Hill v. United States, 68
Decision Date | 22 January 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 68,68 |
Citation | 368 U.S. 424,82 S.Ct. 468,7 L.Ed.2d 417 |
Parties | James Francis HILL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 369 U.S. 808, 82 S.Ct. 640.
Curtis R. Reitz, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.
Julia P. Cooper for respondent.
In 1954 a jury in a Federal District Court found the petitioner guilty of transporting a kidnapped person in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201, and of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. The petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel at his trial. When, with counsel, he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing, the petitioner was not asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf. The District Judge, after noting his familiarity with the petitioner's character and history, imposed consecutive prison sentences of twenty years and three years for the two offenses of which the jury had found the petitioner guilty. There was no appeal.1
The present litigation began in 1959 with the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. Among various grounds for relief asserted, the motion alleged that the petitioner at the time of sentencing had been 'denied the right under Rule 32(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 U.S.C. (18 U.S.C.A.) to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.' The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32(a) claim. 186 F.Supp. 441. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 282 F.2d 352. We granted certiorari 'limited to the question of whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32(a), 18 U.S.C.A. in the proceeding which he has now brought.' 365 U.S. 841, 81 S.Ct. 806, 5 L.Ed.2d 808.
Rule 32(a) in pertinent part provides: 'Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment' The meaning of this Rule was before the Court last Term in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670. Although there was no Court opinion in the Green case, eight members of the Court concurred in the view that Rule 32(a) requires a district judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his own behalf. There thus remains no doubt as to what the Rule commands. Moreover, the present record makes clear that this petitioner was not given an express opportunity to make a personal statement at the time he was sentenced. This case, therefore, is totally unembarrassed by any such factual controversy as divided the Court in Green. The only issue presented is whether a district court's failure explicitly to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement at the time of sentencing furnishes, without more, grounds for a successful collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence.2 We hold that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may file a motion in the 'court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.' The statute states four grounds upon which such relief may be claimed: (1) 'that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,' (2) 'that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,' (3) 'that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,' and (4) that the sentence 'is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'3
The circumstances which led Congress in 1948 to enact this legislation were reviewed in detail by Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232. It is unnecessary to review again here this legislative history, with which Chief Justice Vinson, as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States, was particularly familiar. Suffice it to say that it conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.4 See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (concurring opinion).
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S., at 219, 72 S.Ct., at 272. (Emphasis added.)5
The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present 'exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27, 59 S.Ct. 442, 446, 83 L.Ed. 455. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 79 L.Ed. 1566; Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302.
In Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982, the Court held that the remedy of habeas corpus was unavailable in circumstances far more compelling than are presented here. There the petitioners at their criminal trial had been denied an opportunity to present a defense which subsequent decisions of this Court had held should clearly have been available to them. What was said in that case is apposite here:
The petitioner James Hill brought this proceeding to vacate two sentences under which he is imprisoned in a federal penitentiary,...
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