Hill v. Stoughton Trailers, LLC.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-2205.,05-2205.
• Citation: 445 F.3d 949
• Parties: Evan S. HULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STOUGHTON TRAILERS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

445 F.3d 949

Evan S. HULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STOUGHTON TRAILERS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-2205.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 4, 2006.

Decided April 26, 2006.

George Vernon (argued), Monroe, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amy O. Bruchs (argued), Michael Best & Friedrich, Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before POSNER, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Stoughton Trailers ("Stoughton") fired Evan Hull ("Hull") shortly after he completed an approved one-week leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2000), and while he was requesting additional FMLA leave. Despite Hull's claims that Stoughton impermissibly fired him because he requested FMLA leave, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stoughton. We affirm, not on the grounds relied on by the district court, but rather because Hull failed to establish his prima facie burden of showing that similarly situated employees who did not take FMLA leave were treated more favorably.

I. BACKGROUND

Hull worked as an assembly line supervisor at Stoughton, a Wisconsin manufacturing facility that fabricates and assembles trailers, containers, and chassis for use with large trucks. In Fall of 2003, Hull had a flare-up of a lower back condition and consulted his doctor, an orthopedic specialist. On October 8, 2003, Hull's doctor prescribed diazepam (commonly known as Valium) and hydrocodone (an opiate) for pain relief. Both of these medications have side effects that include drowsiness and, at higher doses, confusion and even delirium. Hull regularly took these medications with his breakfast at approximately 4:30 a.m. and would then travel to Stoughton's Brodhead, Wisconsin facility, where his shift routinely began at 6 a.m.

On November 3, 2003, Hull met with Barb Patterson ("Patterson"), Stoughton's Human Resource Administrator, and reported that he had a ruptured disc in his back. Hull requested that Patterson begin paperwork for a possible FMLA leave. Hull also discussed his medication regimen with Linda Lewis, Stoughton's company nurse, who purportedly told Hull that his plan of taking the medications at approximately 4:30 a.m. was medically sound.¹

On the morning of November 10, 2003, one of Hull's co-workers noticed that he looked impaired: Hull's speech was slurred and he appeared confused and drowsy. Contrary to standard company policy, Stoughton personnel did not administer a drug test. Instead, Stoughton requested that Hull leave work, which he promptly did. That same day, Hull's physician placed Hull on a one-week medical leave. On November 12, 2003, Stoughton approved the one-week leave, effective November 11, 2003.

On November 17, Hull's physician placed him on an additional two-week leave. That same day (or the day after — the parties, again, disagree), Hull notified Stoughton's Human Resources department that his FMLA leave would need to be extended by two weeks. Unbeknownst to Hull, around this same time, his immediate supervisor, Robert Wahlin, and Stoughton's General Manager, Bradford Alfery ("Alfery"), were conferring to discuss terminating Hull, purportedly for his violation of the company's drug policy and ongoing performance problems. (Hull had received a new work assignment in August 2003, following prior unfavorable reviews in October 2002 and June 2003, but he completed a 45-day initial review period in September 2003, with no indication of continuing performance issues.)

On November 20, 2003, Stoughton terminated Hull, with a retroactive effective date of November 18, 2003. The termination notice to Hull from Alfery, the company decision-maker, stated, in pertinent part:

The Company has determined that you failed to comply with [Stoughton's Drug and Alcohol policy and the Code of Ethics]. By itself, this event is enough to terminate your employment and in light of your previous poor performance, decision making, and your failure to meet the performance improvement expectations as mutually agreed, your immediate termination of employment with the Company is necessary.

Hull filed a lawsuit in Wisconsin state court, alleging that Stoughton retaliated and discriminated against him for taking FMLA leave. Stoughton removed the case to federal court. After the parties conducted significant discovery, Stoughton filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted Stoughton's motion for summary judgment, holding that Hull could not establish that Alfery, the decision-maker, knew that Hull had taken FMLA leave prior to the decision to terminate him. As a result, the district court concluded that Hull could not establish a "causal relationship" between the protected activity (taking FMLA leave) and his firing. The district court further held that even if Hull could establish a prima facie case, Hull could not establish that Stoughton's proferred reasons for the termination were pretextual.

II. ANALYSIS

The district court's principal reason for granting summary judgment was that Hull could not establish that Alfery, the decision-maker, was aware that Hull had requested FMLA leave, and therefore Hull could not establish a "causal relationship" between the protected activity and the adverse action. This court, however, no longer requires the type of causal link that the district court found to be lacking in this case. See Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir.2002). Instead, to establish an FMLA retaliation or discrimination case under the indirect method (which is the case that Hull brings here), Hull must show that after taking FMLA leave (the protected activity) he was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees who did not take FMLA leave, even though he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner. See id.; see also Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir.2004).

On appeal, Stoughton does not dispute that the district court's basis for granting summary judgment was incorrect. Instead, Stoughton argues that Hull cannot meet his prima facie requirement of showing that similarly situated employees who did not take FLMA leave were treated more favorably than Hull. Because this court can affirm summary judgment on any ground found in the record, we consider this argument. See Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir.1985). Hull's evidence on the similarly situated requirement is thin: it consists of a spreadsheet showing that over the course of ten years, eighty-five of Stoughton's employees were disciplined for violating Stoughton's drug use policy, but only three non-probationary employees (like Hull) were discharged for first-time violations of the policy. Furthermore, there were additional grounds (such as manipulating urine samples) that independently justified discharging these three employees. Although this evidence establishes that Hull was likely punished with greater severity than virtually any other first-time violator of Stoughton's drug and alcohol policy, it does not satisfy this court's requirement for establishing a similarly situated comparator group. Specifically, Hull fails to show that at least one of these other Stoughton employees (the comparators) is directly comparable to him and did not take FMLA leave.

"To determine whether two employees are directly comparable, a court looks at all the relevant factors, which most often include whether the employees (i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the...