements and closing arguments, revealed that the prosecutor intended to charge the defendant with three separate counts of armed criminal action related to three separate assaults. Id. at 21.
Despite not raising his double jeopardy claim in the trial court, this court reviewed the claim citing Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Mo. banc 1992), which mentioned the jurisdictional nature of such a claim because the right to be free from double jeopardy is a constitutional right that goes to the power of the State to bring a defendant into court to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mckee v. State
...of the greater offense charged, and convicting him of the lesser-included offense. Section 556.046 RSMo Supp.2001; Hill v. State, 181 S.W.3d 611, 620 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). Here, Movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 29.15 motion, because he failed to alleged facts, not......
-
Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
...12:30 a.m. on January 1, 2000, four officers who were on patrol heard automatic gunfire and drove toward its source. Hill v. State , 181 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). They saw Hill and two other men on the steps of an apartment building, where the men had apparently been trying to s......
-
Taylor v. State
...hearing on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request instructions for a lesser offense. See Hill v. State, 181 S.W.3d 611, 621 (Mo. App. W.D.2006) (affirming denial of Rule 29.15 motion without evidentiary hearing where facts alleged would not have supported acquittal of......
-
Section 31.6 Procedural Default
...(§31.6) 1. (§31.6) Procedural Default Double jeopardy does not have to be pleaded in an original Rule 29.15 motion. In Hill v. State, 181 S.W.3d 611 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006), the defendant’s 29.15 motion was denied. He did not raise double jeopardy at trial, on appeal, or in his original 29.15 ......
-
Section 10.22 Limitations on Relief Under Rule 29.15
...Limitations on Relief Under Rule 29.15 Double jeopardy does not have to be pleaded in an original Rule 29.15 motion. In Hill v. State, 181 S.W.3d 611 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006), the defendant’s Rule 29.15 motion was denied. He did not raise double jeopardy at trial, on appeal, or in his original ......