Hill v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 25 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 30172,30172
• Citation: 518 P.2d 1353,112 Cal.Rptr. 257,10 Cal.3d 812
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 518 P.2d 1353, 95 A.L.R.3d 820 Frank HILL, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A.

Page 257

112 Cal.Rptr. 257

10 Cal.3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 95 A.L.R.3d 820

Frank HILL, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. No. 30172.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Feb. 25, 1974.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Harold E. Shabo, William S. Berland and Seymour Weisberg, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Joseph P. Busch, Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Arnold T. Guminski, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

BURKE, Justice.

Frank Hill, who is charged by information with attempted burglary, seeks mandamus to compel respondent court to issue an order directing the People to permit him to examine and copy 'the felony conviction record, and the arrest and detention records of Harry Sillence.'

The public defender who represents petitioner made a pretrial motion for discovery of the foregoing records. A supporting declaration by the public defender alleged on information and belief that 'the Los Angeles Police Department and/or the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles have in their possession or under their control the past felony conviction, arrest and detention records ('rap sheet') of . . . Sillence' and that Sillence will be called as a prosecution witness at the trial and will testify to substantially the same facts contained in petitioner's arrest report, a copy of which was attached to the declaration and incorporated therein. It appears from that report that Sillence was an eyewitness to the alleged crime. ¹ The declaration further alleged that 'the . . . felony conviction record . . . (and) the arrest and detention records of (Sillence) are unknown to (petitioner) or his attorney'; that it is necessary that those records be made available to petitioner and his attorney in order that they may properly prepare the case for trial; and that Sillence's felony conviction record 'is . . . relevant . . . as it may be used to impeach the witness.'

Petitioner's points and authorities filed in respondent court alleged that Sillence's arrest and detention records 'may show that he has a bias or motive to lie in the current action. He may have prior arrests . . . for burglary. These incidents may be similar to the current offense . . .. ( ) Such incidents could be used to show that Sillence may be the actual perpetrator of the offense for which (petitioner) is now charged, thus giving him a motive to lie.'

At the hearing on the motion the public defender urged that the prosecution had a duty 'to obtain' the desired records (apparently from the Bureau of Identification of the Department of Justice (hereafter called the bureau)), thereby indicating there was doubt as to the accuracy of his information regarding the agency that had the records. The prosecutor did not take any position as to whether the records, if any, were in his possession or control, nor did he clearly affirm or deny the existence of the records.

The motion was denied by respondent, which stated, 'I am denying your motion as to the felony record, if there is one, on the grounds that there is insufficient showing that there may be a felony record . . .. ( ) (A)s to the request for the arrest and detention records, it is not analogous to the situation in Engstrom (v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.3d 240, 97 Cal.Rptr. 484) . . ..' Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate, ² and we stayed the proceeding in respondent court pending final determination of this matter.

The Felony Conviction Record, If Any, Of Sillence

A motion for discovery by an accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery in the interests of justice. (See People v. Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 560--561, 21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 708, 312 P.2d 698; Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal.App.2d 132, 134, 10 Cal.Rptr. 890.) ³

It has been stated that the basis for granting pretrial discovery to a defendant is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial (see Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407; Powell v. Superior Court, Supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707, 709, 312 P.2d 698; Louisell/Wally, Modern California Discovery, Supra, pp. 881--882), and 'Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on the issues in the case, and In particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and As thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.' (Italics added; People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13; in accord, Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 59, 22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919; Powell v. Superior Court, Supra.)

An accused, however, is not entitled to inspect material as a matter of right without regard to the adverse effects of disclosure and without a prior showing of good cause. 'In criminal cases, the trial court retains wide discretion to protect against the disclosure of information which might unduly hamper the prosecution or violate some other legitimate governmental interest. (See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 246--247, 32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16 . . .; Powell v. Superior Court, Supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707--708, 312 P.2d 698.) Additionally, the court had discretion to deny discovery in the absence of a showing which specifies the material sought and furnishes a 'plausible justification' for inspection. (See Ballard v. Superior Court, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838; cf. Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 1113, 1118.)' (See Joe Z. v. Superior Court, Supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 804, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 598--599, 478 P.2d 26, 30--31.) "A showing, however, that the defendant cannot readily obtain the information through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information that might lead to the discovery of evidence, If it appears reasonable that such knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense . . ..' (Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery (1964), 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228, 244; italics added.)' (Ballard v. Superior Court, Supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 167, 49 Cal.Rptr. at p. 307, 410 P.2d at p. 843.)

Petitioner's showing specified the material sought, i.e., Sillence's 'felony conviction . . . records ('rap sheet').' Evidence Code section 788 provides: 'For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by The record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony' unless specified circumstances exist which do not appear to be present here. (Italics added.) Even if a 'rap sheet' is not 'the record of the judgment,' it could provide information that might lead to the discovery of that record.

Respondent's basis for denying the motion for discovery of Sillence's felony conviction record (i.e., that there was an insufficient showing of such a record) lacks merit. It is implicit in Cash v. Superior Court, Supra, 53 Cal.2d 72, 346 P.2d 407, that proof of the existence of the item sought is not required. (See also Louisell/Wally, Modern California Discovery, Supra, pp. 885--886.) A requirement of such proof would, in many cases, deny the accused the benefit of relevant and material evidence. (Cf. People v. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428.)

We turn next to whether petitioner could 'readily obtain the information through his own efforts.' (See Ballard v. Superior Court, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 307, 410 P.2d 838, 843.) The People make no claim that the public defender could have himself obtained the information regarding any felony conviction record of Sillence directly from the bureau or indirectly through the Attorney General. Penal Code section 11105 ⁴ requires the Attorney General to furnish to specified persons, upon application in accordance with that section, copies of summary criminal history information (commonly called 'rap sheets'), but public defenders are not among those specified except in certain circumstances not present here.

We note that section 11105 (see fn. 4) prohibits furnishing such information to persons other than those listed therein 'or as provided by law,' but that section does not prohibit discovery to an accused of another's criminal record where a showing has been made of a plausible justification for inspection. The People do not argue to the contrary, nor do the People argue that Penal Code section 11076 prohibits such discovery. ⁵

The People argue instead that good cause was not shown for inspection of any felony conviction record of Sillence because the defense gave no explanation why the information sought could not be obtained directly from Sillence. In support of their argument the People point to statements in Joe Z. v. Superior Court, Supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 806, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26, ⁶ but Joe Z. did not involve a felony conviction record or indicate that it is always necessary for a party seeking discovery to explain why the information sought could not be obtained directly from the person involved.

In our opinion petitioner was not required to give such an explanation. It cannot be assumed that a person will give accurate and complete information regarding any prior felony convictions he may have, and to require the defense to attempt to obtain from a prosecution witness information regarding any such convictions as a prerequisite to seeking discovery of information regarding them could have effects detrimental to the defense since such an attempt could antagonize the witness.

We conclude that the information sought could not...