Hill v. Tanner
| Decision Date | 05 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-369 |
| Parties | GLENN M. HILL v. ROBERT TANNER, WARDEN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
This matter was referred to this United States Magistrate Judge for the purpose of conducting a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and, as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review of the record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Therefore, for all of the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Petitioner, Glenn M. Hill, is a state prisoner incarcerated at the B.B. "Sixty" Rayburn Correctional Center, Angie, Louisiana. On February 18, 2009, he pleaded guilty to obscenity and aggravated burglary under Louisiana law. On the same date, he was sentenced to a term of three years on the obscenity conviction and to a concurrent term of twenty-five years on the aggravated burglary conviction, with both sentences to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.1 He did not appeal either his convictions or sentences.
On or about February 23, 2009, petitioner filed with the state district court a motion to correct illegal sentence.2 That motion was denied on March 10, 2009.3 However, on October 12, 2009, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal granted his related writ application and amended his sentences to delete the prohibition against parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.4
On or about February 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the state district court an application for post-conviction relief.5 That application was denied on July 16, 2010.6 His related writ applications were then denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on November 22, 2010,7 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on October 21, 2011.8
On or about April 1, 2011, petitioner filed with the state district court a motion for an out-of-time appeal, which was denied on April 26, 2011.9 His related writ applications werelikewise denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on August 29, 2011,10 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on May 25, 2012.11
In the interim, on or about May 13, 2011, petitioner filed with the state district court a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied on May 16, 2011.12 Petitioner's related writ applications were then also denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on August 29, 2011,13 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on May 18, 2012.14
While those state proceedings were still ongoing, petitioner filed the instant federal application for habeas corpus relief on January 30, 2012.15 The state filed a response conceding that the federal application is timely and that petitioner exhausted his remedies in the state courts.16 On June 6, 2012, upon the retirement of United States Magistrate Judge Louis Moore, this matter was transferred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the issuance of a Report and Recommendation.17
Petitioner filed two motions to amend the petition to add additional claims on or about May 24, 2012, and June 1, 2012.18 The state filed no opposition to the those motions. Because the additional claims lack merit, the state is not prejudiced if the proposed amendments are allowed. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the motions to amend be granted and relief denied for the reasons explained herein.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for pure questions of fact, pure questions of law, and mixed questions of both. The amendments "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
As to pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to be correct and a federal court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ( ).
As to pure questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision on the merits of such a claim unless that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Courts have held that the "'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses [of § 2254(d)(1)] have independent meaning." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
Regarding the "contrary to" clause, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [United States] Supreme Court's cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [United States] Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [United States] Supreme Court precedent.
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir.) (), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 294 (2010).
Regarding the "unreasonable application" clause, the United States Supreme Court has explained:
[A] state-court decision can involve an "unreasonable application" of this Court's clearly established precedent in two ways. First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. Second, a state-courtdecision also involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). The Supreme Court has noted that the focus of this inquiry "is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694; see also Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1537 (2012).
While the AEDPA standards of review are strict and narrow, they are purposely so. As the United States Supreme Court recently held:
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In his original petition for federal habeas corpus relief, petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict with his attorney, Douglas Brown.
The United States Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A petitioner seeking relief must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). A petitioner bears the burden of proof on such a claim and "must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel was ineffective." Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2000). If a court finds that a petitioner has made an insufficient showing as to either of the two prongs of inquiry, i.e. deficient performance or actual prejudice, it may dispose of the...
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